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NRF Stichting Nationaal Rampenfonds (National 
Compensation Funds for Disasters) 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
SDRs Special Drawing Rights 
StVG Strassenverkehrsgesetz (Germany) (Traffic Code) 
TRIP Terrorism Reinsurance and Insurance Pool 
(Belgium) 
UmweltHG Umwelthaftungsgesetz (Germany) (Environmental 
Liability Act) 
USD United States Dollar 
WRR Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid 
(Netherlands Scientific Council for Government 
Policy) 
WTS Wet Tegemoetkoming Schade bij Rampen en 
Zware Ongevallen (Law for the Compensation of 
Damage in the Event of Catastrophes and Large 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the recent decade a lot of attention has been paid to the 
way in which victims of a variety of disasters would be 
financially compensated. Many legislators have been active by 
creating specific compensation mechanisms – although, in some 
countries, the compensation is not based on a structural statutory 
framework, but will rather be provided ad hoc if politicians 
consider the particular disaster to deserve ex post compensation. 
Various studies have also shown remarkable differences with 
respect to the financial compensation of victims of disasters, even 
between European countries.1 Notwithstanding the existence of a 
                                                          
 1  See, e.g., FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: 
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH (Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 
2006); VÉRONIQUE BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS: A 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH (2010). 
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European Solidarity Fund, differences between the European 
Member States remain large with respect to victim compensation 
mechanisms because of the lack of harmonisation in the area.2 
Various streams of literature stress the importance of 
adequate financial compensation to victims of disasters. Some 
have pointed at the fact that disasters can have a largely 
disruptive effect on societies. Providing adequate financial 
compensation to victims is therefore considered an important 
condition for restoring societal stability after a disaster. Other 
literature, such as literature which adopts the economic approach 
to law, points at the relationship between ex post compensation 
and ex ante prevention. That literature stresses the fact that 
particular ex post compensation mechanisms, more particularly 
ad hoc compensation provided by the government, may have 
negative effects on the ex ante incentives of victims to invest in 
prevention.3 A careful institutional design of the ex post 
compensation mechanisms is therefore not only of importance to 
restore social stability after a disaster, but also to bolster disaster 
risk reduction.4 
It is against this background that we will comparatively 
analyze financial compensation mechanisms in four countries. 
From the outset, it should be made clear that disasters can lead to 
pecuniary losses (like income loss, property loss etc.) and non-
pecuniary losses. Additionally, remedies may either be of a 
financial nature (e.g. financial compensation) or of a non-
monetary nature (e.g. restoration in-kind, excuses, or other types 
of relief). For reasons of simplicity in this study we do not 
distinguish between different heads of damages, and we merely 
focus on financial compensation for victims of catastrophes.5 
The Netherlands is used as a point of reference because 
various studies have shown that the country’s financial 
                                                          
 2  A Green Paper on the Insurance of Natural and Man-Made Disasters 
was published by the European Union in 2013, asking the question whether or 
not action at EU level could be appropriate or warranted to improve the 
market for disaster insurance in the European Union. See Green Paper on the 
Insurance of Natural and Man-made Disasters, COM (2013) 0213 final (Apr. 
16, 2013). A consultation on the Green Paper was launched in the Spring of 
2013. 
 3  E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks, 
12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 287 (1996); Louis Kaplow, Incentives and 
Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 167 (1991). 
 4  See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Michael G. Faure, The Economics of 
Disaster Relief, 37 LAW & POL’Y 180 (2015). 
 5  See Faure & Hartlief, supra note 1. Where this was equally the case and 
on which this study builds further. 
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compensation mechanism reveals a shortage with respect to 
adequate compensation for disaster victims in comparison to the 
neighbouring countries: Belgium, France, and Germany.6 This 
Article focuses on Belgium, France, and Germany because of 
each country’s proximity to the Netherlands and differences 
between each country’s legislative initiatives to address financial 
compensation of disaster victims. With respect to legislative 
changes, Belgium and France have moved towards a system with 
a structural focus on financial compensation of disaster victims. 
Despite debate in Germany, legislative changes have not resulted 
in a move towards a system with more structural financial 
compensation. 
This Article first provides an overview of the financial 
compensation regimes in Belgium, France, and Germany and a 
discussion of the situation in the Netherlands, which is intended 
to indicate where the compensation in the Netherlands shows a 
particular gap. This Article will identify whether there is a 
particular statutory structural solution, thereby distinguishing 
between insurance-based solutions and others. The discussion of 
the systems in Belgium, France, and Germany is also used to 
indicate where the Netherlands could learn from examples 
abroad, but also to show that in some countries, such as 
Germany, similar problems as in the Netherlands may arise. 
As far as the scope of this study is concerned, this Article 
will focus on four types of disasters. The first type of disasters are 
natural disasters (e.g. flooding, hurricanes, earthquakes). 
Technological or man-made disasters constitute the second type 
of disasters. For example, an explosion in a chemical factory 
which causes large-scale damages would be rendered a 
technological or man-made disaster. The distinction between the 
two types of disasters is important from a liability standpoint. In 
contrast to certain natural disasters, a liable injurer can be 
identified in a technological or man-made disaster which may 
result in the application of liability rules and liability insurance. 
However, some literature points at the fact that the boundaries 
between natural and man-made disasters have become 
increasingly blurred. After all, some natural events turn into 
disasters as a result of the intervention of man. From a legal 
perspective, escalation in the severity of a natural event resulting 
                                                          
 6  See, e.g., Véronique Bruggeman, Michael G. Faure & Tobias Heldt, 
Insurance Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance 
Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185 (2011); 
Ton Hartlief & Michael G. Faure, Vergoeding van schade bij rampen in België 
en Nederland, 52 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR PRIVAATRECHT [TPR] 991 (2015) (Belg.). 
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from an intervention by man does not necessarily enable the 
application of liability rules to natural disasters. In fact, the only 
party who could be subject to liability rules in the case of natural 
disasters would be the government, and many legal systems still 
have higher thresholds or immunities for public authority 
liability. In addition to a general discussion of natural and 
technological disasters, this Article will briefly focus on two more 
specific types of disasters: nuclear accidents and terrorism. The 
focus on the nuclear disasters will be relatively brief as all four 
countries are signatories to the Convention on third party liability 
in the field of nuclear energy of 29 July 1960 and related 
international treaties.7 However, the way in which these 
Conventions have been implemented in the four countries and 
the amounts of compensation differ. After the occurrence of 
terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and 
Germany created specific arrangements for the insurance of 
terrorism-related damage in their respective countries. A brief 
discussion of those mechanisms is equally interesting as these 
show that relatively high amounts of compensation can be 
provided through a so-called public-private partnership whereby 
the government intervenes as reinsurer of last resort via a pool 
construction. 
Of course, in addition to those four specific types of 
disasters, it is easy to imagine other types of catastrophes with the 
potential of creating societal disruption, such as large food 
poisoning outbreaks or cyber security-related risks. However, 
disasters of the aforementioned type are outside the scope of this 
Article. This is due to the fact that cyber risks are very peculiar 
and unique. The main difference between cyber attacks and the 
man-made disasters discussed in this Article is that cyber attacks 
lack catastrophic losses with respect to the amount of personal 
injury stemming from such attack. Moreover, the way in which 
one could deal with financial losses due to cyber security would 
also require a separate treatment. Cyber attacks are on the one 
hand man-made; and on the other hand (and in that sense they 
resemble terrorism) the detection rate is very low as a result of 
which the mechanisms proposed here to address man-made 
disasters cannot automatically be transposed to the case of cyber 
security. In that sense the losses resulting from cyber attacks are 
                                                          
 7  The Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Paris Convention] 
constitutes a framework for the financial compensation for victims of nuclear 
accidents. The Paris Convention was amended by the Additional Protocol of 
28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982. 
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to some extent more comparable to losses resulting from natural 
catastrophes. However, the possibilities for potential victims to 
take preventive measures with respect to cyber attacks are much 
more pronounced than with losses resulting from natural 
disasters. Moreover, the primary demand in cases of cyber 
attacks is often increased cyber security. A cyber attack does not 
always necessarily lead to a demand for compensation of specific 
financial losses. There have been steps towards the application of 
some of the instruments discussed in this Article, such as cyber 
insurance and risk-sharing agreements, to the case of cyber 
security as well.8 Due to the idiosyncrasies of particularities of 
cyber security, an examination into cyber attacks deserves 
separate treatment.  As a result, the concluding chapter (VII) of 
this Article indicates the possible expansion of this study to the 
case of cyber security as one possible avenue for future research. 
As far as the method for this Article is concerned, this 
analysis builds on comparative research9 from 2006 in which the 
financial compensation for victims of catastrophes was sketched 
from a comparative legal perspective. That study equally 
discussed the four countries central to this study. However, that 
study is more than ten years old, and several evolutions have 
taken place in the countries under discussion that need to be 
taken into account. The four countries under review in this 
Article have also been analyzed in the earlier (2006) study. To 
some extent, and in order to provide a consistent picture of the 
situation in the particular legal system, a summary will be 
provided of the results of the 2006 study. However, to the extent 
that important changes took place, an update will be provided. 
The update will not only concern new evolutions in legislation or 
policy, but also the application of specific policy tools to new 
disasters. This Article is also based on other research executed in 
this domain. The research will also build further on the doctoral 
dissertation by Véronique Bruggeman from 2010.10 Bruggeman 
equally addresses France and Belgium, and that can undoubtedly 
be a useful starting point. More recently, Faure and Hartlief have 
compared the financial compensation for victims of catastrophes 
in Belgium and the Netherlands, and Faure has analyzed the 
liability and compensation mechanisms as tools to reduce disaster 
risks.11 All those studies will be a point of reference and starting 
                                                          
 8  See Michael G. Faure & Bernold Nieuwesteeg, Law and Economics of 
Cyber Security Risk Pooling, 14(3) N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 923-963 (2018). 
 9  Faure & Hartlief, supra note 1. 
 10  BRUGGEMAN, supra note 1. 
 11  See Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6; see also M.G. Faure, In the 
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point for the current study. 
Two approaches will be leading as methods for this 
Article. On the one hand, the economic approach to law will be 
employed. In literature utilizing the economic approach to law, 
emphasis has been placed on compensation for victims of 
catastrophes and the effects of various ex post compensation 
mechanisms on ex ante incentives for disaster risk reduction.12 
Literature utilizing law and economics provides the advantage of 
viewing the subject with an effectiveness analysis. The method 
can be employed to analyze the extent to which a particular goal, 
such as adequate13 financial compensation of victims and/or ex 
ante disaster risk reduction, can be achieved through a specific 
institutional design. Without repeating the findings of this law 
and economics literature, the main results can be summarized as 
follows: 1) the ex post compensation mechanism should be shaped 
in such a manner that effective14 ex ante incentives for prevention 
are provided as ex post recovery that will affect ex ante 
prevention;15 2) ex post ad hoc government compensation will not 
provide effective ex ante incentives for prevention and may dilute 
incentives to purchase insurance;16 3) insurance is better able to 
provide ex ante incentives for prevention via effective risk 
differentiation;17 4) given systemic underestimation of the 
catastrophic risk by potential victims,18 mandatory 
comprehensive cover can improve both ex ante prevention and ex 
post compensation;19 5) the supply of catastrophe cover can be 
stimulated through the government by acting as reinsurer of last 
                                                          
Aftermath of the Disaster: Liability and Compensation Mechanisms as Tools 
to Reduce Disaster Risks, STAN.J.INT’L J. 52, 95-178 (2016).  
 12  See, e.g., Michael G. Faure, Financial Compensation for Victims of 
Catastrophes: A Law and Economics Perspective, 29 LAW & POL’Y 339 (2007). 
 13  ‘Adequate’ suggests that the financial compensation is large enough to 
reimburse the victims’ losses. 
 14  ‘Effective’ means “adequate to accomplish a purpose; producing the 
intended or expected result”. It should be noted that this study does not deal 
with efficiency considerations. In other words, we are not explicitly looking at 
whether the financial compensation mechanisms perform in the best possible 
manner with the least waste of time and effort. 
 15  Dari-Mattiacci & Faure, supra note 4. 
 16  Epstein, supra note 3; Kaplow, supra note 3. 
 17  George L. Priest, The Government, the Market and the Problem of 
Catastrophic Loss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219 (1996). 
 18  Paul Slovic, Howard Kunreuther & Gilbert F. White, Decision 
Processes, Rationality and Adjustments to National Hazards, in THE 
PERCEPTION OF RISK 1 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000). 
 19  Howard Kunreuther, The Case for Comprehensive Disaster Insurance, 
11 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1968). 
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resort;20 and 6) especially in developing countries, affordability of 
the insurance premium should be stimulated through a voucher 
system that still reflects risk and incentivizes potential victims to 
adopt risk-reducing measures.21 
On the other hand, the functional comparative method 
will be employed to analyze the extent to which the two main 
goals of an adequate financial compensation system can be 
reached, more particularly: 1) adequate financial compensation to 
victims ex post, and 2) providing ex ante incentives for disaster 
risk reduction. In alphabetical order, the study sketches the 
financial compensation system in Belgium (II), France (III), and 
Germany (IV) in order to finally discuss the Netherlands (V). In 
this respect, not only is the current system outlined, but also the 
historical evolution as well as the reasons for recent legislative 
changes. Of course, not all of the legal details of the system are 
described; only those that are crucial from the perspective of this 
study (law and economics methodology).22 Thus this Article 
focuses mainly on the financing of the system (whether it is 
private or public), the financial compensation provided, the 
involvement of the government, and the matter of whether the 
system offers incentives for prevention (via risk differentiation in 
the financing of the compensation or otherwise). However, the 
general question of whether and to what extent private insurance 
results in better compensation than public catastrophe funds does 
not form part of this Article.23  This is an issue that has been 
extensively dealt with in law and economics literature. The goal 
of this Article is to take the aforementioned literature as one of 
the starting points of the study and to engage in an institutional 
comparative analysis. The critical comparison will specifically 
examine to what extent the situation in the Netherlands shows 
particular gaps in comparison with the other countries (VI). 
                                                          
 20  Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, supra note 6. 
 21  Howard Kunreuther, Catastrophe Insurance: Challenges for the US 
and Asia, in ASIAN CATASTROPHE INSURANCE 3 (Charles Scawthorn & Kiyoshi 
Kobayashi eds., 2008). 
 22  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007). 
 23  See generally Alfred Endres, Cornelia Ohl & Bianca Rundshagen, Land 
unter! Ein institutionenökonomischer Zwischenruf, 29 LIST FORUM FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND FINANZPOLITIK 284 (2003)(Ger.); Christian Gollier, Some 
Aspects of the Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance, in CATASTROPHIC 
RISKS AND INSURANCE, 13 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development ed., 2005). 
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II. BELGIUM 
A. Natural Disasters 
1. Introduction 
The types of natural catastrophes to which Belgium is 
exposed are relatively limited. The most extensive damage is 
normally caused by storms, heavy rainfall, and flooding (as 
Belgium has many surface waters). An exceptional earthquake – 
there  have been instances in the province of Limburg – is also a 
possibility. Moreover, various studies on the potential 
consequences of climate change, as listed in IPCC24 (2007), make 
clear that Belgium is potentially exposed to increasingly severe 
natural catastrophes. 
While Belgium is exposed to a number of natural hazards, 
there have been few significant catastrophic losses in the past few 
years. Nevertheless, as regards the flooding risk in Flanders, the 
Administration for Environment, Nature, Land and Water 
Management (AMINAL) of the Ministry of the Flemish Region 
calculated that 72,000 hectares, or five percent of the territory of 
the Flemish Region, could be demarcated as flood-prone. With 
respect to the flood-prone territory, 6,166 hectares are situated in 
residential zones. Therefore, based on an average surface of 784 
square meters per property, between 60,000 and 80,000 residences 
are represented.25 
Until 2003 Belgium only had a patchwork of regulations 
directly or indirectly applicable to victims of natural catastrophes 
searching for full financial compensation. Indeed, tort law, 
                                                          
 24  IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (Contribution of 
Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), Geneva, 104 pp. 
 25  Wetsontwerp tot wijziging, wat de verzekering tegen natuurrampen 
betreft, van de wet van 25 juni 1992 op de landverzekeringsovereenkomst en 
de wet van 12 juli 1976 betreffende het herstel van zekere schade veroorzaakt 
aan private goederen door natuurrampen [Proposal of an Act amending, as far 
as the insurance against natural disasters is concerned, the Act of 25 June 1992 
on the land insurance contract and the Act of 12 July 1976 on the restoration of 
certain damage caused to private property by natural disasters], <Explanatory 
Memorandum, Parliamentary Proceedings of the Chamber of Representatives 
2004-2005, no. 1732/001, p. 7 (Belg.). These figures have been largely 
confirmed in the Milieurapport Vlaanderen, see Vlaamse Milieu Maatschappij 
[FLEMISH ENVIRONMENT AGENCY], OVERSTROMINGSRISICO (Nov. 2015), 
https://www.milieurapport.be/milieuthemas/waterkwantiteit/afvoer-van-
neerslag-overstromingen/overstromingsrisico. 
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insurance law, various branches of social security law, and 
general solidarity needed to be cumulated to achieve financial 
compensation.26 Theoretically, victims could call on liability law 
to seek full compensation. However, tort law can apply only 
when a liable tortfeasor can be found, which will rarely be the 
case after a natural catastrophe. Hence, the victim will have to 
rely on other sources of financial compensation. Yet, most of the 
existing legislation from the other branches of law granted only 
partial compensation, and the satisfaction of conditional elements 
and the duration of procedures pose significant challenges to 
obtaining financial compensation. This situation changed 
drastically in 2005 when new legislation on financial 
compensation of victims of natural catastrophes was approved. 
2. Evolution of Insurance Coverage 
a. Creation of the Disaster Fund 
After a whirlwind caused considerable damage in January 
1976 to some parts of Belgium, the Council of Ministers decided 
to implement basic legislation allowing for the reparation of 
damage to private property due to natural disasters. The Act of 
12 July 1976 on the Repair of Certain Damage Caused to Private 
Goods by Natural Disasters27 installed a so-called Disaster Fund 
as a part of the National Cash Registry for Disaster Damage.28 
Pursuant to Art. 37 of the Act of 12 July 1976, the Disaster Fund 
is financed in the aftermath of a natural catastrophe by advances 
from the Treasury, loans and, where necessary, allocations drawn 
from the State budget, gifts, legacies, and profits from the 
National Lottery. The Federal Disaster Fund used to 
compensate, in instalments, for direct material damage caused by 
such a natural disaster, up to the amount of EUR 64,800, while a 
deductible of EUR 250 was applied – on the condition that the 
total direct damage to private goods amounted to at least EUR 
1,250,000 and the average damage amounted to at least EUR 
                                                          
 26  Kristiaan Bernauw, De verzekering van natuurrampen, TIJDSCHRIFT 
VOOR VERZEKERINGEN = BULLETIN DES ASSURANCES (ED. BILINGUE) 153 
(Belg.) (2006). 
 27  Wet van 12 juli 1976 betreffende het herstel van zekere schade 
veroorzaakt aan private goederen door natuurrampen [Act of 12 July 1976 on 
the Repair of Certain Damage Caused to Private Goods by Natural Disasters] 
of July 12, 1976, Belgisch Staatblad [B.S.] 13-08-1976 (Belgium). 
 28  Following the regionalization of the Federal Disaster Fund in the sixth 
State reform, the regions have competence in this matter for disasters that 
occurred after 1 July 2014. 
270 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 31:2 
5,000 per family. The Act of 12 July 1976 permits full financial 
compensation only if the granted money is used for restoration or 
construction works within the following three years. 
The Disaster Fund cannot be considered a great success 
since citizens must wait a considerable amount of time before 
receiving financial compensation for damage, the government 
must recognize the event as a natural disaster,29 and the 
application procedure is very complex.30 Moreover, financial 
compensation is granted only up to a certain amount and 
determined in accordance with statutory criteria that lack a 
consideration of real damage.31 Furthermore, the area of 
application of the Act of 1976 is specified narrowly and the 
damage arising from risks that under normal circumstances 
would be covered by insurance policies, such as fire, lightning, 
explosions, hail or storm, is excluded a priori from financial 
compensation. Finally, the legislature opted for a system whereby 
the financing mechanism only becomes operative from the 
moment a catastrophe occurs. 
b. Insurance Solution for Fire 
Since the Disaster Fund is financed by general taxpayers 
in accordance with the notion of solidarity, the Government of 
Belgium searched for other ways to provide financial 
compensation for natural catastrophes, such as calling on the 
insurance industry. The promulgation of the Royal Decree of 24 
December 1992 on the Insurance against Fire and other Dangers 
as concerns the Simple Risks was a first, albeit small, step 
forward. This Royal Decree is applicable to those insurance 
                                                          
 29  Recognition of an event as a disaster is a political decision, in which 
other more than purely technical motives also play a role. Nevertheless, to be 
declared a natural disaster, the phenomenon needs to have an exceptional 
character and have caused considerable damage. The criteria are as follows: 
total damage must amount to at least EUR 1,239,467.60; average damage must 
amount to at least EUR 5,577.60 per family; and the phenomenon must have a 
retain period of a maximum of once every twenty years. See: Ministeriële 
omzendbrief van 30 november 2001 betreffende de toepassing van de wet van 
12 juli 1976 betreffende het herstel van zekere schade veroorzaakt aan private 
goederen door natuurrampen [Ministerial Circular of 30 November 2001 on 
the Application of the Act of 12 July 1976 on the Repair of Certain Damage 
Caused to Private Goods by Natural Disasters – new norms on the recognition 
as natural disaster]. 
 30  Isabelle C. Durant, Belgium, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR 
VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH, supra note 1, 
at 37, 72-73. 
 31  Bernauw, supra note 26, at 155-157. 
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agreements in which simple risks32 are insured against damage 
due to: 1) fire and related dangers (such as a lightning strike, 
explosion, implosion, and contact with an aircraft, vehicle or 
animal); 2) electricity; 3) attacks and labour conflicts; 4) storm, 
hail, ice and snow pressure; 5) natural disasters; 6) water; 7) 
broken windows; 8) theft; 9) indirect losses; and 10) industrial 
damage for which daily compensation is guaranteed. 
c. Insurance Solution for Storm Coverage33 
Although damage caused by storms in principle could be 
(partially) covered by most fire insurance policies, the Disaster 
Fund did pay out EUR 15,284,632 of compensation after 
windstorm Daria hit the country in 1990. Consequently, the Fund 
was not able to build up a financial reserve, and the former 
Minister of Economic Affairs, Willy Claes, proposed in 1990 and 
in 1992 to transfer the task of the Disaster Fund to the private 
insurance sector.34 This is one of the reasons why the Royal 
                                                          
 32  Fire insurance coverage for simple risks relates to: 1) every good or 
entity of goods of which the insured value does not add up to more than EUR 
743,680.57; and 2) each of the following goods for which the insured value is 
below EUR 23.921.725,24: a. offices and houses, including apartments or office 
buildings as far as the surface used for commercial purposes does not amount 
to more than twenty percent of the total surface of all the floors; b. 
agricultural, garden and viniculture companies, fruit and cattle-breeding 
companies; c. places used for the exercise of professions, with the exception of 
pharmacies; d. places used for religious events, such as for masses, abbeys and 
cloisters; e. places used for cultural, social and philosophical activities; f. 
buildings used for education, with the exception of higher education; g. music 
conservatories, museums and libraries; h. installations that are exclusively 
used for sport activities; and i. institutes for medical treatment, sanatoria, 
hospitals, clinics and rest homes. The mentioned amounts are coupled to the 
ABEX (Association Belge des Experts)-index, with a basic index of 375. 
Koninklijk besluit van 24 december 1992 betreffende de verzekering tegen 
brand en andere gevaren wat de eenvoudige risico’s betreft [Royal Decree of 
24 December 1992 concerning the insurance against fire and other hazards 
with regard to the simple risks] of Dec. 24, 1992, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD 
[B.S.], 31-12-1992, Art. 5 (Belg.). 
 33  Koninklijk besluit van 16 januari 1995 tot wijziging van het koninklijk 
besluit van 24 december 1992 betreffende de verzekering tegen brand en 
andere gevaren wat de eenvoudige risico’s betreft [Royal Decree of 16 January 
1995 amending the Royal Decree of 24 December 1992 on insurance against 
fire and other hazards with regard to the simple risks] of January 16, 1995, 
BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.], 11-04-1995 (Belg.). 
 34  Luc Nijs, Wateroverlast en de rol van de verzekeringswereld, in Ruimte 
voor water, de beste verzekering tegen wateroverlast, Brussels, AMINAL & 
KBC, 15 May 2001. 
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Decree of 16 January 1995 established that ‘storm coverage’ – 
which legally comprises hail, ice and snow pressure – would be 
an obligatory extension of every fire insurance policy that 
concerns simple risks.35 The legal rule is now based on the 
principle that property will be mandatorily insured against 
storms that have a wind speed of no less than 100 kilometres per 
hour. Furthermore, the Royal Decree foresees a minimum level of 
coverage and authorises the exclusion of those goods that are 
highly vulnerable to the storm risk (such as light or easily 
movable constructions, open buildings and bell towers). 
d. Mandatory Extension for Flood Risks 
The Act of 21 May 2003, modifying the Act of 25 June 
1992 on the Land Insurance Agreement, and the Act of 12 July 
1976 on the Repair of Certain Damage Caused to Private Goods 
by Natural Disasters, in turn introduced flood coverage as a 
mandatory extension to the fire insurance policies concerning 
simple risks (in the same way as storm coverage had been 
introduced in 1995).36 This mandatory extension only applies, 
however, to property situated in flood-prone areas (an optimal 
extension is available for property outside this risk area), which 
had to be demarcated by the country’s three Regions. As a result, 
the Disaster Fund no longer needs to intervene since flood risk is 
insured or at least insurable. The Act of 1976, though, continues 
to exist for those events and property not included in the Act of 
2003, namely for those goods that are not insured because of the 
low financial capabilities of the victim, and for agricultural 
damage. In addition, the Act of 2003 foresees the creation of an 
Office of Tariffication, providing insurance to those who do not 
have any coverage because either no agent is willing to cover the 
risk or the requested premium is too high. 
                                                          
 35  Explanatory Memorandum, Parliamentary Proceedings of the Chamber 
of Representatives 2004-2005, no. 1732/001. 
 36  Kurt Termote, Naar een verplichte dekking van natuurrampen?, 375 
BALANS 6 (1998) (Belg.); Kurt Termote, Natuurrampen: nieuwe poging tot 
regeling, 423 BALANS 4 (2000); Kurt Termote, Verplichte 
overstroningsverzekering: niet voor iedereen, 473 BALANS 5 (2003); Caroline 
Van Schoubroeck, The quest for private insurance for damage caused by 
natural disasters: a Belgian case, 6 J. BUS. L. 558 (2003); Chris Celis & Miek de 
Graeve, De overstromingsverzekering: een slag in het water?, 2006 
TIJDSCHRIFT VERKOOP VASTGOED [TVV] 529 (Belg.). 
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e. Mandatory add on to fire insurance37 
The Act of 21 May 2003 did not enter into force, however, 
mainly due to difficulties with the demarcation of the flood-prone 
areas.38 In addition, the Ministerial Council decided on 23 
January 2004 to consolidate the loan that it had granted to the 
Disaster Fund.39 The Belgian State then argued that it would be 
better off if a new act transferred coverage of natural disasters to 
the insurance sector. Therefore, the Act of 2003 was amended by 
the Act of 17 September 2005, building on the former legal 
provisions.40 
The Belgian legislature created general solidarity between 
all citizens who buy fire insurance for the so-called simple risks – 
comprising 90-95 percent of the Belgian population – by 
introducing a mandatory extension to natural disaster coverage. 
The latter consists of four perils: flooding (referring to water that 
comes from below); earthquakes; the flowing over or the 
impoundment of public sewers; and a landslide or subsidence. 
Fire insurance for simple risks and coverage for natural 
catastrophes are bound up inextricably, meaning that if the fire 
insurer refuses to offer coverage for natural disasters, he cannot 
offer any longer fire insurance itself.41 The extra insurance 
                                                          
 37  Wet van 17 september 2005 tot wijziging wat de verzekering tegen 
natuurrampen betreft, van de wet van 25 juni 1992 op de 
landverzekeringsovereenkomst en de wet van 12 juli 1976 betreffende het 
herstel van zekere schade veroorzaakt aan private goederen door 
natuurrampen [Act of 17 September 2005 amending as regards insurance 
against natural disasters, the Act of 25 June 1992 on the land insurance 
contract and the Act of 12 July 1976 on the restoration of certain damage 
caused to private property by natural disasters] of September 17, 2005, 
BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.], 11-10-2005 (Belg.). 
 38  Philippe Colle, De wet van 17 september 2005 betreffende de 
verzekering van natuurrampen, 69 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD [RW], nr. 23, 
2005-2006, at 881 (Belg.). 
 39  Chamber of Representatives, 25 April 2005, Bill on the Amendment, as 
concerns the Insurance Against Natural Disasters, of the Act of 25 June 1992 
on the Land Insurance Agreement and the Act of 12 July 1976 on the Repair of 
Certain Damage Caused to Private Goods by Natural Disasters, DOC 51 
1732/001, 2004-5, p. 14.  
 40  See Act of 17 September 2005: Assuralia, De natuurrampendekking, 
ASSURINFO, Oct. 19, 2005 (Belg.); Colle, supra note 38; Bernauw, supra note 
26; Marc de Graeve, De natuurrampenverzekering; de kogel is eindelijk door 
de kerk, VOL TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WETGEVING [T.V.W.] 81 (Belg.); Kurt 
Termote, Natuurrampenverzekering: sinds 1 maart in voege, 538 BALANS 5 
(2006). 
 41  The fire insurer is entitled nevertheless to refuse insurance of flooding 
in the event that (part of) the building was constructed more than eighteen 
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premium will be adjusted to every individual case accordingly 
and one can expect it to be between EUR 3-4 per EUR 25,000 
insured. The maximum indexed deductible for disaster coverage 
amounts to EUR 610 per claim. 
This way, at least all direct damage to the insured 
property caused by a natural catastrophe or by an insured peril 
that results directly from it (notably fire, explosion, or implosion) 
is compensated. Additionally, damage to the insured property due 
to measures taken by a legally constituted authority to safeguard 
and protect goods and persons as well as the clearance and 
demolition expenses associated with reconstruction of the 
property is compensated. Potential accommodation costs 
occurred during the three months following the catastrophe (if the 
dwelling became inhabitable) can also be reimbursed. Non-
gathered crops, soil, objects located outside of the building (unless 
if they are permanently attached), easily movable constructions, 
garden houses and vehicles, among other things, are excluded 
from retribution, unless otherwise stipulated. 
Furthermore, each insurer has been given some limits 
regarding the monetary burden he should bear, since disaster 
coverage concerns catastrophic risks that can reach extraordinary 
proportions – the ratio legis being to avoid the financial downfall 
of the insurance companies. Indeed, a limit per insurance 
company (instead of a global limit for the insurance market) has 
the advantage that the insurer can calculate precisely the 
maximum risks he is taking,  and thus find reinsurance more 
easily (Art. 68-8 paragraph 2, Act of 25 June 1992 on the Land 
Insurance Agreement). When this limit is attained, the National 
Cash Registry for Disaster Damage intervenes with a general 
upper limit of EUR 280 million (EUR 700 million for 
earthquakes) per event (Art. 34-2, 1° and 34-3 of the Act of 12 
July 1976). If these amounts are not sufficient to compensate the 
victims fully, the intervention of the Cash Registry will be 
reduced in proportion. 
These limits seem adequate to compensate for most losses, 
especially considering the fact that granted compensations for the 
three most destructive natural catastrophes that have hit Belgium 
since 1976 until 200542  amounted to EUR 74.7 million, EUR 42 
                                                          
months after the publication in the Belgian Gazette of the Royal Decree that 
classifies the building as being in a flood-prone area. The ratio legis of this 
exception lies in the empowerment of, on the one hand, the local 
administrations not to grant building licences, and, on the other hand, the 
owners who know that they reside in a risk area. 
 42  In particular the storms of 25-26 January 1990, the earthquake of 8 
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million, and EUR 38.125 million, respectively.43 
In addition, the 2005 Act has set up an Office of 
Tariffication. The insurance sector has calculated that between 
three and four percent of the insured risks for fire damage are in 
fact uninsurable for flooding and that approximately eight 
percent of those insured against fire, coverage will see a doubling 
of the premium. It is for these uninsurable flooding risks that the 
Office of Tariffication will specify the premium conditions. 
To conclude, the Act of 17 September 2005 allows victims 
of natural catastrophes to direct themselves to their fire insurer 
(as long as their damage relates to the simple risks in the sense of 
the fire insurance) without recourse to the Disaster Fund, which 
is advantageous for both the victims and the Belgian State.44 As 
far as the victim is concerned, the long and often complicated 
administrative procedure associated with the Disaster Fund is 
avoided. The damaging natural peril no longer needs to be 
declared a natural catastrophe by the Ministerial Council. As for 
the Belgian State, the main burden of compensating the victims 
of natural catastrophes is now borne by the insurers. The Disaster 
Fund only intervenes if the limit of the individual insurance 
company has been reached and if the damaged property is not 
insured due to the financial position of the victim. 
                                                          
November 1983 at Liège/Luik, and the abundant rains of 13-15 September 
1998. 
 43  Explanatory Memorandum, Chamber of Representatives 2004-5, no. 
1732/001, p. 15. The actual losses and needs for compensation can be much 
higher than the tens of millions of euros mentioned in the Belgian parliament. 
First, the numbers that are given are not corrected for inflation and current 
risks may be higher due to ongoing population growth and accumulation of 
capital. Second, historic losses over the short period of existence of the Belgian 
Fund (approximately 25 years) are likely to be lower than the probable 
maximum losses that can be estimated using loss models. Hence, flooding in 
Belgium can inflict more damage than the amounts mentioned in the Belgian 
parliament. For an overview of all disasters hitting the Belgian continent 
between 1993 and 2012, see SERVICE PUBLIC FÉDÉRAL INTÉRIEUR, 
DIRECTION DES CALAMITES, ÉTUDE STATISTIQUE DES CALAMITÉS DEPUIS 
1993 (2013), 
https://ibz.be/sites/default/files/media/docs/etude_statistique_des_calamitsdepu
is_1993_version_2013septembre.pdf. The top 10 natural disasters in Belgium 
is available at http://emdat.be/. 
 44  Colle, supra note 38, at 885. 
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f. New Legislation45 
The Act of 4 April 2014 repeals most of the provisions of 
the 1992 Insurance Act. However, all relevant articles related to 
the insurance against natural disasters as concerns the simple 
risks have been literally taken over in the new Act of 2014. 
g. Separate Solution in the Flemish Region46 
Following the sixth State reform (via the Special Act of 6 
January 2014), the three Regions in Belgium have been attributed 
the competence of legislating and implementing the financial 
compensation in response to damage caused by disasters, and this 
from 1 July 2014 onwards. Consequently, Flanders promulgated 
the Decree of 3 June 2016 regarding the Compensation for 
Damage caused by General Disasters in the Flemish Region. This 
decree unites the principles of compensation, reimbursement 
procedures and financing methods for damage suffered by 
general disasters on the territory of the Flemish Region. It builds 
on the basics of the Act of 12 July 1976 – which it repeals, while it 
also strives for administrative simplification and an update of the 
reimbursement process.47 The Decree of 3 June 2016 has been 
further implemented by the Decision of the Flemish Government 
of 23 December 2016.48 
                                                          
 45  Wet van 4 april 2014 betreffende de verzekeringen [Act of 4 April 2014 
on insurance] of April 4, 2014, B.S. 30-04-2014 (Belg.) 
 46  Decreet van 3 juni 2016 betreffende de tegemoetkoming voor schade, 
aangericht door algemene rampen in het Vlaamse Gewest [Decree of 3 June 
2016 concerning the compensation for damage caused by general disasters in 
the Flemish Region] of June 3, 2016, B.S. 23-06-2016 (Belg.). Similar legislative 
measures have been promulgated in the Walloon Region, see 
Programmadecreet houdende verschillende maatregelen betreffende de 
begroting inzake natuurrampen, verkeersveiligheid, openbare werken, energie, 
huisvesting, leefmilieu, ruimtelijke ordening, dierenwelzijn, landbouw en 
fiscaliteit [Program Decree of 12 December 2014, which establishes the Fonds 
Wallon des Calamités naturelles] of Dec. 12, 2014, B.S. 29-12-2014 (Belg.). 
 47  Ontwerp van decreet betreffende de tegemoetkoming voor schade, 
aangericht door algemene rampen in het Vlaamse Gewest, Explanatory 
Memorandum, 695 (2015-2016) – Nr. 1, page 3, available at 
https://docs.vlaamsparlement.be/docs/stukken/2015-2016/g695-1.pdf. 
 48  Besluit van 23 december 2016 van de Vlaamse Regering tot uitvoering 
van het decreet van 3 juni 2016 betreffende de tegemoetkoming voor schade, 
aangericht door algemene rampen in het Vlaamse Gewest [Decree of 23 
December 2016 of the Flemish Government implementing the Decree of 3 June 
2016 regarding the compensation for damage caused by general disasters in the 
Flemish Region] of December 23, 2016, B.S. 13-02-2017 (Belg.) 
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In Flanders, exceptional natural phenomena that meet a 
particular financial criterion (i.e. damage to private and public 
goods exceeding EUR 30 million) can be recognized as a “general 
disaster”. As a result victims can turn to the Flemish Disaster 
Fund.49 The same is the case if the aforementioned financial 
criterion is not met, but if other specific scientific criteria are 
fulfilled. The specific criteria, laid down in the Decision of 23 
December 2016, are based on the return period of a disaster or on 
a determined scientific scale. 
In order to determine the geographical extent of the 
general disaster, the municipalities receive up to 60 days after the 
exceptional natural phenomenon to request that their territory is 
included in the geographical demarcation area of the general 
disaster. This period for applying for recognition to the Flemish 
Government is being restricted in comparison with the 1976 Act 
and fits in with the overall goal to accelerate the procedure. 
Contrary to the 1976 Act, this decree considers the fire 
insurance coverage for simple risks: the physical goods which can 
be insured under this insurance coverage are excluded from the 
scope of the 2016 Decree. It can be reiterated here that this fire 
insurance coverage for simple risks provides coverage against 
damage caused by lightning, explosion, storm (including the gusts 
of wind with a local character), hail, ice and snow pressure, 
flooding, overflowing or pushing up public sewers, landslides or 
subsidence and earthquakes. 
The request for financial compensation needs to be 
submitted within three months following the publication of the 
recognition decision in the Official Journal. The principle laid 
down in the 2016 Decree is that the financial compensation 
should be used to repair the damage. The compensatory amount 
is calculated by applying coefficients to the total net amount of 
the damage, while a deductible of EUR 500 is applied. 
Finally, like the 1976 Act, the Flemish Government acts as 
a Guarantee Fund for insurers in case they are confronted with 
some harsh financial conditions. The intervention of the Flemish 
Government covers the part of the financial compensation the 
insurer cannot pay to his insureds. 
                                                          
 49  Agricultural disasters are legislated in a separate Decree. 
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B. Technological disasters 
1. Strict Liability 
Belgian law has created quite a few strict liabilities for 
technological disasters.50 The Civil Code includes a strict liability 
for the guardian of a defective object (Article 1384, al. 1 of the 
Civil Code). Strict liability is also reserved for employers and 
other superiors if a tort is committed by their agents (Article 1384, 
al. 3 of the Civil Code). The owner of an animal is strictly liable if 
damage is caused by the animal (Article 1385 of the Civil Code) 
and the owner of a building is strictly liable with respect to 
damage caused by the partial or complete collapse of a building if 
that was caused by a construction defect or a lack of maintenance 
(Article 1386 of the Civil Code).51 
Specific statutes equally introduce strict liabilities inter 
alia with respect to damage caused by mines, the transport of gas, 
damage caused by toxic waste, fire or explosions in public 
buildings and nuclear accidents.52 However, that does not imply 
that the Belgian rules with respect to strict liability have been 
developed in a systematic manner. The reality is rather that 
specific statutes introduced strict liability ad hoc, usually at the 
occasion of a scandal or large accident.53 For example, it is 
unclear why strict liability is introduced for fires or explosions in 
public buildings but not for operators of a petrochemical plant.54 
2. Solvency Guarantees 
Belgian law has a large amount of mandatory solvency 
guarantees such as compulsory liability insurance.55 An important 
                                                          
 50  See, e.g., HUBERT BOCKEN & INGRID BOONE, HET 
BUITENCONTRACTUEEL AANSPRAKELIJKHEIDSRECHT EN ANDERE 
SCHADEVERGOEDINGSMECHANISMEN 123-171 (2010) for an overview. 
 51  Burgerlijk Wetboek [Civil Code], Book III, B.S. 03-09-1807 (Belg.). 
 52  See, e.g.,  Hubert Bocken, Van fout naar risico: Een overzicht van de 
objectieve aansprakelijkheidsregelingen naar Belgisch recht, 21 TIJDSCHRIFT 
VOOR PRIVAATRECHT [TPR] 329, 329-415 (1984) for an overview. The 
regulation concerning nuclear accidents will be discussed in the next section. 
 53  MICHAEL G. FAURE & ROGER VAN DEN BERGH, OBJECTIEVE 
AANSPRAKELIJKHEID, VERPLICHTE VERZEKERING EN 
VEILIGHEIDSREGULERING 201-202 (1989). 
 54  Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6, at 1008-09. 
 55  See, e.g.,  Jean Rogge, De verplichte verzekering: een ongedefinieerde 
notie, in LIBER AMICORUM HUBERT BOCKEN 239, 242 (Ingrid Boone, Ignace 
Claeys & Luc Lavrysen eds., 2009), and Véronique Bruggeman, Michael G. 
Faure & Ton Hartlief, Verplichte verzekering in België, 2007 TIJDSCHRIFT 
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example of such a mandatory solvency guarantee relates to the 
strict liability for personal injury and material damage caused to 
third parties as a result of fire or explosion in a public building – 
without prejudice to the ordinary recourse to the persons 
responsible for the damage.56 The Act not only creates strict 
liability, but also a mandatory solvency guarantee: a place cannot 
be opened to the public if the strict liability to which it is exposed 
has not been adequately covered through liability insurance. The 
amount to be covered is regulated in a Royal Decree57 for damage 
related to personal injury; the limit is EUR 14,873,611.4958 and 
for material damage the limit is EUR 743,680.57.59 These 
amounts are increased based on inflation. According to this 
system, when an explosion in a public place takes place, strict 
liability and mandatory liability insurance up to the mentioned 
limits would be applicable. 
As a result of strict liability and mandatory liability 
insurance, victims of a technological disaster in a public building 
in Belgium have a reasonable likelihood of being compensated. 
The reasonable likelihood of compensation is bolstered by the 
fact that such victims have a so-called direct action against the 
liability insurer, which entitles the victims to priority over other 
creditors. By receiving priority over other creditors, victims avoid 
the risk that the insured amounts would no longer be available as 
compensation in the event of bankruptcy.60 Of course questions 
                                                          
VOOR VERZEKERINGEN 387, for details. 
 56  Based on the Wet betreffende de preventie van brand en ontploffing en 
betreffende de verplichte verzekering van de burgerrechtelijke 
aansprakelijkheid in dergelijke gevallen [Act on the prevention of fire and 
explosion and on the compulsory insurance of civil liability in such cases] of 
Jul. 30, 1979, B.S., Sept. 20, 1979. See AloƯs Van Oevelen & Armand 
Vandeplas, Preventie van brand en ontploffing, objectieve aansprakelijkheid 
en verplichte burgerlijke aansprakelijkheidsverzekering, 44 RECHTSKUNDIG 
WEEKBLAD [RW], no. 4, 1980-1981, at 217 for details. 
 57  Koninklijk besluit van 5 augustus 1991 tot uitvoering van de artikelen 
8, 8bis en 9 van de wet van 30 juli 1979 betreffende de preventie van brand en 
ontploffing en betreffende de verplichte verzekering van de burgerrechtelijke 
aansprakelijkheid in dergelijke gevallen [Royal Decree of 5 August 1991 on the 
articles 8, 8bis and 9 of the Act of 30 July 1979 on the prevention of fire and 
explosion and on the compulsory insurance of civil liability in similar cases] of 
August 5, 1991, B.S. 30-08-1991 (Belg.), as amended. 
 58  The Royal Decree mentions an amount of 600 million Belgian francs, 
now of course transposed to euros.  
 59  The amount mentioned in the Royal Decree is 30 million Belgian 
francs.  
 60  See Geert Jocqué, De rechtsbescherming van de verzekerde en de 
benadeelde in de aansprakelijkheidsverzekering (2015) (unpublished 
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can still arise with respect to the adequacy of the financial 
compensation mechanism. 
With respect to cases involving non-public buildings, 
specific strict liability may not be applied to the personal injury 
despite the occurrence of activities which could be deemed 
dangerous, such as the operation of a petrochemical plant.61 In 
cases of such a technological disaster the strict liability of the 
guardian of a defective object might be applicable.62 For risky 
activities, mandatory liability insurance often applies, even 
though this may not only be imposed via a statutory duty. Often, 
insurance coverage is required as a condition in the 
environmental permit of the specific installation. Another 
problem is that there may be cases in which there is no 
mandatory solvency guarantee despite strict liability. Generally, 
strict liabilities, mandatory solvency guarantees (like mandatory 
liability insurance), or both, have been created for most high-risk 
activities (which could create technological disasters) in 
Belgium.63 
3. Rapid Claims Settlement 
A new Belgian Act was promulgated on 13 November 
2011 concerning financial compensation for victims of 
technological accidents, which came into force on 1 November 
2012.64 Its emergence was related to the disaster of an exploding 
gas pipeline operated by Fluxys, a Belgian company, that 
happened on 30 July 2004 in Ghislenghien. As a result of the 
                                                          
dissertation, Ghent University (on file at UGent) for a more detailed discussion 
(http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8512153). 
 61  If environmental damage would be caused as a result of that 
hypothetical accident, as a consequence of the implementation of the 
Environmental Liability Directive, strict liability would apply to the 
environmental damage, but not to the personal injury resulting from the 
accident. 
 62  This is based on Art. 1384 al. 1 of the Belgian Civil Code. 
 63  Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6, at 1010. 
 64  Wet van 13 november 2011 betreffende de vergoeding van de 
lichamelijke en morele schade ingevolge een technologisch ongeval [Act of 13 
November 2011 concerning the financial compensation for victims of 
technological accidents] of Nov. 13, 2011, B.S., Feb. 24, 2012, 12678. See, e.g., 
C. Coune, Wet van 13 november 2011 betreffende de vergoeding van de 
lichamelijke en morele schade ingevolge een technologisch ongeval, 5 
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR BELGISCH HANDELSRECHT [R.D.C.-T.B.H.], no. 5, 2012, at 
5; C. De Mulder, Nieuwe wettelijke regeling voor de vergoeding van 
slachtoffers van grote technologische rampen, 76 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 
[RW], no. 27, 2013, at 1076. 
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accident in Ghislenghein, 24 people died and over 150 people 
were injured. Because of the link between civil procedure and 
criminal procedure in Belgium, most of the victims of the 
Ghislenghein accident did not receive compensation until seven 
years after the incident. Accidents, such as the exploding gas 
pipeline in Ghislenghein, illustrate the need for a new Act that 
specifically aims to accelerate victim compensation.65 
The Act applies to so-called technological disasters of 
great extent, which are defined as technological incidents 
involving bodily injury to at least five persons through death or 
hospitalization. The Act will apply when a specific committee66 
declares the incident to be an exceptional disaster, and victims 
shall claim financial compensation within six months from the 
publication of the committee’s decision. Subsequently, 
compensation matters are taken care of by the Belgian motor 
insurance Guarantee Fund. A Special Unit in charge of the 
victim’s support is appointed by the public prosecutor. This 
Special Unit establishes a list of victims and communicates this 
list to the Fund. Victims can ask for financial compensation by 
addressing a registered letter to either the Fund or the Special 
Unit. The Fund in principle only compensates bodily injury 
which is not compensated by the general social security 
framework or by other insurance mechanisms. Victims are free to 
pursue compensation by filing a claim under the Act or under 
Belgian Civil Liability Law. 
The Act does not specify the conditions under which the 
Fund will compensate. Art. 10 of the Act only specifies that the 
Fund will compensate the victim or their descendants according 
to the rules of common law, considering the exceptional character 
of the damage. 
Within three months after the Fund has received the list of 
the victims, the administration of the Fund will formulate an 
informed advice explaining whether the damage is of such a 
nature that it should be compensated on the basis of the statute. 
If the advice regarding financial compensation is affirmative and 
                                                          
 65  See generally Stefaan Voet, Belgium, in CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE: 
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 25 (Christopher Hodges, Iris Benöhr & Naomi 
Creutzfeldt-Banda eds., 2012); Stefaan Voet, Public Enforcement and A(O)DR 
as Mechanisms for Resolving Mass Problems: a Belgian Perspective, in 
RESOLVING MASS DISPUTE: ADR AND SETTLEMENT OF MASS CLAIMS 270 
(Christopher Hodges & Astrid Stadler eds., 2013) for an overview and critical 
discussion of (consumer) ADR in Belgium. 
 66  This specific committee is often referred to as the “committee of wise 
men”. 
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if the damage can be quantified, the Fund will provide an offer of 
compensation. This offer is final. According to Art. 14 of the Act, 
the acceptance of the Fund’s final offer by a victim or their 
descendants is deemed a final settlement of the case. If the victim 
does not agree with the decision of the Fund according to Art. 10, 
he can sue the Fund before the civil court. 
The financing is based on pre-payment by insurance 
companies. Pursuant to Art. 16, when the committee’s decision to 
declare the incident a technological disaster has been published, 
the Fund will make an estimate of the damage and ask private 
insurers to pay to the Fund based on their market share. Insurers 
active in the area of civil liability insurance (with the exception of 
insurances covering liability in the field of motor vehicles) are 
forced to contribute to the Fund on the basis of Art. 16, 
paragraph 2. The total maximum amount insurers will have to 
contribute is EUR 50 million per year.67 
The Fund is, moreover, subrogated in the rights of the 
victim against the liable tortfeasor and his insurer.68 Art. 17 sets 
out that the Fund recovers the damages paid, including the 
interest as well as the fees and costs for managing the Fund, from 
the liable tortfeasor and its insurer. When no liable tortfeasor can 
be identified or when it is not possible to recover the amounts 
from the liable tortfeasor (because of his insolvency), the Fund 
requests repayment from the National Disaster Fund. The 
amounts that can hence be recollected by the Fund from either 
the tortfeasor, the tortfeasor’s liability insurer, or from the 
National Disaster Fund will then, according to the market share, 
be paid back to the insurance companies that initially 
contributed. 
Art. 20, however, stipulates that if after a procedure it 
appears that there is no liable tortfeasor, the entire costs of the 
compensation will be paid by the National Disaster Fund. On the 
other hand, if there is a liable tortfeasor from whom it is 
impossible to obtain financial compensation due to insolvency, 
the National Disaster Fund takes care of 50% of the costs that 
could not be recovered. The remaining 50% will in that case 
presumably remain with the insurers who contributed. 
Regarding the Ghislenghien incident in which the Fund 
intervened, all 140 files have been closed, leading to a total 
                                                          
 67  Act concerning the financial compensation for victims of technological 
accidents, supra note 64, Art. 16, paragraph 5. 
 68  Id. at Art. 9, paragraph 4. 
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compensation of EUR 6,599,919.69 
C. Nuclear Accidents 
1. General Framework 
Because all four countries under discussion are members 
of the relevant Conventions, the general framework regarding the 
financial compensation of victims of nuclear accidents is 
applicable to all countries. As a result, this Article will focus on 
the methods in which implementation in the particular countries 
differs. 
Two separate international compensation regimes were 
established in the 1960s, and both were substantially revised after 
the Chernobyl accident of 1986. The Paris Convention on Third 
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960 
(“Paris Convention”)70 and the Supplementary Convention to the 
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy of 31 January 1963 (“Brussels Supplementary 
Convention”)71 were developed under the auspices of the OECD 
Nuclear Energy Agency (“NEA”). The aim of the 1963 Brussels 
Supplementary Conventions is to supplement the compensation 
system provided in the Paris Convention “with a view to 
increasing the amount of compensation for damage which might 
result from the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.72 
The second regime was developed under the aegis of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) and relates to the 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 
May 1963 (“Vienna Convention”).73 These two regimes are 
                                                          
 69  Fonds Commun de Garantie Automobile, Rapport Annuel Exercice 
2012, 12, http://www.fcgb-bgwf.be/documents/Rap-
Ver/RAPPORT_2012_FCGA.pdf. 
 70  Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 
July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. This 
Convention was amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and 
by the Protocol of 16 November 1982. For more information, see: 
https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/multilateral-agreements/brussels-supp-
convention-third-party-liability.html.  
 71  Convention Supplementary to the Convention on Third Party Liability 
in the Field of Nuclear Energy, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1963, 1041 
U.N.T.S. 358 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1974) [hereinafter Brussels 
Supplementary Convention]. 
 72  Id. considerations. 
 73  Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for 
signature May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265 (entered into force Nov. 12, 1977) 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
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usually referred to as the first generation of nuclear liability 
Conventions.74 
The 1986 Chernobyl accident triggered an intensive 
discussion about the limitations of both conventions and resulted 
in an eventual revision process of the existing regimes. The so-
called second generation of nuclear liability Conventions was 
established thereafter. The Conventions comprising the second 
generation include the Joint Protocol of 1988 Relating to the 
Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention 
(“Joint Protocol”),75 the Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (“Protocol to 
the Vienna Convention”),76 the Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage (“CSC”),77 the 2004 Protocol 
to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy (“Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention”),78 
and the Protocol to Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 
Supplementary to the Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (“Protocol to the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention”).79 
Several fundamental principles underly the International 
Nuclear Liability Conventions, in particular strict liability, 
limited liability, and financial security. 
                                                          
 74  See Michael G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear 
Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of the US and International 
Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 220 (2008). 
 75  Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention 
and the Paris Convention, opened for signature Sept. 21, 1988, 1672 U.N.T.S. 
293 (entered into force April 27, 1992). 
 76  The Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention was adopted by a 
Diplomatic Conference, 8-12 September 1997, and was opened for signature at 
Vienna on 29 September 1997 at the 41st General Conference of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, see INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc566.pdf. 
 77  Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 
Sept. 12, 1997, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc567.pdf>, 
otherwise International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/567, available at: 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc567.pdf. 
 78  Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field 
of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the additional Protocol of 
28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, Feb. 12, 2004, 
available at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris_convention_protocol.pdf. 
This 2004 Protocol has not yet entered into force. 
 79  Protocol to Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary 
to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy, 12 February 2004, available at: https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/formidable/18/2004-Protocol-to-Amend-the-Brussels-
Supplementary-Convention-on-Nuclear-Third-Party-Liability-2.pdf. 
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The Paris Convention establishes a system of absolute 
liability.80 According to this system, the operator81 is liable for 
damage caused by a nuclear incident in a nuclear installation or 
involving nuclear substances coming from such installations.82 
Similar stipulations regarding absolute liability and exonerations 
can also be found under the Vienna Convention.83 The 
Conventions of the second generation have not changed the 
principle that strict liability applies to the operator of a nuclear 
power plant. However, an important change took place as far as 
the operator’s available defences are concerned: natural disasters 
are no longer an applicable defence.84 
Under the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention, 
the operator’s liability is limited both in amount and in time. The 
Paris Convention sets the maximum liability of the operator at 15 
million Special Drawing Rights (“SDRs”) (around EUR 18.4 
million or USD 21 million) but allows the Contracting Party to 
establish a greater or lesser amount by legislation considering the 
capacity of insurance and financial security. The Contracting 
Party can also require a lower amount of liability according to the 
nature of the installation. The lower amount should be no less 
than 5 million SDRs (around EUR 6.1 or USD 7 million).85 By 
contrast, the Vienna Convention sets the cap of liability at no less 
than USD 5 million.86 
The liability limitation has, however, been changed under 
the second generation nuclear Conventions. The Protocol to the 
Paris Convention increases the limit for nuclear operators to no 
less than EUR 700 million. The Contracting Party can reduce the 
liability to no less than EUR 80 million for the carriage of nuclear 
substances according to the reduced risks.87 The Convention even 
allows for the adoption of unlimited liability by the Contracting 
Parties, as long as the financial security required is no less than 
                                                          
 80  Paris Convention, supra note 70, Exposé des Motifs, point 14. See 
PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 738-745 (3rd ed. 2012). 
 81  Paris Convention, supra note 70, Art. 1(a)(vi), defining ‘operator’ as ‘the 
person designated or recognised by the competent public authority as the 
operator of that installation’. 
 82  Id. at Art. 3. 
 83  Vienna Convention, supra note 73, at Arts. I(1)(k), IV(1) & IV(3). 
 84  See Protocol to the Paris Convention, Art. 9; Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention, Art. 4(3). 
 85  Paris Convention, supra note 70, at Art. 7(b). 
 86  Vienna Convention, supra note 73, at Art. V(1). 
 87  Protocol to the Paris Convention, Art. 7(a) and (b). 
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the amount mentioned above.88 
Further, seeking financial security coverage for the 
operator’s liability is important for the international regimes on 
nuclear liability. Both Conventions require the operator to have 
and maintain insurance or other financial security up to its 
liability cap.89 
In addition, it should be mentioned that the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention added two additional layers of 
financial compensation via public funds on top of the first tier of 
private funds (operator’s liability) provided for by the Paris 
Convention. Indeed, the first tier of the Brussels Supplementary 
Convention is the insurance coverage of the nuclear operator as 
established under the Paris Convention. On top of that amount, 
the Brussels Supplementary Convention provides for two 
additional tiers of public funds: one ‘national’ public fund  and 
one international solidarity fund (‘third tier’). The national public 
fund is to be made available by the Installation State in whose 
territory the nuclear installation of the liable operator is situated. 
The international solidarity fund is to be made available by all 
Contracting Parties according to a pre-determined formula. In 
particular, according to Article 3 of the Brussels Supplementary 
Convention, the Contracting Parties undertake that 
compensation in respect of damage caused by a nuclear accident 
shall be provided up to the amount of 300 million SDRs per 
incident (EUR 368.30 million or USD 418.20 million). Such 
financial compensation shall be provided: 
- Up to an amount of at least 5 million SDRs, out of 
funds provided by insurance or other financial 
security, such amount to be established by the 
legislation of the Contracting Party in whose 
territory the nuclear installation of the liable 
operator is situated; 
- A second tier consisting of the difference between 
SDR 175 million and the amount required under 
the first tier (thus maximum 170 million SDRs or 
EUR 208.705 million or USD 237 million), out of 
public funds to be made available by the 
Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear 
installation of the liable operator is situated; 
- A third tier of 125 million SDRs (EUR 153.459 
                                                          
 88  Id. at Art. 10(b). 
 89  Paris Convention, supra note 70, Art. 10; Vienna Convention, supra 
note 73, Art. VII. 
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million or USD 174 million), out of public funds to 
be made available by the Contracting Parties 
according to a formula for contributors which is 
based on the GNP and the thermal capacity of the 
reactors. 
Under the Brussels Supplementary Convention, each 
Contracting Party has certain freedoms. It can establish the 
maximum liability of the operator, pursuant to the Paris 
Convention, at 300 million SDRs, and provide that such liability 
shall be covered by the insurance of the nuclear operator. In that 
case the Installation State has met its obligation under the 
Convention, and it must not provide for national public funding 
in the second layer. However, the Contracting Party can also set 
the maximum liability of the operator at an amount at least equal 
to the insurance of the nuclear operator and provide that, in 
excess of such amount and up to 300 million SDRs, public funds 
shall be made available by some means other than as cover for 
the liability of the operator.90 
Important changes occurred in the international regime 
after the Chernobyl accident. As mentioned above the first tier 
liability, the liability of the operator of the nuclear power plant, 
shall increase to EUR 700 million. Moreover, according to the 
Protocol to the Brussels Supplementary Convention, the 
Contracting Parties will undertake that financial compensation in 
respect to nuclear damage shall be provided up to an amount of 
EUR 1.5 billion per nuclear incident. This will be divided as 
follows: 
- Up to an amount of at least EUR 700 million: funds 
provided by insurance or other financial security or 
out of public funds provided pursuant to Art. 10(c) 
of the Paris Convention; 
- Between this amount and EUR 1,200 million: 
public funds to be made available by the 
Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear 
installation of the liable operator is situated; 
- Between EUR 1.2 billion and EUR 1.5 billion, out 
of public funds to be made available by all the 
Contracting Parties according to the formula for 
contributions. 
                                                          
 90  See Tom Vanden Borre, Shifts in Governance in Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage: 20 Years After Chernobyl, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 302 (Michael G. Faure & Albert Verheij eds., 
2007), for more details. 
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Finally, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation 
for Nuclear Damage (CSC), adopted on 12 September 1997, is a 
new and independent legal instrument, which means that a State 
does not need to be a party to the Vienna or Paris Conventions in 
order to become a party to the CSC. 
According to Article III.1.A of the CSC, the Installation 
State shall ensure the availability of at least 300 million SDRs. 
This provision provides for an obligation of the Installation State 
to ensure that 300 million SDRs are available: the Installation 
State is free to choose how this amount is funded (private 
insurance, regional agreement, etc.). A State meets its obligation 
under Art. III.1.A of the CSC when it imposes liability on the 
operator for the entire amount. Therefore, this Article does not 
oblige a State to make public funds available. According to 
Article II.1.B of the CSC, however, the Contracting Parties shall 
make public funds available beyond the amount required under 
the first tier.91 
If one were to summarize the situation, one could hold 
that in addition to the individual liability (with financial caps) of 
the nuclear operator there are two additional types of funding 
mechanisms. First,  there is an obligation of an Installation State 
to make certain amounts of money available. This can take place 
either by providing for public funding, or by making the nuclear 
operator liable for the total amount – this is the second tier of the 
Brussels Supplementary Convention and the first tier under the 
CSC. Second, there is a system that can be called an international 
solidarity fund, funded by all Contracting Parties.92 This 
Collective State Fund is an additional and supplementary 
compensation mechanism that can hence be applied, if a State is a 
member to the CSC, and when the particular State is neither in 
the NEA nor in the Vienna Convention regime. 
 The total amounts available in the nuclear liability regime 
can be summarized in the following Table 1: 
 
                                                          
 91  According to the following formula: the amount which shall be the 
product of the installed nuclear capacity of that Contracting Party multiplied 
by 300 SDRs per unit of installed capacity; and the amount is determined by 
applying the ratio between the United Nations rate of assessment for that 
Contracting Party as assessed for the year preceding the year in which the 
nuclear incident occurs, and the total of such rates for all Contracting Parties 
to 10% of the sum of the amounts calculated for all Contracting Parties. 
 92  Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 71, at arts. III(a)-III(b); 
JING LIU, COMPENSATING ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE: COMPARATIVE AND 
ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS 214 (2013); SANDS & PEEL, supra note 80, at 740. 
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Amount in million EUR 
What 
Convention? 
Who pays? First 
generatio
n 
Second 
generation 
Paris Convention Nuclear operator 57 700 
Brussels 
Supplementary 
Convention 
Installation State (or 
nuclear operator) 
193.7 500 
 Collective State 
Fund 
142.4 300 
Total NEA-
regime 
 341.8 1,500 
Vienna 
Convention 
Nuclear operator 4.2 170.9 
 Collective State 
Fund 
- 170.9 
Total Vienna 
Convention 
 4.2 341.8 
Convention on 
Supplementary 
Compensation 
Operator/Installation 
State 
 341.8 
 Collective State 
Fund 
 341.8 
Total CSC   683.7 
Table 1: Available amounts of compensation under the international nuclear 
liability Conventions.93 
Table 1 demonstrates that under the nuclear 
compensation scheme of the second generation, public funding is 
either newly created or kept at the same level as in 1963 in 
relative terms.94 In absolute terms, there is considerably more 
public funding in the second generation Conventions. In 
particular, under the 2004 Brussels Supplementary Convention, 
the public intervention has more than doubled,95 and under the 
IAEA regime, no public intervention existed under the 
Conventions of the first generation. 
                                                          
 93  See Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 74, at 239 (providing the 
amounts of compensation in USD according to the exchange rate in 2008). 
 94  See Vanden Borre, supra note 90, at 303-04. 
 95  In the second tier of the Installation State the amount rose from EUR 
202 million to EUR 500 million; in the third tier, the Collective State Fund 
went from approximately EUR 150 million to EUR 300 million. 
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It is important to underline that out of the four new 
nuclear liability instruments that resulted from the revision 
exercise, only two have entered into force so far. The Protocol to 
the Vienna Convention entered into force on 4 October 2003 and 
the CSC entered into force on 15 April 2015. 
2. Implementation in Belgium 
Rules on nuclear third party liability are contained in the 
Act of 22 July 1985 on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy,96 as modified.97 This law implements the 1960 
Paris Convention and the 1963 Brussels Supplementary 
Convention as well as its Protocols. The 1985 Act, as modified, 
lays down the principle of strict liability and limited liability in 
amount and time, channelled to the operator of a nuclear 
installation.98 In this respect, Article 7 of the law establishes the 
maximum amount of the operator’s liability for nuclear damage 
at EUR 1.2 billion. A royal decree can increase or reduce this 
amount in order to fulfill Belgium’s international obligations as 
well as to take into account low risk installations or transport; 
however, it may not set a level lower than EUR 80 million for 
transportation and EUR 70 million for the nuclear installations. 
Pursuant to the terms of the law, the operator is obliged, in 
                                                          
 96  Wet van 22 juli 1985 betreffende de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid op het 
gebied van de kernenergie [Act of 22 July 1985 on Third Party Liability in the 
Field of Nuclear Energy], Jul. 22, 1985, B.S., Aug. 31, 1985, 48087 (Belg.). 
 97  Several decrees have been adopted to implement the 1985 Law, in 
particular:  
Royal Decree of 28 April 1986, determining the financial security certificate for 
transport of nuclear substances, whose purpose is to ensure that financial 
security certificates (given to all carriers of nuclear substances by the operator 
liable) comply with the Paris Convention requirements in this respect, as 
prescribed by the 1985 Law. Available at: 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/besluit/1986/04/28/1986011107/justel;  
Ministerial Decision of 9 March 1987 on the register concerning nuclear 
installations, which aims to implement Section 13 of the 1985 Law regarding 
the obligation to make available to the public the register containing the texts 
granting recognition to the operators of nuclear installations. This register 
contains a certified copy of the royal decrees of recognition and a card of the 
installations indicating the limits of each site. It may be consulted at the 
Federal Public Service for Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy. The 
local authority for the territory where the installation is located must comply 
with a similar obligation. Available at: 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/eli/besluit/1987/03/09/1987011069/justel. 
 98  See on those principles the discussion in the general framework, supra 
Section II.C.1. 
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conformity with Art. 10 (a) and (d) of the Paris Convention, to 
take out insurance or another form of financial security to cover 
his liability up to the amount set in the law (Article 8). The 
private insurance market, however, does not have sufficient 
capacity to complete the totality of such a high liability risk, 
which the operators nevertheless need to have insured. The 
problems arise in particular for the coverage of liability claims 
that might arise more than ten years after the accident, and to a 
lesser extent, the coverage of damage to the environment. There 
are insurance policies available for this type of risk, but the 
coverage amounts offered in the market do not reach the 
requirement amount of EUR 1.2 billion or – for low risk 
installations or transport – EUR 297 million. That is why the Act 
of 29 June 2014 (modifying the Act of 22 July 1985) has 
introduced a state guarantee, to be enjoyed by the operators of 
nuclear installations against a fee and insofar as the private 
insurance market does not offer the coverage (Article 10/1). 
Consequently, the Royal Decree of 10 December 2017 
establishes a guarantee program for legal liability in the area of 
nuclear energy.99 This Royal Decree was promulgated after the 
European Commission allowed the program in the framework of 
Articles 107 and 108 on state support. Since state intervention 
must be subsidiary to the private market, the premium from the 
operator to the State has been established at an amount that is 
higher than the market price; the supplement is situated around 
15%. This should encourage operators and insurers to develop 
insurance solutions instead of appealing on the State. The 
operators are free to choose their affiliation to the guarantee 
program and the amount compensated by the State will have to 
be repaid by the liable operator, as long as this amount does not 
exceed the liability ceiling laid down in the Act of 22 July 1985. 
Finally, the damage caused by a nuclear accident should be 
covered in the first place by the insurance policies of the operator. 
Only when the amount of the damage exceeds the insured 
amount, the State should intervene, to the extent of the surplus, to 
warrant the liable operator in case he fails to compensate. 
Article 23 of the law establishes a prescription period of 
thirty years for nuclear physical injuries and of ten years for other 
nuclear damage from the date of the nuclear incident in respect of 
                                                          
 99  Koninklijk besluit van 10 December 2017 tot opstelling van een 
waarborgprogramma voor de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid op het gebied van 
de kernenergie [Royal Decree of 10 December 2017 establishing a guarantee 
program for civil liability in the field of nuclear energy] of Dec. 10, 2017, B.S., 
Dec. 20, 2017, 113492 (Belg.). 
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the right to claim financial compensation from the operator. The 
State is responsible for the payment of compensation in respect of 
claims for nuclear physical damage which are time barred, within 
a period between ten and thirty years from the date of the 
incident. From 1 January 2019 onwards, the State’s obligation to 
compensate will be transferred to the operator.100 
Belgium also ratified the 1971 Convention relating to Civil 
Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material 
on 15 June 1989. 
D. Terrorism 
1. Property Damage 
Terrorism risk in Belgium is regulated through an Act of 1 
April 2007 which entered into force on 1 May 2008.101 In fact, the 
Belgian legislator copied the Dutch model of the Nederlandse 
Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor Terrorismeschade (“NHT”). 
This was made clear in the preparatory works of the Belgian 
Act.102 The Belgian legislator praised the Dutch model for 
providing a pragmatic solution and held that the insurance 
market in Belgium is comparable to the situation in the 
Netherlands, and therefore it found inspiration in the Dutch 
legislation.103 
The Belgian Act can be called upon when a dedicated 
                                                          
 100  Koninklijk besluit van 7 december 2017 betreffende de 
inwerkingtreding van artikel 2, b), van de wet van 7 december 2016 tot 
wijziging van de wet van 22 juli 1985 betreffende de wettelijke 
aansprakelijkheid op het gebied van de kernenergie en tot bepaling van de 
datum bedoeld in artikel 23, vierde lid, van de wet van 22 juli 1985 betreffende 
de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid op het gebied van de kernenergie [Royal 
Decree of 7 December 2017 on the entry into force of article 2, b) of the Act of 7 
December 2016 amending the Act of 22 July 1985 on civil liability in the field 
of nuclear energy and to determine the date referred to in article 23, fourth 
paragraph, of the Act of 22 July 1985 on civil liability in the field of nuclear 
energy] of Dec. 7, 2017, B.S., Dec. 21, 2017, 114049, Art. 2 (Belg.). 
 101  Wet van 1 april 2007 betreffende de verzekering tegen schade 
veroorzaakt door terrorisme [Act of 1 April 2007 on the insurance against 
damage caused by terrorism] of Apr. 1, 2007, B.S., May 15, 2007, 26350 (Belg.).  
 102  Bernard Dubuisson, L’indemnisation des dommages causés par des 
actes de terrorisme en Belgique: la loi du 1er avril 2007, 365 TIJDSCHRIFT 
VOOR VERZEKERINGEN = BULLETIN DES ASSURANCES (ED. 
BILINGUE) [BULL.ASS.] 348, 349 (2008). 
 103  During the Parliamentary Proceeding the Belgian Legislator explicitly 
referred to the benefits of the Dutch model. For details see Dubuisson, supra 
note 102, 349. 
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Committee has judged that the particular event(s) should be 
considered a “terrorist act” (Art. 6).104 In such case, the 2017 Act 
provides, like the Dutch model, a combined intervention by the 
insurance company, reinsurers and by the Belgian State. A model 
has been developed whereby a first layer of financial 
compensation is provided by all Belgian insurers up to a limit of 
EUR 300 million. If that amount is insufficient to cover the loss, a 
second layer will intervene which is provided through the 
reinsurance market up to an amount of EUR 400 million. Finally, 
if the amounts provided by the first and second layer of financial 
compensation would still be insufficient the Belgian State 
intervenes up to a limit of EUR 300 million, like in the Dutch 
system.105 The total amount of compensation (not indexed) is 
hence constituted as follows: 
 
Insurers                     EUR  300 million 
Reinsurers EUR  400 million 
Belgian State            EUR  300 million 
Total                          EUR                                     1                 billion 
 
An insurance pool, called the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Pool (“TRIP”) is created, that will manage the terrorism risk. 
Although the scheme is not compulsory it has attracted more than 
95% participation from amongst the insurers operating in 
Belgium. The Belgian legislator considered that the creation of 
the TRIP was a necessity.106 The Belgian State only intervenes 
after the insurers and reinsurers have provided compensation and 
only if the amount of compensation provided by such groups (a 
                                                          
 104  The Committee declared, in its decision of 19 September 2017, the 
events of 17 August 2017 in Barcelona (Spain) a terrorist attack. A similar 
decision has been made, on 29 June 2017, regarding the events of 7 April 2017 
in Stockholm (Sweden). This was also the case, inter alia, for the events of 14 
July 2016 in Nice (France), the events of 6 August 2016 in Charleroi (Belgium), 
the events of 20 November 2015 in Hotel Radisson Blu in Bamako (Mali), and 
the events of 22 March 2016 in Brussels (see: Comité voor schadeafwikkeling 
bij terrorisme, 28 April 2016). These decisions of the Committee have all been 
published in the official Belgian Gazette B.S. 
 105  See Dubuisson, supra note 102, at 353-54 for details. 
 106  OECD INT’L. PLATFORM ON TERRORISM RISK INS., BELGIUM – 
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAMME (2016), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/Belgium-Terrorism-Risk-
Insurance.pdf. It should be noted that most insurance policies obligatorily 
cover terrorist damage, including occupational accident insurance, life 
insurance, hospitalization insurance, accident insurance, fire insurance and 
civil liability car insurance. 
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total of EUR 700 million) would not be sufficient to cover the 
loss. Moreover, the reinsurance layer provided by the Belgian 
State is, like in the Dutch example, not provided for free, but the 
Belgian State is compensated for this intervention. It was held 
that this was necessary to avoid the prohibition of state aid 
contained in European law.107 
Legal doctrine in Belgium holds that this financial 
compensation of terrorism related damage via the creation of a 
pool has been effective in covering terrorism-related risks. The 
public-private partnership between insurers, reinsurers, and the 
State is praised for providing relatively large amounts of cover 
(EUR 1 billion) in three layers.108 
The 2007 Act mainly aims at compensating damage to 
persons (Article 7 paragraph 2), and compensation of damage to 
property is hence limited. In particular, damage to industrial 
property, including contents located at a single company site, will 
be compensated up to EUR 75 million per insured and per year. 
Further, there is also a compensation percentage that is applied to 
pay-outs. The percentage rates are worked out using three broad 
headings which consist of one percentage rate for personal injury, 
one percentage rate for material damage, and one percentage rate 
for moral damage. The deductible is 10% of the damage cost 
where damage from a terrorist act has occurred to industrial 
business and a 10% deductible is applied to damages which are 
caused through a nuclear bomb for risks other than motor vehicle 
third party liability, strict liability for public places, workmen’s 
compensation insurance, life insurance, and health insurance. 
2. Personal Injury 
It cannot be excluded that some victims of terrorism will 
not receive any compensation through TRIP because the 
conditions in their insurance contract are not fulfilled. In order to 
remedy this situation, the Act of 1 August 1985 on Fiscal and 
Other Provisions109 has been supplemented by a special 
subchapter on governmental help for victims of acts of deliberate 
violence. The Fund for Intentional Acts of Violence can pay out 
compensation to the uninsured victims who are confronted with 
                                                          
 107  See Dubuisson, supra note 102, at 354-355 (doubting whether a 
compensation to victims of disasters could effectively be considered as a 
prohibited state aid). 
 108  Id. at 362. 
 109  Wet houdende fiscale en andere bepalingen [Act on Fiscal and Other 
Provisions] of Aug. 1, 1985, B.S., Aug. 6, 1985, 37751. 
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personal or physical damages.110 However, the government has 
the ability to increase this sum after a terrorist attack (Art. 37bis). 
In order for the government to increase the sum of compensation, 
the King must  declare the event an act of terrorism (Art. 
42bis).111 
The Fund is financed by fixed contributions of all persons 
sentenced to a criminal or misdemeanour penalty (Art. 29), but, if 
necessary, extra contributions can be requested. Generally, extra 
contributions are requested from the Treasury, loans, gifts and 
legacies, a part of the profits of the National Lottery, and other 
sources of revenue determined by the King (Art. 42bis). 
3. The Aftermath of the Terrorist Attack on Brussels Airport 
On 22 March 2016, several terrorist attacks were 
committed in and around Brussels (in particular, in Brussels 
Airport and in the Brussels metro) where a total of 35 persons 
were killed. The damage resulting from the attacks in Zaventem 
and Molenbeek falls under the scope of the Act of 1 April 2007 
and is being evaluated for a total of EUR 168 million. The 
distribution of this amount is estimated as follows: damage to 
persons 80%, material damage 15%, and non-pecuniary loss 
5%.112 The amount remains well below the maximum threshold, 
EUR 1 billion, provided for in the Act of 1 April 2007. 
Following the attacks, the Act of 30 May 2016 was 
adopted, which amended the Act of 1 August 1985 on Fiscal and 
Other Provisions with regard to assistance to victims of deliberate 
acts of violence.113 The 2016 Act has introduced the following 
                                                          
 110  Of course, these victims will also receive compensation for their 
personal injury from social security. 
 111  See, e.g, Koninklijk besluit tot erkenning van daden als daden van 
terrorisme in de zin van artikel 42bis van de wet van 1 augustus 1985 [Royal 
decree recognizing acts as acts of terrorism in the sense of article 42bis of the 
Act of 1 August 1985] of Mar. 15, 2017, B.S., Mar. 17, 2017, 37771, which 
declares a list of events that took place between 2012 and 2017 (amongst which 
the attacks on Brussels Airport on 22 March 2016) as an act of terrorism.  
 112  See BELGIAN CHAMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES, SCHRIFTELIJKE 
VRAAG EN ANTWOORD NR: 0887, TUSSENKOMST VERZEKERINGEN BIJ 
TERRORISME (June 8, 2016), 
https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=qrva&language=nl&-
cfm=qrvaXml.cfm?legislat=54&dossierID=54-b082-861-0887-
2015201610033.xml. 
 113  Wet tot wijziging van de wet van 1 augustus 1985 houdende fiscale en 
andere bepalingen, wat de hulp aan slachtoffers van opzettelijke gewelddaden 
betreft [Act amending the Act of 1 August 1985 on fiscal and other provisions, 
as regards assistance to victims of deliberate acts of violence], of May 31, 2016, 
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changes: 
a. The ceilings for financial compensation have been 
doubled. Compensation will be awarded when the 
damage amounts to more than EUR 500 and up to 
EUR 125,000. 
b. Certain conditions have been relaxed or were even 
deleted when compensation is requested for 
damage related to terrorist attacks. In this specific 
context, it is not necessary to deposit a complaint or 
to apply for civil party status first. 
c. Belgian victims of acts of terrorism in a country 
that does not provide a settlement for these types of 
events can also appeal to the Fund for Intentional 
Acts of Violence. 
A Commission for financial assistance to victims of acts of 
deliberate violence and occasional rescuers has been established. 
This Commission deliberates on the applications for emergency 
aid,114 financial compensation or additional assistance.115 A 
subsection of the Commission is specialized in dealing with 
applications from victims of terrorist attacks. 
It should be noticed that the contribution by the State has 
a subsidiary character: the victim should not be able to receive 
sufficient compensation for his damage in any other way. 
Therefore, the Commission takes into account: 
- the solvency and the potential instalments of the 
aggressor; 
- the contribution of the health insurance fund or the 
work accident insurance institution; 
- a possible compensation in the framework of a 
private insurance. 
The Commission can grant equitable assistance, but does 
not guarantee a full compensation. 
Two months after the attacks, victims were officially 
notified of the first emergency aid decisions and the first 
payments were made.116 Nevertheless, one year after the terrorist 
                                                          
B.S. June 17, 2016, 36657. 
 114  Emergency aid can be requested when any delay in the granting of 
compensation may cause the applicant a serious disadvantage, have regard to 
his financial situation. The emergency aid is granted per intentional act of 
violence and per applicant for damage in excess of EUR  500 and is limited to 
an amount of EUR 30,000. 
 115  The Commission can award additional assistance if the disadvantage 
has apparently increased after the compensation has been granted. 
 116  FEDERALE OVERHEIDSDIENST JUSTITIE, EEN UNIEK LOKET VOOR DE 
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attacks, many victim organizations have complained about the 
slow payment of damages and the administrative burden.117 
Following the Belgian regulation, the financial compensation of 
material and non-material damage caused by terrorism is 
primarily a task for insurance companies. Because these 
insurance companies can take a long time to determine the exact 
damage, the Commission can give an advance of up to EUR 
30,000 in urgent cases (i.e. the emergency aid). The first figures 
show that the insurance companies have put aside EUR 136 
million for the payment of the compensation, but have only paid 
out EUR 16 million. In March 2017, more than half of the victims 
were still waiting for part of their compensation, and a quarter of 
the victims had not received anything at all. The Commission 
paid out EUR 1.2 million in advances and helped 160 victims, 
while 398 applications were received. 
In addition, following the Act of 18 July 2017, Belgians 
who are victims of a terrorist attack will receive a lifelong 
pension.118 They get their own “statute of national solidarity” that 
is comparable to the statute of civilian victims from World War 
II. As a result, in addition to the right to a benefit/pension, they 
also receive a full reimbursement of their medical costs as long as 
such costs are neither covered by insurance nor by the Fund for 
Intentional Acts of Violence. 
E. Summary 
In summary, Belgium has gone through an interesting 
evolution and many steps have been taken in recent years. As far 
as the natural disasters are concerned, Belgium started from a 
model of national solidarity via the Disaster Fund. With the 
statutes of 2003 and 2005, however, the role of that Disaster Fund 
has been seriously reduced. Belgium de facto followed the French 
model by mandatorily adding first party cover for a large group 
                                                          
SLAACHTOFFERS VAN DE AANSLAGEN IN BRUSSEL (June 1, 2016), 
https://justitie.belgium.be/nl/nieuws/andere_berichten_27. 
 117  Leen Vervaeke, Belgische terreurslachtoffers naar de rechter om trage 
uitbetalingen verzekeraar, DE VOLKSKRANT (Mar. 20, 2017), 
https://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/belgische-terreurslachtoffers-naar-de-
rechter-om-trage-uitbetalingen-verzekeraar~a4476798/. 
 118  Wet betreffende de oprichting van het statuut van nationale 
solidariteit, de toekenning van een herstelpensioen en de terugbetaling van 
medische zorg ingevolge daden van terrorisme [Act on the establishment of the 
statute of national solidarity, the granting of a recovery pension and the 
reimbursement of medical care due to acts of terrorism], of Jul. 18, 2017, B.S., 
Aug. 4, 2017, 77667. 
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of natural disasters to voluntarily purchased fire insurance. As far 
as technological disasters are concerned, it is striking that 
Belgium has a large amount of mandatory solvency guarantees, 
forcing operators to seek financial cover for the consequences of 
their liability. Moreover, since 2012, Belgium also has a specific 
model for rapid claims settlement in case of technological 
disasters. 
With regard to the nuclear risk, Belgium implemented the 
Nuclear Liability Conventions. The operators’ liability is now 
capped at the total amount of EUR 1.2 billion; in addition there is 
a substantial state guarantee. The terrorism risk in Belgium is 
regulated through the Act of 1 April 2007 which created TRIP, 
and provides a total amount of compensation of EUR 1 billion on 
the basis of a system of multi-layered compensation. Recently, 
TRIP had to be applied after the 22 March 2016 terrorist attack 
on the Brussels airport. TRIP mainly intervenes for property 
damage. As far as personal injury is concerned, there is another 
statute of 1985 that provides compensation to victims after a 
terrorist attack. Following the Brussels airport attacks, the 
statutory framework has once more been changed with the Act of 
18 July 2017, providing inter alia for a life-long pension for 
victims of a terrorist attack. 
Belgium has a mix whereby on the one hand the French 
solidarity model is followed, providing generous compensation 
(first via a Disaster Fund for victims of natural disasters, 
covering equally personal injury resulting from the terrorism 
risk). At the same time it also obliges operators, via a combination 
of strict liability and mandatory liability insurance to provide 
proof of their solvency, thus equally stressing the importance of 
exposing potential injurers to the social costs of their activity. 
III. FRANCE 
A. Natural Disasters 
1. Mandatory Comprehensive Cover 
France has an elaborate system of first party insurances 
for property damage. Eighty-five percent of all inhabitants of 
France own first party insurance,119 and therewith a right to 
financial compensation for property damage within the scope of 
                                                          
 119  This can be deduced from the AZF case, where it was noticed that only 
15% of the victims were uninsured. 
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the insurance policy. A typical example of such a policy is the so-
called multi-risques habitation which is commonly requested as a 
precondition for renting a premise, and which covers most risks 
with respect to real estate and movable property within the 
house. 
In addition to voluntary first party insurance, which 
covers damage against property, the French system typically also 
includes, through the Act of 13 July 1982 (“the 1982 Act”),120 a 
mandatory additional cover for the consequences of natural 
disasters. This constitutes France’s well-known and 
internationally praised example of mandatory comprehensive 
disaster insurance.121 In France, there is, therefore, no generalized 
duty to insure catastrophic risks, but the compulsory coverage 
extension of voluntarily subscribed property insurance contracts. 
Property damage policies in France are widespread and, 
consequently, a large group of individuals are forced to pay an 
additional amount for the coverage of natural disasters. 
The ‘Code des Assurances’ offers a definition of what is 
considered a natural disaster. Remarkably, the Code defines a 
natural disaster as an accident that causes damage which is 
unusual, unavoidable, and normally not insurable.122 The fact 
that this damage would normally not be insurable is precisely the 
reason for the mandatory additional coverage. Indeed, the French 
Insurance Code defines loss resulting from natural catastrophes 
as “non insurable direct material damage whose determining 
cause was the abnormal intensity of a natural agent. . .” (Art. L. 
125-1 par 3). Lawyers have criticized this definition since it seems 
confusing to call uninsurable a risk that the law makes insurable 
by compulsory coverage.123 The paradox, however, disappears if 
one realizes that compulsory insurance allows for a sufficient 
spreading of risks and functions as a remedy to adverse selection, 
                                                          
 120  Loi 82-600 du 13 juillet 1982 relative à l’indemnisation des victimes de 
catastrophes naturelles [Law 82-600 of July 13, 1982 concerning compensation 
for victims of natural disasters], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jul. 14, 1982, p. 2242. 
 121  See Kunreuther, supra note 19 (already arguing in 1968 in favour of 
comprehensive disaster insurance and repeating it many times since, e.g. after 
Katrina); Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive 
Natural Disaster Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM 
HURRICANE KATRINA 175 (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettle & Howard 
Kunreuther eds., 2006). 
 122  Michel Cannarsa, Fabien Lafay & Olivier Moréteau, France, in 
FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL APPROACH, supra note 1, at 86; BRUGGEMAN, supra note 1, at 304. 
 123  Cannarsa, Lafay & Moréteau, supra note 122, at 86. 
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which may make natural disasters uninsurable. By imposing a 
duty to insure, the law transforms an uninsurable risk into an 
insurable one. Compulsory insurance may enable the private 
insurance market to cover harm caused by natural disasters in 
geographically limited areas. Floods and earthquakes are clear 
examples, but the French compulsory disaster insurance coverage 
also extends to droughts, cyclonic storms, terrorist attacks, and 
technological catastrophes. 
Insurers are only held liable to compensate damage if the 
government declares a certain incident a natural disaster. This is 
an administrative act that can also give rise to an administrative 
appeal.124 The declaration of the event as a natural disaster is 
published in the Journal Officiel. From the date of that 
publication the victim only has ten days to file a claim with his 
insurer. This very short time limit aims to pressure the victim to 
act carefully and to allow the insurer’s experts to establish the 
extent of the damage as soon as possible. The Code des 
Assurances further stipulates that the insurer must make an offer 
of financial compensation within three months after the victim’s 
claim. Moreover, the insurer must also make an advance 
payment within a period of two months.125 Agricultural damage is 
excluded. 
The supplementary coverage for catastrophic loss is 
financed through an additional premium of twelve percent on all 
insurance contracts covering property other than motor vehicles, 
and an additional premium of six percent for fire and theft 
insurance for motorised land vehicles.126 The mandatory coverage 
is applied to all insured individuals, irrespective of whether they 
are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters and thus exposed 
to the insured risk. The Act of 13 July 1982 further includes 
compulsory deductibles together with a prevention plan; these are 
Risk Exposure Plans, which today have become Risk Prevention 
Plans. The links between financial compensation and prevention 
have been strengthened by a sliding scale that adjusts the 
deductibles applying to communes that do not have Risk 
Prevention Plans, to encourage them to introduce such plans. 
Reinsurance is provided through the Caisse centrale de 
réassurance, which is fully controlled by the French State.127 
                                                          
 124  Id. at 95. 
 125  Id. at 96. 
 126  Art. 2 of the 1982 Act stipulates that the catastrophe guarantee is 
financed by an additional premium calculated on the basis of a single rate set 
by Decree for each category of insurance policy. 
 127  See Roger Van den Bergh & Michael G. Faure, Compulsory insurance 
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There are particular features of the French system which 
are potentially at odds with European competition law. It has 
been argued that those anti-competitive effects may, to some 
extent, benefit from the efficiency defence: the need to create 
sufficiently large risk pools and to cure the problem of adverse 
selection may justify the tying clause (the fact that catastrophe 
cover is mandatorily provided with housing insurance). Other 
features of the compulsory insurance scheme for catastrophic loss 
in France, such as the fixed premiums for the disaster coverage 
and the reinsurance by the State, may benefit from a solidarity 
exception.128 
2. Example: The 2016 Floodings 
May and June of 2016 was marked by a major, atypical, 
natural catastrophe, i.e. the flooding of the Seine and its 
tributaries, and of some tributaries of the Loire. It was declared a 
natural catastrophe by Arrêté du 8 juin 2016 portant 
reconnaissance de l’état de catastrophe naturelle. About 182,000 
claims have been reported, and it cost insurers more than EUR 
1.4 billion, being the most expensive flood since 1982. The 
resulting cost to the CCR amounts to EUR 623 million which 
represents the second largest loss – the largest flood event – ever 
recorded since the inception of the natural disaster compensation 
scheme in 1982. A major portion of the impact on CCR’s 
underwriting results was, however, offset due to a capital 
equalization reserves release of EUR 240 million.129 
The floods led to the interruption of several transportation 
networks and also put into question the ability of the crisis 
management system to respond to an event of a higher 
                                                          
of loss to property caused by natural disasters: competition or solidarity? 29 
WORLD COMPETITION, no. 1, 2006, at 25, 30. The European Commission 
approved on 26 September 2016 both the principles and the terms of the 
natural disaster reinsurance scheme operated in France by the Caisse Centrale 
de Réassurance (CCR). In particular, the Commission approved the guarantee 
granted to CCR by the State in this capacity on an exclusive basis. The 
Commission considers that this guarantee does not constitute a state aid 
incompatible with the European internal market rules given that “the French 
natural disaster compensation system is proportionate” and that “it enables 
each household and business to be insured against these risks”. 
 128  Van den Bergh & Faure, supra note 127. 
 129  CAISSE CENTRALE DE REASSURANCE [CCR], 2016 ACTIVITY REPORT 
(2016), 
https://www.ccr.fr/documents/23509/29244/Activity+report+2016+CCR+EN.p
df/af04f3a2-2ef4-4b8b-ad39-d2b9a3f32b1c. 
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magnitude. 
B. Technological Disasters 
1. Liability 
Although the fault regime is still the central rule in French 
tort law, several strict liabilities have been developed. The 
French Cour de Cassation ruled that Article 1384, paragraph 1 of 
the Civil Code which holds the guardian of a defective object 
liable for the damage caused by that object, should be considered 
as a general stand-alone provision, providing for a presumption 
of responsibility where damage is caused by objects.130 This 
article has been interpreted very broadly in French law: strict 
liability is imposed on the sole basis of the use, direction and 
control by the defendant of the object which caused the damage. 
Moreover, there are also separate statutes laying down strict 
liability in various areas (e.g. strict liability for car drivers causing 
a road traffic accident). 
In addition, there is far-reaching tort liability for public 
authorities under French administrative law. Public authority 
liability has already been accepted in France, for example, at the 
occasion of a disastrous flooding at Grand-Bornand on 14 July 
1987, which caused the death of 23 persons in addition to 
substantial property damage. It led to a joint liability of the State 
and the municipality.131 
French law also has an interlocutory proceeding, the so-
called référé, which allows the victim to seek a provisional order 
from a single judge within a short period of time (also outside of 
cases of urgency). This procedure is also applied to obtain 
provisional payment when the debt cannot be disputed. It will 
therefore allow a victim to obtain in practice 80% of what may be 
regarded as fair compensation.132 
2. Act of 30 July 2003 
There is another particular feature of the way in which 
French law deals with compensation for technological disasters. 
The creation of this Act is related to an accident that happened in 
France on 21 September 2011 (incidentally ten days after 9/11, 
but totally unrelated) at the chemical plant called AZF owned by 
                                                          
 130  Cannarsa, Lafay & Moréteau, supra note 122, at 92. 
 131  BRUGGEMAN, supra note 1, at 297-98. 
 132  Cannarsa, Lafay & Moréteau, supra note 122, at 98-99. 
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Total Fina Elf in Toulouse where thirty people died, 5,000 
suffered personal injury, and substantial property damage was 
caused.133 Most victims obtained financial compensation through 
their first party insurance; others claimed compensation from the 
liable operator, Total Fina Elf. Since the property damage 
insurance (multi-risques habitation) is not mandatory, however, 
some victims were uninsured (in first party insurance) and 
therefore had to sue the operator of the plant in tort law.134 That 
was the reason for the French legislator to extend, through the 
Act of 30 July 2003,135 the first party insurance coverage like the 
one provided by the multi-risques habitation to damage caused 
by industrial catastrophes. In particular, if an official statement is 
made that there is a “situation of technical catastrophe” occurring 
from an “installation classée”, causing damage to a large number 
of buildings, the coverage of the first party motor vehicle and 
housing insurance extends to risks linked to these technological 
catastrophes (Art. L-128-1 Code des Assurances136). It is striking 
that although this concerns technological (and therefore man-
made) disasters, the Act does not apply to third party insurance, 
but to property damage caused by technological disasters, except 
for terrorist attacks. In this case, the compulsory disaster cover is 
(again, like in the case of natural disasters) linked with 
voluntarily subscribed first party property insurance contracts. 
All insured undergo an increase in their premiums, irrespective of 
whether they are exposed to a technological risk. In contrast with 
the regime that was created for the compensation of damage 
resulting from natural disasters, the legislator did not find it 
useful to install a premium percentage. It is as such remarkable 
that in a case of a man-made technological disaster, where a 
liable wrongdoer can be identified, a mandatory cover for victims 
is introduced. Imposing solvency guarantees on the side of the 
wrongdoer, such as compulsory liability insurance, could be a 
preferable solution.137 
For uninsured victims a compensation fund is created to 
                                                          
 133  Id. at 115; BRUGGEMAN, supra note 1, at 326-28. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Loi 2003-699 du 30 juillet 2003 relative à la prévention des risques 
technologiques et naturels et à la réparation des dommages [Law 2003-699 of 
July 30, 2003 concerning the prevention of technological and natural risks and 
compensation of damages], J.O., Jul. 31, 2003, p. 13021. This Act introduced a 
new chapter in the French Insurance Code, namely arts. L.128-1 to 128-4. 
 136  Code des assurances [Insurance Code], available at: 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?-
cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006073984. 
 137  Van den Bergh & Faure, supra note 127, at 30. 
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compensate for the consequences of technological catastrophes. It 
was technically done by extending the benefits of the 
compensation fund for victims of automobile accidents (fonds de 
garantie) through the Act of 30 July 2003 to all uninsured victims 
of industrial disasters (Article L.421-16 Code des Assurances) – 
regardless of whether insurance was actually available.138 
Compensation will be limited at EUR 100,000 (Article R.421-78 
Code des Assurances). This limited compensation will hence give 
incentives to still insure against the risk of damages. 
C. Nuclear Accidents 
French law on third party liability in the field of nuclear 
energy is derived from a combination of, on the one hand, the 
Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention 
which under the Constitution are directly integrated into the 
domestic legal system on ratification and, on the other hand, Act 
No. 68-943 of 30 October 1968,139 as amended, on third party 
liability in the field of nuclear energy. 
The legal regime introduced by the Paris Convention and 
adopted in the Act of 30 October 1968 introduced into French 
law the principle of strict liability on the nuclear operator 
regardless of fault. This strict liability regime relieves the victim 
of the burden of proving the liability of the operator and makes 
the operator strictly liable for damage to or loss of life of any 
person, and damage to or loss of any property caused by any 
nuclear accident occurring in his installation or during transport 
on his behalf. It is relevant to State, however, that the Paris 
Convention does allow the operator to have a conventional right 
of recourse against another party to a contract if the accident was 
caused by an intentional act or omission, but this may not operate 
against the victim. 
The liability of the operator is limited to: 
- EUR 91,469,410 for an accident occurring in an 
installation (Art. 4 Act No. 68-943); 
- EUR 22,867,353 for transport or a low-risk 
installation (Art. 4 Act No. 68-943). 
Over and above the amount of the operator’s liability, 
victims are compensated under the conditions and within the 
limits laid down by the Brussels Supplementary Convention: 
                                                          
 138  Cannarsa, Lafay & Moréteau, supra note 122, at 88. 
 139  Loi 68-943 du 30 octobre 1968 relative à la responsabilité civile dans le 
domaine de l’énergie nucléaire [Law 68-943 of October 30, 1968 on third party 
liability in the field of nuclear energy], J.O., Oct. 31, 1968, p. 10195. 
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- up to 175 million SDR (EUR 215 million or USD 
244 million) by the State in whose territory the 
installation is located; 
- up to 300 million SDR (EUR 368.30 million or 
USD 418.20 million) by the Contracting Parties to 
this Convention, including France, whose own 
financial contribution under the method of 
calculation used currently stands at approximately 
34%. 
Article 7 of the Act of 30 October 1968 requires each 
operator to have and maintain insurance or other financial 
security for an amount corresponding to his liability for an 
accident. This financial security must be approved by the 
Minister of Economy and Finance. Should the victims of a 
nuclear accident be unable to obtain financial compensation for 
their damage from the insurer, financial guarantor or operator, 
the compensation burden shifts to the State up to the amount of 
EUR 91,469,410 without prejudice to any possible additional 
amounts. 
Protocols amending the Paris and Brussels Conventions 
were signed in Paris on 12 February 2004. Although these 
Protocols have yet to enter into force, their approval was 
authorized in France by Act No. 2006-786 of 5 July 2006.140 They 
have already been transposed into national law (Article 55 of Act 
No. 2006-686 of 13 June 2006 on nuclear transparency and 
safety,141 whose provisions will be applicable upon entry into 
force of the Protocol amending the Paris Convention) in order to 
bring French law into line with the new legal regime thus 
introduced. Once the Protocol amending the Paris Convention 
enters into force, the maximum liability of the operator is set at 
EUR 700 million for nuclear damage caused by each nuclear 
accident (see Art. L-597-4 Ordonnance no 2012-6 du 5 janvier 
2012 modifiant les livres Ier et V du code de l’environnement). 
                                                          
 140  Loi 2006-786 du 5 juillet 2006 autorisant l’approbation d’accords 
internationaux sur la responsabilité civile dans le domaine de l’énergie 
nucléaire [Law 2006-786 of July 5, 2006 authorizing the approval of 
international agreements on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy], 
J.O., Jul. 6, 2006, p. 10115. 
 141  Loi 2006-686 du 13 juin 2006 relative à la transparence et à la sécurité 
en matière nucléaire [Law 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 on transparency and 
nuclear safety], J.O., Jun. 14, 2006, p. 8946. 
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D. Terrorism 
1. Property Damage 
Property coverage against attacks and acts of terrorism 
has been compulsory for all property insurance policies since the 
Act of 9 September 1986.142 Under Article L 126-2 of the Code des 
Assurances, insurance contracts guaranteeing fire damage to 
property as well as damage to motorized land vehicles are 
mandatorily extended to cover direct material damage to the 
insured property caused by a terrorist attack or act of terrorism 
sustained on national territory. The repair of material damage, 
including decontamination costs, and the repair of non-material 
damage resulting from such damage are covered within the limits 
of the deductible and the ceiling set in the fire insurance contract. 
Different limits and excesses may be agreed in the case of large 
risks143 (paragraph 2 of Article L 111-6 of the Code des 
Assurances). 
The terrorist attacks and acts of terrorism referred to in 
the Code des Assurances are the offenses defined by Articles 421-
1 and 421-2 of the French Criminal Code and extends to acts of 
terrorism committed using nuclear, biological, chemical, or 
radiological (NBCR) weapons. In addition, following the 
introduction of the Act of 23 January 2006,144 coverage also 
includes any material damage sustained on national territory that 
may result from an attack perpetrated outside its borders, such as 
contamination by chemical agents; cyber terrorism is also 
covered. 
In 2002, the Gestion de l’Assurance et de la Réassurance 
des Risques Attentats et Actes de Terrorisme (“GAREAT”)  
                                                          
 142  Loi 86-1020 du 9 septembre 1986 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme 
et aux atteintes à la sûreté de l’Etat [Law 86-1020 of September 9, 1968 on 
combatting terrorism and attacks on national security], J.O., Sep. 10, 1986, p. 
10956. 
 143  Large risks are “those relating to fire and natural elements, other 
damage to property, general civil liability, various pecuniary losses, hulls of 
land motor vehicles as well as civil liability, including that of the carrier 
pertaining to these vehicles, when the policyholder carries out an activity 
whose importance exceeds certain thresholds defined by decree taken after 
consultation of the Council of State” (paragraph 2 of Article L 111-6 of the 
Code des Assurances) 
 144  Loi 2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et 
portant dispositions diverses relatives à la sécurité et aux contrôles frontaliers 
[Law 2006-64 of January 23, 2006 on combating terrorism and laying down 
various provisions relating to security and border controls], J.O., Jan. 24, 2006, 
p. 1129. 
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reinsurance pool was created jointly by insurers, reinsurers and 
the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance.145 The GAREAT program is 
divided into two sections: the Large Risks section and the Small 
Risks section. Large risks are defined as risks for which the sums 
insured amount to EUR 20 million or more. The GAREAT 
program is further divided into layers: 
a. the first layer consists of co-reinsurance between 
the members of the pool (EUR 500 million in 
annual aggregate); 
b. the next layers (of each EUR 500 million in annual 
aggregate) consist of reinsurance by international 
professional reinsurers up to the level at which the 
French State intervenes; 
c. the top layer (in excess of EUR 2,520 billion) 
consists, for the Large Risks section, of unlimited 
reinsurance granted by the CCR with a guarantee 
from the French State.146 
A market agreement requires insurers affiliated with the 
two French professional insurance bodies, FFSA and GEMA, to 
cede their terrorism risks systematically to GAREAT’s Large 
Risks section. All other French or foreign insurers authorized to 
cover such risks may likewise join GAREAT’s Large Risks 
section on an individual basis. CCR supplements GAREAT’s 
Large Risks program by providing unlimited state-guaranteed 
coverage beyond the above limit. CCR receives a premium for 
providing unlimited state cover with a state guarantee (i.e. 10% 
of the annual premiums collected by insurers). 
GAREAT reinsurance rates depend upon the sum insured 
of each risk ceded (with the exception of the premium on nuclear 
risks, which is 24% regardless of the sums insured). GAREAT 
rates apply to the property premium of the risks ceded 
individually to GAREAT: 
- insured value between EUR 20 million and < EUR 
50 million: 12% rate; 
- insured value ≥ EUR 50 million: 18% rate. 
The 2015 premium estimated income of GAREAT Large 
risks section is EUR 200 million.147 This figure has remained 
                                                          
 145  In 2015 GAREAT federates 197 members, including ten insurance 
captive companies of large corporations (which have direct membership) and 
60 Lloyd’s Syndicates with which GAREAT deals through their 
representation office in Paris. 
 146   The unlimited coverage is granted under a global Stop Loss 
reinsurance treaty reinsured 100% by Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR). 
 147  OECD INT’L. PLATFORM ON TERRORISM RISK INS., FRANCE – 
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stable for several years and reflects an average 15% rate on 
property policies. Private and public reinsurance accounts for 
around 30% of the premium, which is a significant decrease since 
the scheme’s inception due to the fact that the reinsurance market 
has become more competitive in this field.148 At the close of the 
underwriting year, GAREAT – being a non-funded pool – gives 
back to the members the residual premiums, after deduction of 
the cost of reinsurance, the cost of the CCR Unlimited Treaty, the 
claims, and the management fees. 
2. Personal Injury 
The Guarantee Fund for victims of terrorism and other 
criminal acts, the Fonds de garantie des victimes des actes de 
terrorisme et d’autres infractions (“FGTI”), was created in 1986 
to compensate for bodily harm resulting from acts of terrorism, 
and to provide assistance to victims of offences under ordinary 
law.149 The Fund is financed by a contribution levied on property 
insurance policies.150 Articles L. 422-1 to 6 2 and R. 422-1 to 10 3 
of the Insurance Code deal with the organization and financing of 
the FGTI. 
Since its creation, French or foreign victims of terrorist 
acts occurring in France on or after 1 January 1985 and French 
victims of acts of terrorism occurring abroad can request 
compensation from the FGTI following a special procedure. 
When the authorities pass on information regarding the 
circumstances surrounding the terrorist act and the identity of the 
                                                          
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAMME (2016), 6, 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/France-Terrorism-Risk-Insurance.pdf. 
 148  INT’L FORUM FOR TERRORISM RISK (RE)INS. POOLS, WORLD 
TERRORISM INSURANCE POOLS AND SCHEMES, June 2017, 27, 
http://iftrip.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IFTRIP-brochure-final.pdf. 
 149  See Loi 86-1020 du 9 septembre 1986 relative à la lutte contre le 
terrorisme et aux atteintes à la sûreté de l’Etat, as amended by the loi 90-589 
du 6 juillet 1990 modifiant le code de procédure pénale et le code des 
assurances et relative aux victimes d’infractions [Law 90-589 of July 6, 1990 
amending the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Insurance Code and 
concerning victims of crimes], J.O., Jul. 11, 1990, p. 8175. 
 150  The Guarantee Fund is 75% funded by a lump sum contribution of 
EUR 4.30 (in 2016) from each property insurance contract taken out with a 
company operating in France. The resources of the FGTI are, if necessary, 
supplemented by the reimbursement of the indemnities that the Fund obtains 
from the perpetrators of the offenses that caused the compensated damage 
(20%) and by financial investments (5%). In January 2017, the amount of the 
tax on insurance contracts is increased to EUR 5.90 per contract corresponding 
to EUR  140 million of additional revenue for the FGTI. 
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victims to the FGTI, the Fund’s dedicated terrorist victim 
compensation team contacts victims directly. It helps the 
identified victims to put together their application and strives to 
make funds available quickly in order to cover any initial costs. 
The Fund sets out a compensation proposal to victims within 
three months of a definitive assessment of the damage having 
been determined. Victims will be fully compensated for bodily 
harm, usually after an assessment by a doctor designated by the 
Guarantee Fund. If directly related to the act of terrorism, 
clothing expenses are also reimbursed up to a certain limit by the 
Guarantee Fund on presentation of supporting documents. 
Payments received from other sources for the same losses (e.g. 
national insurance or a mutual insurance scheme) will be 
deducted from the financial compensation paid by the Guarantee 
Fund. 
In 2015, the FGTI made payments totalling EUR 328.8 
million to victims of terrorism and other offences. It should be 
noted that, contrary to Belgium, the French government pays for 
all damages and later claims them back from the insurers. 
3. Example I: The Terrorist Attacks in Paris 
Six terrorist attacks took place on 13 November 2015 in 
Paris. During the attacks, 129 people were killed and more than 
350 wounded. President Hollande called on all Member States of 
the European Union to offer assistance to France. He referred to 
Article 42 (7) of the EU Treaty, which states that if a Member 
State is attacked on its own territory, the other countries have the 
duty to “provide help and assistance by all means available to 
them”. This was the first time in the history of the European 
Union that a Member State relied on the article. On 17 
November, all 28 EU Member States unanimously agreed with 
the request for help. The Member States were allowed to decide 
for themselves how they implemented the aid. 
It is to be noted that the Guarantee Fund’s articles state 
that anyone who, at the time of the attack, was within a 
government-determined perimeter of a terrorist attack, may call 
himself a victim, even without being physically injured. The 
Fund’s clause seems to have unintentionally created a new 
market – more and more people know how to find their way to 
the Fund and claim to be victims of a terrorist attack. Indeed, 
among the 2,579 people who have received compensation from 
the state-run Fund, “1,218 claimed compensation for 
psychological injuries sustained in the attacks, 576 claimed 
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compensation for physical injuries sustained in the attacks and 
758 are family members of people who were killed in the 
attacks”.151 Victims of the attack on 13 November received, in 
respect of the provisions paid by the FGTI, EUR 64 million. In 
November 2017, 947 victims out of 2,579 have been the subject of 
a final offer of compensation. 
There is also controversy over the amounts allocated, and 
critics argue that the operation of the FGTI is “too old and 
bureaucratic”. The FGTI is now engaged in improving its 
services and, on 26 September 2017, its Board of Directors 
decided to recognize “anguish” as a form of suffering. Anguish is 
compensated with a minimum lump sum of EUR 10,000.152 
It is expected that the November attacks in Paris will lead 
to claims worth EUR 350 million in the coming years. Several 
newspaper articles claim that the Guarantee Fund has been 
depleted. 
4. Example II: The Terrorist Attacks in Nice 
On the evening of 14 July 2016, a nineteen ton cargo truck 
was deliberately driven into crowds of people celebrating Bastille 
Day on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice, France. The attack 
resulted in the death of 86 people and the injury of 458 others. 
Following the attack, the FGTI received 2,966 requests, 
and 1,609 victims received a compensatory response by July 2017. 
Nearly 98% of victims have been compensated. The first 
compensation provisions were paid within ten days.153 Family 
members of victims who died in Nice can count on a 
compensation of EUR 40,000. Those who were injured are 
reimbursed according to the severity of their injuries. At the end 
of July 2017, the French government had already paid around 
                                                          
 151  Romina McGuinness, France pays 64 million euros to victims of Paris 
Bataclan terror attacks, EXPRESS (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/876648/paris-bataclan-terror-attack-
victims-france-pay-millions-euros.  The article quotes a spokesperson for the 
Guarantee Fund for Victims of Terrorist and Other Criminal acts. 
 152  Aurélie Abadie, Terrorisme: 64 M€ déjà versés aux victimes de 
l’attentat du Bataclan, L’ARGUS DE L’ASSURANCE (Nov. 6, 2017), 
http://www.argusdelassurance.com/institutions/organisations-professionnelles-
et-regulateurs/terrorisme-64-m-deja-verses-aux-victimes-de-l-attentat-du-
bataclan.123745. 
 153  Flore Thomasset, À Nice, de Nouvelles demandes d’indemnisation de 
victims arrivent chaque jour, LA CROIX (July 13, 2017), https://www.la-
croix.com/France/Securite/A-Nice-nouvelles-demandes-dindemnisation-
victimes-arrivent-chaque-jour-2017-07-13-1200862732. 
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EUR 300,000 to the victims of Nice. However, there’s also anger 
over the slow pace of victim compensation on the part of the 
State.154 Only 25 of the promised EUR 300 million have been paid 
out to 1,610 victims.155 After filing an application, victims are 
given an advance payment of between EUR 2,500 and EUR 
5,000. 
E. Summary 
Like most nations in the world, French society refuses to 
reconcile itself to the notion of fatality. Instead, the country likes 
to characterize itself as requiring ever-growing safety and 
security. This requirement generates the conviction that all risks 
must be covered, that the repair of all damage must be quick and 
complete and that society must provide, to this effect, not only 
compensation for the damage it has provoked, but also for both 
unforeseeable damage and unpreventable damage. The general 
tendency is therefore to extend the risks covered and to enable 
damage compensation at any point in time. Once the demand for 
reparation becomes necessary, hybrid mechanisms (mixing to 
various degrees insurance, liability, and solidarity) for damage 
compensation are used. This overall tendency can be summarized 
by the expression “risk socialization”.156 It is, however, not really 
the risk that is socialized, but its harmful consequences and their 
compensation. 
It can be noted that, if insurance is already a form of 
solidarity – since it leans on mutualisation – risk socialization 
calls upon a widened solidarity beyond the circle of the co-
insured, hereby including national solidarity. 
This attitude of France towards compensation is also clear 
from the way in which the financial compensation for victims of 
                                                          
 154  Barbara Wesel, France remembers Nice terror attack victims but 
questions remain, DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 13, 2017), 
http://www.dw.com/en/france-remembers-nice-terror-attack-victims-but-
questions-remain/a-39682325. 
 155  Cécile Bouanchaud, Un an après l’attentat, la complexe indemnisation 
des victims de Nice, LE MONDE (July 15, 2017), 
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2017/07/14/un-an-apres-l-attentat-la-
sinueuse-indemnisation-des-victimes-de-nice_5160886_3224.html. 
 156  The concept of “risk socialization” is highlighted in the Annual Report 
2005 of the Conseil d’ État: Conseil d’ État (2005). “Rapport public 2005 – 
Responsabilité et Socialisation du Risque”.  La Documentation française, 
Paris: 398, available at: http://www.conseil-etat.fr/Decisions-Avis-
Publications/Etudes-Publications/Rapports-Etudes/Responsabilite-et-
socialisation-du-risque-Rapport-public-2005. 
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disasters is arranged in France. With its Act of 1982 which 
provides a comprehensive mandatory insurance for natural 
disasters, France is in a way even a frontrunner at international 
level. The mandatory insurance guarantees that all those who 
have housing insurance, which is more than 90% of the 
population, will also be automatically insured against natural 
disasters. The model also provides for state guaranteed 
reinsurance via the CCR, and is regularly applied inter alia at the 
occasion of the 2016 flooding. With respect to technological 
disasters France created a mandatory first party insurance in 
2003 which resulted in a mandatory add-on for technological 
risks. With regard to nuclear damage, the compensation 
provided, at least via the operators’ liability is, as will be shown 
later, low in an international comparison. For terrorism, an 
insurance pool jointly created by insurers, reinsurers and the 
CCR (GAREAT) provides cover for property damage via a 
multi-layered approach with even unlimited reinsurance via the 
CCR with a state guarantee. Personal injury will be covered 
through a fund. The Guarantee Fund was applied inter alia to 
cover for the November 2015 terrorist attacks. 
IV. GERMANY 
A. Natural Disasters 
1. Ad hoc ex post Compensation 
Germany’s approach to financial compensation for 
victims of natural disasters is remarkably different than the 
regimes implemented in Belgium and France. The most 
significant difference stems from Germany’s exclusion of 
damages related to natural disasters from the mandatory 
insurance scheme.157 Therefore, no single instrument deals 
exclusively with financial compensation of victims of natural 
catastrophes.158 As a result, potential victims of natural 
catastrophes in Germany must rely on private insurance.  In 
exceptional cases, such as widespread damage resulting from a 
catastrophe, the German government, or specific Länder, will 
intervene with ad hoc legislation to provide financial 
                                                          
 157  Reimund Schwarze & Gert G. Wagner, In the aftermath of Dresden: 
New directions in German flood insurance, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND 
INS. [GPRI] 154, 159 (2004). 
 158  Ulrich Magnus, Germany, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS 
OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACH, supra note 1, at 121. 
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compensation to victims of catastrophes.159 The ad hoc 
compensation based on specific statutes in Germany is qualified 
as “rather insecure, often inadequate, but sometimes 
‘overgenerous’”.160 Because disaster insurance is not mandatory 
in Germany, insurance coverage is generally low.161 
The German system of ad hoc ex post compensation was 
heavily criticised in various studies, mainly for creating the so-
called charity hazard. Charity hazard refers to the concept that 
individuals reject insurance cover against natural hazards 
because they anticipate governmental and private aid.162 
Empirical research comparing the mandatory public monopoly 
insurance in Switzerland with systems of risk transfer found in 
Austria and Germany also indicated that charity hazard in 
Germany caused a substantial market failure in terms of 
insufficient insurance demand.163 As a result, numerous reforms 
to the German system were formulated, the most important one 
related to the introduction of  mandatory comprehensive disaster 
insurance based on the French system.164 Despite political debates 
in 2004, discussions regarding mandatory disaster insurance did 
not result in action at Germany’s legislative level. Schwarze and 
Wagner show that political considerations played an important 
role in the decision-making process.165 This is related to the fact 
                                                          
 159  See Raschki, P., Schwarze, R., Schwindt, M. & Weck-Hannemann, H., 
Alternative financing and insurance solutions for natural hazards. A 
comparison of different risk transfer systems in three countries – Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland – Affected by the August 2005 floods, Innsbruck, 
KGV Prevention Foundation, 2009, 13-15; REIMUND SCHWARZE, MANIJEH 
SCHWINDT, GERT WAGNER & HANNELORE WECK-HANNEMANN, 
ÖKONOMISCHE STRATEGIEN DES NATURGEFAHRENMANAGEMENTS: 
KONZEPTE, ERFAHRUNGEN UND HERAUSFORDERUNGEN 25-26 (2012). 
 160  Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 157, at 154. 
 161  At the occasion of the “flood of the century” (Jahrhundert Flut) of the 
Elbe in 2002, estimates were provided of available flooding insurance. The 
number of policies with additional (flooding) cover was estimated not to exceed 
9%. See: Id., at 160.  Also later studies inter alia with respect to a flooding in 
2005 showed low amounts of insurance cover. See: SCHWARZE, SCHWINDT, 
WAGNER & WECK-HANNEMANN, supra note 159, at 25-26. 
 162  See Paul Raschki & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, Charity hazard: a 
real hazard to natural disaster insurance?, 7 ENVTL. HAZARDS, no. 4, 2007, at 
321. 
 163  See, e.g., Raschki, Schwarze, Schwindt & Weck-Hannemann, supra 
note 159, at 20. 
 164  See, e.g., Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 157, at 162-63; Endres, Ohl 
& Rundshagen, supra note 23. 
 165  “Ad hoc aid gives the decision-makers greater discretion in their 
response to natural disasters than regularised benefits”. See Reimund 
Schwarze & Gert G. Wagner, The Political Economy of Natural Disaster 
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that ad hoc responses to disasters provide large political 
advantages, more particularly to the politicians already in office. 
It is a point that has been powerfully made by Depoorter who 
showed that there will often be underinvestment in ex ante 
prevention and overinvestment in ex post recovery for the simple 
reason that politicians can obtain larger political rewards from ex 
post recovery payments than from investments in ex ante 
prevention, which only pay off after their term of office.166 The 
case of the Elbe flood in 2006 illustrates that point: “Chancellor 
Schröder’s energetic and sympathetic efforts to help Saxony 
during the floods led to the governing parties renewed popularity, 
helping the social democrats to win the 2006 election”.167 Another 
argument against the introduction of the mandatory disaster 
insurance was that it would lead, in a time of economic crisis, to 
an estimated withdrawal of EUR 2.85 billion  (USD 3.24 billion) 
of purchasing power from the German economy, which was 
needed to stimulate economic growth.168 The refusal to introduce 
mandatory disaster insurance in Germany once more underscores 
the difficulty of introducing mandatory insurance, given the 
political rewards that can be gained through (largely inefficient) 
ex post ad hoc compensation. 
2. Example I: The 2002 Elbe Flooding 
After the 2002 flood, a specific Act, 
Flutopferhilfesolidaritätsgesetz, was created to establish a Fund 
in order to support the victims of the catastrophe.169 The purpose 
of the Fund was to give first and limited financial assistance on a 
primary level (Soforthilfe) and, subsequently, to finance measures 
for reconstruction (Aufbauhilfe) and the removal of damage 
caused by the flood.170 
Various studies on the Elbe flood of 2002 also provide 
information on the amount of losses and the financing of such 
losses.171 The official estimate in 2002 was that total losses 
                                                          
Insurance: Lessons from the Failure of a Proposed Compulsory Insurance 
Scheme in Germany, 17 EUR. ENV’T. 403, 413 (2007). 
 166  Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and 
Demand of Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L. J. 101 (2006). 
 167  Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 165, at 413. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Magnus, supra note 158, at 121. 
 170  Id. at 123. 
 171  Mechler, R. & Weichselgartner, J. (2003). Disaster Loss Financing in 
Germany – The Case of the Elbe River Floods 2002. IIASA Interim Report. 
IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria: IR-03-021, available at: 
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resulting from the Elbe flooding would amount to approximately 
EUR 9.2 billion (USD 10.4 billion). According to Magnus the 
2002 Flood Fund disposed of a total amount of EUR 8.1 billion 
(USD 9.2 billion) that was distributed through the administration 
of the local communities.172 
The following amounts were compensated by the 
government after the Elbe flooding 
Table 2: Financing Programs in the Elbe Flood 
 Private 
Households 
Residential 
Property 
Business Agricultur
e and 
Forestry 
Emergency 
Relief 
Financing 
EUR 
500/person 
(USD 568), 
Max. EUR 
2,000/household 
(USD 2,270) 
EUR 
5,000/building 
(USD 5,680) 
EUR 15,000 
(50% of loss) 
(USD 17,000) 
and EUR 
500/employee 
EUR 
50,000 
(USD 
57,000) 
 Municipal 
Infrastructure 
Residential 
Property 
Business Agricultur
e and 
Forestry 
Reconstructio
n Financing 
Assistance 
90% of 
reconstruction 
costs 
Max. 80% of 
reconstruction 
costs 
35-75% of 
reconstruction 
costs 
Max. 30% 
of crop 
losses, Max. 
EUR 1 
million 
Source: Mechler & Weichselgartner (2003), 31. 
3. Example II: 2013 Floodings 
Following heavy early summer flooding across much of 
Germany in 2013, federal and State leaders agreed on an EUR 8 
billion package of assistance to help those hit hardest by the 
natural disaster. The federal government agreed to finance all the 
so-called “reconstruction aid” upfront. The Länder then needed to 
pay back EUR 3.25 billion through debt retirement and interest 
payments over twenty years. The Fund picked up the tab for up 
to 80 percent of the cost of repairing the flood damage. 
                                                          
http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/7060/  
 172  Magnus, supra note 158, at 133. 
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4. Example III: 2017 Summer Floodings 
In the summer of 2017, the Elbe rose from a normal 
summer level of about two metres to 9.16 metres, well surpassing 
the 8.77 metre record of 1845. The particular storm, Paul,  raged 
mainly in the northern half of Germany, especially in Hamburg, 
Berlin, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-Westphalia. In the last 
two days of June 2017, Storm Rasmund’s heavy rain fell on large 
parts of Berlin and Brandenburg. In part, over 200 liters of rain 
fell over a square meter within 24 hours. By comparison, 
Germany has an average of just under 800 liters per square meter 
for a whole year. The heavy rain alone caused damage of around 
EUR 60 million, mainly in Berlin and Brandenburg. For the 
heavy storm series between the end of June and the beginning of 
July 2017, the compensation for insured persons amounted to 
around EUR 600 million. About half of the compensation related 
to damaged houses, household effects, commercial and industrial 
enterprises while the other half of compensation related to fully 
insured cars.173 
Following the 2017 summer floodings, the German 
government announced hundreds of millions of euros in 
emergency relief to flood victims; further, the German 
government offered a package of tax breaks to ease the clean-up. 
The Länder also set up various compensation programs. The 
State of Lower Saxony, for example, put in place an aid program 
for private households, in order to support tenants and owners in 
the repair of residential buildings and the renovation of 
household items. If the damage surpasses EUR 500, victims can 
receive compensation of up to 80 percent, but victims should 
primarily use insurance benefits. The financial compensation is 
tied to the condition that those affected insure themselves against 
natural hazards in the future.174 In June 2017, the conference of 
the Heads of the Federal States agreed to negotiate a piece of 
federal legislation that regulates pay-outs of governmental 
disaster relief aid. 
                                                          
 173  GESAMTVERBAND DER DEUTSCHEN VERSUCHERUNGSWIRTSCHAFT, 
UNWETTER “PAUL” UND “RASMUND” VERURSACHEN SCHÄDEN VON ÜBER 
EINER HALBEN MILLIARDE EURO (July 12, 2017), 
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B. Technological Disasters 
Germany does not have specific regulations for 
technological disasters. There are, however, strict liabilities 
introduced via liability statutes for example: the Road Traffic 
Act, Straßenverkehrsgesetz (“StVG”); the Air Traffic Act, 
Luftverkehrsgesetz (“LuftVG”); the Environmental Liability Act, 
Umwelthaftungsgesetz (“UmweltHG”); and the Genetechnic Act, 
Gentechnikgesetz (“GenTG”).175 Catastrophic events resulting 
from a dangerous activity are in principle covered by strict 
liability statutes. Examples such as a derailed train or a train 
burning in a tunnel would be subject to a strict liability of the 
operator or keeper.176 
However, literature  which adopts the economic approach 
to law holds that strict liability statutes fail to provide 
satisfactory protection in the case of catastrophic damage for a 
variety of reasons. First, there may be catastrophic damage 
resulting from a technological disaster where no specific strict 
liability statute is applicable. For example, the storage of 
explosives in an inhabited flat in a densely-populated 
neighbourhood. Second, there is a large possibility for the 
operator to call on force majeure, thus excluding the liability. A 
third criticism relates to the fact that the special statutes 
introducing strict liability often contain limited amounts of 
compensation. As a result of such financial caps, the full damage 
resulting from the technological disaster may not be 
compensated.177 
C. Nuclear Accidents 
Liability for nuclear installations is laid down in the 
Nuclear Energy Act, Atomgesetz (“AtG”),178 which executes the 
international conventions mentioned above.179 The Atomic 
Energy Act aims both at promoting the use of nuclear energy and 
preventing damages. While initially passed in 1959, the Atomic 
Energy Act was recast in 1985 and modified in 2002, 2011, and 
                                                          
 175  Magnus, supra note 158, at 124-125. 
 176  Id. at 125. 
 177  Id. at 127. 
 178  Gesetz über die friedliche Verwendung der Kernenergie und den 
Schutz gegen ihre Gefahren [AtG] [Atomic Energy Act], July 15, 1985, BGBL. I 
at 1565, as amended by Gesetz zur Modernisierung der Rechts der 
Umweltverträglichkeit [Act on the modernization of the law of environmental 
compatibility], July 20, 2017, BGBL. I at 2808, paragraph 2 section 2 (Ger.). 
 179  See supra Section II.C.1. 
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2017. In addition, Germany is a party to the Paris Convention, 
the Brussels Supplementary Convention, and the Joint 
Protocol.180 According to the Atomic Energy Act, “the Paris 
Convention shall apply as national law in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, unless its provisions depend on reciprocity as effected 
by the entry into force of the Convention” (paragraph 25 (1) AtG). 
The provisions of the Paris Convention provide the basis of 
nuclear liability in Germany. They are complemented by Sections 
25 – 40 of the Atomic Energy Act. 
The Atomic Energy Act sets forth characteristics of 
nuclear liability in Germany.181 As in the international regime, 
liability is channelled to the operators of a nuclear power plant 
and the operators are strictly liable for the damage caused by a 
nuclear incident (paragraph 25 (1) AtG). Liability is stricter in 
Germany because defenses under the international regimes, such 
as defenses for armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, insurrection, 
or grave natural disasters of an exceptional character, are no 
longer available (paragraph 25 (3) AtG). If the damage occurs 
abroad, however, financial compensation is only due if that 
country provides reciprocal benefits (paragraph 25 (3) AtG). The 
territorial restrictions under Article 2 of the Paris Convention do 
not apply such that the operator is liable irrespective of the place 
of the damage (paragaph 25 (4) AtG). Germany’s system of 
unlimited liability constitutes a significant deviation from the 
international system. The liability is limited to the maximum 
amount of the government indemnification only if damage is 
caused by an armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, insurrection, or 
a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character (paragraph 31 
(1) AtG). 
To provide coverage for the potential liability, the 
operators are required to seek financial security (paragraph 13 (1) 
AtG). The administrative authority shall determine the type, 
                                                          
 180  OECD-NEA, Nuclear Legislation in OECD and NEA Countries. 
Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities. Germany, 
2011, available at: https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/germany.pdf. 
Germany signed the 2004 Protocols to Amend the Paris Convention and the 
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with other EU States to deposit its instruments of ratification of the Protocols. 
Gesetz zu den Pariser Atomhaftungs-Protokollen 2004 [Act on the 2004 Paris 
Nuclear Liability Protocols], August 29, 2008, BGBL. II at 902; Gesetz zur 
Änderung haftungsrechtlicher Vorschriften des Atomgesetzes und zur 
Änderung sonstiger Rechtsvorschriften [Act to amend the liability provisions 
of the Atomic Energy Act and other legal provisions], August 29, 2008, BGBL. 
I at 1793 (Ger.). 
 181  See LIU, supra note 92, at 226-27, for further details. 
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terms and amount of the financial security; however, in 2002, a 
limitation of EUR 2.5 billion was imposed on the amount of 
financial security (paragraph 13 (2) AtG).182 Since the maximum 
coverage amount of EUR 2.5 billion is not available at the 
insurance market, the operators of nuclear power plants started 
to find alternatives. In 2001, the four parent companies of 
Germany’s nineteen nuclear power plants negotiated and 
concluded a “Solidarity Agreement” (Solidarvereinbarung).183 The 
Agreement consists of six sections and four annexes. Under this 
Agreement, up to EUR 255.6 million nuclear liability is covered 
by third party liability insurance taken out by each operator.184 
Between this amount and EUR 2.5 billion, coverage is provided 
under the framework of a a contract to which all nuclear power 
plant operators and their respective parent companies are jointly 
subscribed. Each party has an obligation to contribute a 
percentage of the total amount in case a damage is attributed to 
one of the parties. The percentage for each nuclear power station 
is calculated according to the square root of the thermal reactor 
output. The percentage of power plants is then attributed to the 
parent companies on the basis of their participation (Clause 1 (3) 
Solidarity Agreement). 
This allocation of liability is different from that in the US, 
where each operator bears the same quota. In Germany, the 
allocation of contribution is based on the generating capacity. As 
in the US, the obligation to make the contribution only comes due 
after a damage in excess of the insurance capacity happens. 
                                                          
 182  In the beginning of the 1970s, a pooling system in Germany emerged. 
At that time, an increase of the financial security up to 1 billion DEM (≈ EUR 
500 million) was on the legislative agenda. The first DEM 500 million should 
be covered by private means while the government should indemnify the 
remaining half. The insurers and nuclear operators negotiated to cover liability 
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fronted contract. The remaining DEM 300 million was reinsured by the 
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valid until 2002. In 2002, the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act increased 
the amount of financial security up to EUR 2.5 billion and allowed financial 
security in other forms rather than through liability insurance. See Norbert 
Pelzer, International Pooling of Operators’ Funds: An Option to Increase the 
Amount of Financial Security to Cover Nuclear Liabilities, 79 NUCLEAR L. 
BULL. 37, 43 (2007); Simon Carrol, Perspective on the Pros and Cons of a 
Pooling-type Approach to Nuclear Third Party Liability, 81 NUCLEAR L. 
BULL. 75, 91 (2008). 
 183  Pelzer, supra note 182, at 44 n. 24. 
 184  Insurers argued they could only provide full coverage up to EUR  256 
million. See Carrol, supra note 182, at 91. 
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However, the risk that the operators have to contribute is even 
smaller in Germany where the partners only have to pay if 
neither the operator nor the parent company are in a position to 
pay up to EUR 2.5 billion (Clause 1 (5) Solidarity Agreement). 
The Solidarity Agreement is hence only a guarantee for the 
payment by the liable parties. 
If the liability is not covered by or cannot be satisfied by 
financial security, the German State shall indemnify the operator 
(paragraph 34 (1) AtG). The maximum amount of 
indemnification – to the extent that the damages are not covered 
by private financial security or that claims cannot be paid out of 
such security – is set at EUR 2.5 billion. The obligation of 
payment is the maximum amount minus the amount that is 
covered by financial security. Such indemnification is borne for 
up to the amount of EUR 500 million, 75% by the federal 
authorities and 25% by the region (in German referred to as 
Land) where the installation is situated. The federal State covers 
the amount between EUR 500 million and 2.5 billion alone. After 
the payment of the indemnification, recourse is possible if the 
operator disobeys specific obligations, or the operator caused the 
damage wilfully or by gross negligence, or if the operator did not 
seek financial security to the required extent (paragraph 37 AtG). 
But the liability for third parties prevails over the claims for 
recourse (Clause 1(8) Solidarity Agreement). In addition to 
mutually guaranteeing the coverage of liability, the partners must 
also provide help in handling claims; for example, they may 
provide legal and commercial staff capacity and infrastructure. 
For this kind of support, the partners cannot ask for repayment. 
The partners also provide help for the use of independent 
contractors, up to the amount of EUR 122,218 million (Clause 2 
Solidarity Agreement). To ensure the availability of assets in case 
of damage, the partners must submit an auditor’s certification 
each year (Clause 3 Solidarity Agreement). 
German law therefore differs importantly from the 
international Conventions by providing a much higher amount of 
compensation via a retrospective pooling scheme. The amount of 
financial security to be provided through the pool moreover does 
not eliminate the principal liability of the operator. In other 
words, under the German approach nuclear operators are still 
liable if the capacity of the pool is depleted. 
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D. Terrorism 
1. Material Damage 
In response to 9/11, the German reinsurance market made 
the decision to exclude losses due to an act of terrorism. The 
primary market followed suit in view of the missing reinsurance 
capacity. This led to the creation of a so-called terrorism pool – as 
was the case in many countries. Extremus Versicherungs-AG 
(“Extremus”), a pool consisting of seventeen insurers and 
reinsurers, was created and approved by the German State 
authority in September 2002.185 Extremus acts as primary insurer, 
issuing the policies on its own paper. The company buys 
reinsurance from its shareholders, from other companies active in 
the German market and from international reinsurers. The 
scheme is not mandatory, nor is it mandatory for insurers to offer 
terrorism coverage for larger risks. Primary insurers might 
recommend their clients to Extremus if the clients wish to 
purchase terrorism insurance.186 
Extremus intervenes to cover damage to property and 
losses due to the interruption of business operations. Nuclear, 
biological, or chemical (“NBC”) contamination is excluded, as 
well as cyber terrorism. The scheme also does not include 
aviation, marine, life or personal accidents. Financial 
compensation for victims of terrorist attacks is thus not covered 
by Extremus. All property has to be located within Germany and 
losses have to occur in German territory. 
Due to the scope of risk for which Extremus is eligible, the 
primary market is able to provide coverage for smaller risks that 
result as a consequence of a terrorist attack. Extremus covers 
losses higher than EUR 25 million, but coverage is subject to an 
overall limitation of EUR 2.5 billion.187 All policies provide for a 
standard deductible of EUR 50,000. The maximum damage 
which a policyholder can insure with Extremus for a single year 
is limited to EUR 1.5 billion.188 Above the limit of EUR 2.5 
billion (in the annual aggregate co-insured by members of the 
pool), the German State provides additional coverage up to an 
amount of EUR 10 billion for excess losses.189 For its guarantee, 
the State receives a payment of 12.5% of the premiums collected 
                                                          
 185  Magnus, supra note 158, at 130. 
 186  INT’L FORUM FOR TERRORISM RISK (RE)INS. POOLS, supra note 148. 
 187  Magnus, supra note 158, at 130. 
 188  Id. 
 189  Id.; Schwarze & Wagner, supra note 157, at 163. 
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by Extremus. Extremus is in other words a multi-layered 
insurance pool consisting of insurers and reinsurers providing a 
total capacity of EUR 10 billion. Thus far, no indemnifications 
have been paid out by Extremus. The severe terrorism attack on 
19 December 2016 in Berlin affected one insured (the other 
victims having sustained only physical injuries), but the loss 
remained within the deductible.190 
Since 1 January 2017, Extremus has been offering so-
called “threat insurance”, which covers certain incidental costs if, 
for example, a shopping center is closed by authorities because it 
is presumed to be the scene of a terrorist attack. 
2. Personal Injury 
Victims of violent crime in Germany have a right to ask 
financial compensation under the Victims Compensation Law.191 
The Law is based on the concept that victims of a violent attack 
have a claim for compensation against the State which has been 
unable to protect them in spite of all its efforts. Physical or mental 
harm as a result of a violent attack is a prerequisite for a claim for 
compensation. Victims of crimes of violence receive all health 
treatment measures necessary to restore or improve their health; 
this includes, for example, health or occupational rehabilitation 
measures, care services, psychotherapeutic treatment, etc. This 
Act also provides payments to cover living expenses and long-
term pension payments to compensate for the physical injuries 
and economic losses. The level of the graduated pension 
payments is governed by the extent of the respective injury to 
health and the losses of income caused by the injury. At the 
lowest level, the current monthly payment is EUR 118. The only 
payments that will be deducted are those which the victim 
actually receives in respect of the same injury and which are also 
intended for the same purpose. 
Compensation can be claimed by German nationals and 
by foreigners who are lawful residents in Germany. 
                                                          
 190  Charlie Thomas, Extremus Considering First Claim Following Berlin 
Attack, THE INSURANCE INSIDER (Jan. 18, 2017), 
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berlin-attack. 
 191  Gesetz über die Entschädigung für Opfer von Gewalttaten [OEG] 
[Victims Compensation Law], May 11, 1976, BGBL. I at 1181 (Ger.). 
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3. Example: The 2016 Berlin Terrorist Attack 
On 19 December 2016, a truck was deliberately driven 
into the Christmas market next to the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial 
Church at Breitscheidplatz in Berlin, leaving twelve people dead 
and 56 others injured. 
There was some initial confusion over the financial 
compensation for the victims’ families. Since the attacker used a 
truck, it was initially classified as a road incident rather than a 
terrorist attack. Therefore, the victims had to apply to the 
Verkehrsopferhilfe, an assistance Fund set up to aid victims of 
road accidents. As a result, the victims of the Berlin attack have 
been compensated partly from a Fund primarily set up to deal 
with motor vehicle accidents and not under the aegis of the 
Victims Compensation Law. The German Justice Minister said 
that the government would rewrite German law to rule out such 
absurdities in future. By December 2017, Germany paid out EUR 
2.3 million in compensation and support. The government’s 
hardship rules set individual sums of EUR 10,000 for immediate 
family members and EUR 5,000 for siblings.192 Those left 
wounded have received sums based on the severity of their 
injuries. 
The initial response to the tragic events in Berlin has been 
broadly criticized, and the poor handling of Germany’s response 
has been widely admitted, so much so that a final report on the 
underlying problems has been presented by the German Justice 
Minister in December 2017.193 In particular, victims and relatives 
complained about the lack of state recognition, the lack of timely 
information, and the inadequate government financial support. 
The report proposes the establishment of information centers for 
victims and relatives at the site of terrorist attacks, as well as a 
point of contact in the government. It also wants to streamline 
procedures for notifying family members of people who have 
been seriously injured or killed. Further, the government should 
take the lead in advising victims and relatives on how to get 
support and compensation payments. Interestingly, the 
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recommendations in the report have been based on general 
practice in Israel, a country with an extensive history of dealing 
with terrorist attacks. 
E. Summary 
Germany regards the prevention of catastrophic damage 
as a matter of great importance.194 Prevention as far as possible is 
the overriding aim of any protection against catastrophes. This is 
particularly affected by requiring extended preventive measures 
and precautions as far as private or public operators of publically 
accessible places or events (installations, plants, trains, planes, 
sporting events, etc.) are concerned. These operators are required 
to provide reasonable preventive safety measures even against 
natural disasters. Moreover, the German Federation and the 
Länder have established specific institutes, agencies and 
measures with the goal of protecting the population against 
catastrophic risks. 
However, as far as ex post financial compensation for 
victims is concerned, Germany lacks a structural solution similar 
to the mandatory comprehensive first party insurance systems 
implemented in Belgium and France. Attempts to introduce such 
a model failed. As a result, victims of natural disasters in 
Germany have to rely on ad hoc ex post compensation. The 
flooding that occurred in 2013 and 2017 showed that the German 
government (often the federal level, but often equally in 
combination with the Länder) generously intervenes. 
Germany especially has a strikingly interesting model for 
the compensation of damage caused by nuclear accidents. The 
total amount of indemnification is high, also in international 
comparison (EUR 2.5 billion), but it is especially striking that the 
largest part of this compensation is paid via a risk-sharing 
agreement between the nuclear power plant operators. Germany 
has, like the Netherlands and Belgium, also created a special 
insurance pool to deal with terrorism-related property damage 
(Extremus). Personal injury is compensated on the basis of a 
special act dealing with financial compensation for specific 
victims. Notwithstanding particular problems, the German 
government paid out EUR 2.3 million in compensating the 
victims of the 2016 Berlin terrorist attack. 
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V. THE NETHERLANDS 
A. Natural Disasters 
1. Introduction 
The Netherlands has suffered various types of natural 
catastrophes, including an earthquake in Southern-Limburg 
(1992), severe storms (1997, 2002, 2007 and 2013), and heavy rain 
and flooding in the South-East (1993-1995). With respect to each 
natural catastrophe, the legal instruments available to provide 
financial compensation came into question. Victims frequently 
approached the government for compensation and, as a result, 
the government of the Netherlands intervened on various 
occasions by using the public budget to provide ad hoc 
compensation to the victims. As is shown below, a specific Act – 
Wet Tegemoetkoming Schade bij Rampen en Zware Ongevallen 
(“WTS”) – was created in 1998 with the aim of providing 
financial compensation to the victims of catastrophes and severe 
accidents. in practice, however, it appears that WTS often has 
not been applied to cases where many people suffered harm as a 
result of a disaster. Therefore, in addition to the statutory 
arrangement in the WTS, the government of the Netherlands 
along with other organisations created ad hoc solutions for 
specific victims. The main problems with respect to the 
insurability of disasters and the solutions via these collective 
arrangements are addressed below. 
2. Evolution of Insurance Coverage 
In the 1950s Dutch insurers issued so-called binding 
decisions, applying to all their members, prohibiting them from 
insuring flood and earthquake risks; the latter being relatively 
small in the Netherlands with the exception of the area around 
southern Limburg.195 The argument of the insurers was that these 
risks were technically not insurable and that therefore all of their 
members should refrain from covering them.196 The insurers 
feared adverse selection because of concerns regarding the 
occurrence of a natural disaster that resulted in billions of euros 
                                                          
 195  Ton Hartlief, Vergoeding van watersnoodschade, in RECHT IN HET 
WATER: DE JURIDISCHE ASPECTEN VAN WATERSNOOD 131, 142-143 (Michael 
G. Faure & Frits Stroink eds., 1995). 
 196  MICHAEL G. FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING 
SYSTEMIC RISKS, 223-25 (2003). 
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worth of damage and an insufficient amount of statistical 
material for the calculation of premiums. It was argued that only 
those who would be largely exposed to the risk would have a 
demand for insurance; others would have no need for coverage, 
leading to a situation of adverse selection. Consequently, those 
who faced the risk of being affected by a natural disaster could 
not receive coverage simply because insurers had agreed not to 
cover those risks. 
As a result of an earthquake close to Roermond in 1992 
and the flooding of the River Meuse in 1993, the binding decision 
concerning earthquakes was quickly withdrawn, and insurers 
came under increased pressure to abrogate the binding decision 
on flooding. In part, this was the result of political pressure on 
insurers, as can be seen, for instance, by the questions that were 
put to the government during the parliamentary proceedings.197 
But it was due also to the concerns of the European competition 
authorities since the binding decision clearly violated the 
conditions of Regulation 3932/92 of 21 December 1992 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the “Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance 
sector”.198 Levie and Cousy (1994) have commented on this 
exemption regulation, which states that standard policy 
conditions in particular may not contain any systematic exclusion 
of specific types of risk without providing for the express 
possibility of including that cover by agreement (see 
Consideration 8 preceding the exemption of the Regulation, as 
well as Article 7(1)(a) of the exemption, reflecting that non-
competitive practices are apparently not an exception in Dutch 
insurance practice). The binding decision was subsequently 
withdrawn in 1998.199 
Negotiations took place between the government and the 
insurers on a new system of coverage for natural disasters, with 
the French model being used as an important example. These 
debates finally led to the introduction of the WTS 1998, 
                                                          
 197  Overstromingen in Nederland, December 1993, Documents of the 
Second Chamber of Representatives 1993-1994, 23 564, no. 3. 
 198  Commission Regulation 3932/92, 1992 O.J. (L 398) 7. Note that this 
group exemption for the insurance sector has meanwhile been abrogated. 
 199  Report to the European Parliament concerning the operation of the 
exemption Regulation 3932/92 COM (1999) 92 final (May 12, 1999). Where the 
European Commission explicitly discussed these binding decisions, stating 
that, as a result of the questions asked by the Commission, the Dutch 
Association of Insurers had decided to bring its binding decisions into line with 
the regulation by simply converting the binding decision into a non-binding 
recommendation, leaving each insurer free to extend cover to flood risks. 
2019 Compensation for Victims of Disasters 327 
providing for public compensation in the event that the damage 
is uninsurable. In addition, by the end of the 1990s, Dutch 
insurers acquiesced to political pressure and announced that they 
were prepared to cover damage caused by heavy rain, as can be 
seen in a letter of the Secretary of State of Internal Affairs Gijs de 
Vries.200 The fact that the public funding mechanism offered 
under the WTS 1998 was not applicable to cases where risks in 
principle would be insurable played an important role in this 
respect. As a result, damage due to heavy rainfall became 
insurable. 
In 1999, the Dutch Association of Insurers advised that 
insurance against heavy rainfall would be included in the existing 
building, fire and theft, and contents covers.201 Damage due to 
rainfall, including the overflow risk of dikes and quays, should be 
covered for both private individuals and companies. Damage 
resulting from the flooding of rivers not originating in the 
Netherlands and saltwater flooding remains uninsurable. That 
shows that the scope of insurance cover for flooding in the 
Netherlands remains extremely limited. The WTS 1998 gives 
citizens and companies the right of financial compensation when 
insurance possibilities are exhausted. 
As a side note, it is of interest to mention that the Dutch 
Association of Insurers agreed in 2002 to offer agricultural water 
damage insurance through a pool, covering damage up to an 
amount of EUR 50 million, backed by a guarantee of the central 
government for an amount between EUR 50 and 100 million 
with a deductible of 25% if the damage is higher.202 This example 
makes clear that the Netherlands has been moving forward with 
regard to the insurability of water damage. The insurance is 
meant to cover, in particular, crop damage due to heavy rain. 
The agricultural sector also agreed that, in such a case, it would 
not call for financial compensation from the government on an ad 
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hoc basis. However, the WTS 1998 would still remain applicable, 
for instance in the event of damage caused by flooding. Yet, since 
the guarantee of the central government principally constitutes 
state aid, the European State Aid procedure had to be followed, 
as reflected by the letter of the Minister of Agriculture, Cornelis 
Pieter Veerman of 11 April 2003.203 On 15 October 2003, the 
European Commission approved the subsidy provided by the 
central government in the form of a guarantee.204 Thereon, it 
became possible for the market to start developing these crop 
damage insurances. Two pools, Agriver and OWM AquaPol205 
(formerly LTO AquaPol), were instituted. Both apply for the 
subsidy in the form of a guarantee by the central government. 
Since 19 March 2004, Agriver has offered insurance for crop 
damage against the consequences of heavy rain, subsidized by a 
guarantee of the central government.206 In 2007, crop insurance 
was expanded to include compensation of damage to crops in the 
fruit-farming sector caused by frost. The European Commission 
approved the extension of such regulation on 19 June 2007.207 The 
Dutch State hereby provides a subsidy in the form of a guarantee 
as a stimulus for insurance companies, ranging from EUR 
6,677,400 (USD 7,586,962) to a maximum of EUR 20,927,400 
(USD 23,778,025) per year for frost damage, with a total insured 
value of EUR 762.6 million (USD 866.5 million). Furthermore, 
the decision of the European Commission altered the state aid 
rules regarding the first branch of crop insurance. In both cases, a 
deductible of 25% per crop applies. It is noteworthy that 
governmental intervention thereby facilitated the insurability of 
the risk caused by a catastrophe, especially crop damage caused 
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by heavy rainfall and extreme frost. 
This course of events makes clear that although there are 
undoubtedly great benefits to cooperation between insurers, the 
case of the Dutch binding decisions indicates that this 
cooperation may effectively also limit or even exclude coverage. 
Even when the binding decisions were abrogated, the 
negotiations between the government of the Netherlands and the 
Dutch Association of Insurers determined the conditions for 
covering damage caused by natural disasters. According to legal 
doctrine, this shows that an effective competition policy is in 
great need in order to generate a wide and differentiated supply 
of insurance policies.208 
3. WTS 1998 
In the 1990s the debate on financial compensation for 
victims of catastrophes, more particularly of flooding, continued. 
The government of the Netherlands originally argued against the 
French solution due to fears that free consumer choice would be 
limited, and that a compulsory system would increase costs for 
citizens.209  Ultimately, the government chose to introduce a draft 
of legislation similar to the French framework. The draft 
installed a Fund which would be financed through a tax on 
housing insurance. All those insured (bad or good risks) would 
have to pay the tax. However, the Dutch Council of State 
criticized this draft because they claimed that the preferable 
course of action would be letting the government finance this risk 
and that insuring the flooding risk was possible.210 Hence, the 
government decided to withdraw the draft. 
Following the withdrawal of a draft similar to the French 
framework, the government of the Netherlands used the Belgian 
Disaster Fund of 1976 as a model for the WTS, an Act on 
compensation of damage in the event of catastrophes and large 
accidents.211 The WTS sought to provide a structural solution for 
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financial compensation of victims of catastrophes rather than 
impose a system of ad hoc responses.212 De Vries (1998),213 de 
Groot (2004),214 and Bruggeman (2010)215 completed separate 
analyzes to determine the situations under which the WTS would 
provide a right to financial compensation for damage. The result 
of such analyzes indicates that compensation is applicable in the 
case of events classified as a catastrophe, such as fresh water 
flooding or earthquakes, or large accidents of at least an equal 
amount of damage. Large accidents only fall within the WTS’s 
scope of application if such accident was declared to constitute a 
large accident by a Royal Decree (Art. 3). To qualify as a large 
accident, parliamentary proceedings indicate that governmental 
organizations and services of various disciplines must have 
intervened in a coordinated response effort. Further, the accident 
must have endangered the health of many individuals and caused 
substantial damage.216 
The WTS clearly has a subsidiary character, as is made 
clear in the Act itself. Article 4, for instance, provides that victims 
will receive financial compensation for particular types of 
damage, including damage to a dwelling, commercial loss and 
property damage.217 Article 4(3) of the WTS stipulates that 
victims are not entitled to financial compensation when the 
                                                          
aardbevingen of andere rampen en zware ongevallen [Wet tegemoetkoming 
schade bij rampen en zware ongevallen] [Act on compensation for damages in 
case of disasters and major accidents], Stb. 1998, 325 (Neth.). 
 212  The WTS foresees, according to its explanatory memorandum, in a 
“structural arrangement on the basis of which the State gives compensation to 
those who made costs in preventing or limiting damage and to those who 
suffered damage which is the immediate and directive consequence of a 
freshwater flood, an earthquake of another catastrophe of at least equal order”.  
 213  de Vries, F.J., ‘Vergoeding van rampschade’, Nederlands Juristenblad 
[NJB], 1998, 1908-13. 
 214  de Groot, J.F., ‘Na de ramp. Een beschouwing over de toepassing van 
de WTS’, Overheid en Aansprakelijkheid, 2004, 141-52. 
 215  BRUGGEMAN, V., COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS. A 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Kluwer Law International, 2010. 
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Dutch. 
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damage was reasonably insurable or when the victim was able to 
obtain compensation from another source. The parliamentary 
proceedings made clear that damage is considered as reasonably 
insurable when it is not generally excluded from coverage and 
when it is generally insurable without limiting conditions or 
excessively high costs, which calls into question whether damage 
resulting from natural disasters can be considered insurable. In 
response, the WTS explicitly notes that certain types of damage, 
such as damage to motor vehicles, will not be compensated under 
the Act because the type of damage is insurable and covered 
under commercial insurance.218 If, however, insurance were 
theoretically possible, but victims did not take up the possibility 
because the premium charged would not be proportional to the 
coverage provided, the WTS may be applicable again.219 
The WTS works with a layered system of compensation. 
The general basis for compensation is set forth in Article 6 of the 
Act, but the Implementing Regulation WTS220 contains more 
specific rules regarding the calculation of the magnitude of 
certain heads of damage and costs. In case the WTS is directly 
applicable, or declared applicable to a specific disaster by Royal 
Decree, a Ministerial Regulation will have to be elaborated. This 
Ministerial Regulation then sets forth more detailed rules 
regarding the compensatory amount and the calculation methods. 
Since the general basis for compensation cannot remain 
uncapped, the victim will only receive a contribution in the total 
amount of his or her damage and costs, and thus not full financial 
compensation. In practice, the available amount per disaster or 
large accident is limited to EUR 500 million.221 
The WTS mainly applies to damage caused by heavy 
rain.222 De Groot (2004, 152) claims that the WTS has been 
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applied only four times.223 The first and second applications of 
the WTS stemmed from cases of heavy rain. In both instances, 
the WTS needed to be declared applicable by Royal Decree 
because the heavy rain did not pertain to a formal flood in the 
sense of Article 1 of the WTS. It is remarkable that this statutory 
arrangement, which was specifically created by the legislator to 
compensate victims of catastrophes, has been applied merely in 
the case of damage due to heavy rainfall (which is in principle 
insurable). The legislator has not succeeded in its (at least 
implicit) attempt to create with the WTS an exclusive 
arrangement for government contributions in the event of both 
natural catastrophes. Hence, it is not surprising that the WTS has 
been the subject of criticism in various literature. 
4. Recent Evolutions 
The absence of an adequate flooding insurance in the 
Netherlands was criticized by the Netherlands Scientific Council 
for Government Policy (WRR),224 which resulted in Dutch 
insurers developing a proposal for flooding insurance based on 
the French model. This time, however, they encountered 
difficulties with the Netherlands Competition Authority, 
Autoriteit Consument en Markt,  (“ACM”). The ACM criticized 
the fact that consumers would no longer have a choice and 
doubted whether there was a societal need for disaster 
insurance.225 The ACM argues, inter alia, that consumer interest 
groups would not support flooding insurance.226 As a result, the 
insurers withdrew their initiative in 2013 and determined that a 
political solution was required. The insurers stated in their press 
memo: 
As a result of the position of the ACM, the Netherlands 
will still be without an affordable flooding insurance 
with an adequate cover. At the occasion of a next 
flooding (which will inevitably take place), victims will 
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again be uncompensated. They will then have to await 
whether they can still call on the WTS. And they will 
rightly ask why no arrangements have been made.227 
It is striking that despite long negotiations and attempts to 
implement flooding insurance, flooding insurance remains 
unavailable in the Netherlands.228 The reluctance to seek 
insurance solutions was also apparent in the reaction of the 
Netherlands to the Green Paper on the insurance of natural and 
man-made disasters.229 In the Dutch reaction, the government 
claims to be against European regulations that increase the 
insurability of natural disasters. The government resists a larger 
involvement of the government (arguing that that would lead to 
moral hazard), mandatory disaster insurance (as it would lead to 
negative redistribution), and the French model of a mandatory 
add-on in addition to voluntarily purchased insurances.230 
This overview of the development of disaster insurance in 
the Netherlands reveals that efforts to develop flooding insurance 
have failed despite numerous attempts.231 Although the binding 
decisions from the 1950s have formally been abrogated, the failed 
efforts to develop flooding insurance indicate that the spirit of 
those binding decisions has not left the Netherlands.232 For 
victims of natural disasters this effectively means that they are 
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subjected to a declaration of applicability of the WTS. 
Alternatively, victims of natural disasters need to await ad hoc 
government compensation. Notwithstanding the many reports 
and recommendations, including from the WRR,233 60 years after 
the dramatic flooding that took place in the province of Zeeland 
in 1953, flooding insurance in the Netherlands is still not 
available.234 
B. Technological Disasters 
1. Introduction 
In addition to the negligence rule set forth in Article 6:162 
BW, the Netherlands Civil Code235 includes a large amount of 
strict liabilities. For example, Article 6:175 BW includes strict 
liabilities for damage caused as a result of dangerous substances 
and waste sites. Those strict liabilities are not linked to any 
compulsory liability insurance, but, if the liable injurer would 
have purchased liability insurance, the victim has a direct right of 
action against this liability insurer.236 
The liabilities incorporated in Section 6:3 BW can in 
theory be applied in case of a technological disaster. However, in 
practice, the question of whether the injurer can effectively 
provide compensation arises more frequently than the issue of 
satisfying the legal conditions for liability. Insured amounts are 
often insufficient to compensate victims of technological 
disaster.237 
2. Solvency Guarantees 
Dutch legislation does not provide a large amount of 
mandatory solvency guarantees. The Belgian example of 
compulsory insurance in combination with strict liability for 
explosions and fires in public buildings has also been discussed in 
the Netherlands.238 A Belgian scholar, Van Schoubroeck, even 
theorized that if a disaster like Volendam would have taken place 
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in Belgium, the damage would have been largely covered under 
the mandatory insurance cover.239 
3. WTS 
When drafting the WTS, legislators in the Netherlands 
sought to create an arrangement that would provide exclusive 
compensation in the case of large disasters, i.e. both natural and 
man-made catastrophes. For man-made catastrophes, the WTS 
must be declared applicable by Royal Decree. 
However, Article 4(3) of the WTS imposes a condition that 
compensation for damages must not be recoverable from another 
source. The historical application of the WTS has shown that, as 
a result, the WTS may not be applicable in cases of man-made 
disasters where damage can be claimed from a liable injurer. 
Thus, the subsidiarity of the WTS manifests itself in one of two 
circumstances. First, the WTS is applicable, but if certain types 
of damage are recoverable from another source they are not 
covered under the WTS. Second, the WTS is not applicable at all, 
given the claim possibilities in tort law. 
In order to provide a good picture of the problems with 
which victims of technological disasters are confronted, two 
major technological catastrophes that occurred at the beginning 
of this century will be described. They are a good illustration for 
the problems of providing financial compensation to victims of 
technological disasters in the Netherlands. Precisely in cases of 
serious man-made disasters with large personal injury, like in the 
cases of Volendam and Enschede, the WTS was not applied. The 
formal reason provided was that the damage in both cases 
concerned “insurable damage” such that the WTS was 
inapplicable.240 
4. “Enschede” 
The first example is the explosion of a fireworks factory in 
Enschede on 13 May 2000.241 The fire in the fireworks factory 
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and the subsequent explosions resulted in numerous deaths, 
injuries, and the destruction of nearly an entire neighbourhood. 
The damage amounted to several hundred million euros. The 
compensation for damages resulting from the explosions arose as 
a question in the wake of the catastrophe.  While a claim was 
filed against the liable company under tort law, it became 
immediately clear that the corporation could not compensate the 
entirety of the damage resulting from the explosion. A tort claim 
would therefore never lead to financial compensation of the 
victims. As a result, the question of whether other mechanisms 
could be used to compensate the victims arose again. 
The explosion in Enschede clearly displays the limited 
ability of the WTS 1998 to provide financial compensation to 
victims of catastrophes. This Act was not declared applicable to 
the catastrophe in Enschede because the government argued that 
the catastrophe concerned largely insurable damage. As far as 
victims are concerned, one can of course think of various first 
party insurances that have or could have covered the losses of the 
victims. With respect to corporate damage, one can again think 
about various corporate insurances that would have covered the 
losses. However, although the WTS 1998 was not declared 
applicable, the government argued that a national catastrophes 
fund Stichting Nationaal Rampenfonds (“NRF”) could provide 
some financial compensation to victims for damage which was 
not insured.242 The latter is an interesting construction: it is in 
principle a private initiative and thus a privately-run fund to 
which the government donates funds. 
In addition to providing first aid after the explosion, the 
community of Enschede paid funeral and other related costs. The 
community received a contribution from the NRF for victims 
who were not sufficiently insured.243 After the disaster, the 
community of Enschede created a commission for the financial 
settlement of the fireworks disaster, the Commissie Financiële 
Afwikkeling Vuurwerkramp (“CFA”). The Commission was 
composed of representatives from the community and province, 
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the insurers, and the NRF. The central government only acted as 
observer. The task of this CFA was to make an inventory of the 
damage and to determine to what extent some victims were 
underinsured.244 The CFA formulated proposals for additional 
financial compensation to the community of Enschede. This CFA 
proposed various arrangements for non-insured damage, which 
were also largely implemented. Compensation for damages of 
individual citizens included compensation for lost furniture, 
compensation for damaged cars (that were not insured) and 
compensation for specific costs caused by the unusual 
circumstances.245 All these heads of damage were compensated 
through the aforementioned NRF. The central government made 
a lump sum payment of 6.2 million guilders to the Fund (around 
EUR 2.8 million or USD 3.2 million).246 
For corporations, a specific Fund was created to make 
advance payments and provide loans.247 Thus, the 
aforementioned NRF provided compensations for citizens, but 
companies could not seek financial assistance from the NRF. In 
particular, in November 2001 an arrangement for companies was 
negotiated specifically for damage caused by the fireworks 
catastrophe, consisting inter alia, of:248 
- a compensation for non-insured and underinsured 
material damage (60% of the value with a 10% 
deductible); 
- a compensation for non-insured and underinsured 
commercial losses (70% of the lost profits compared 
to 1999 with a deductible of 30%) under the 
condition that the assets of the corporation are 
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lower than EUR 225,000;249 
- a compensation in case of the shutdown of a 
company with a maximum of three times the 
annual profit in 1999 under the condition that the 
companies’ own assets were lower than EUR 
225,000; 
- a compensation of maximum EUR 2,500 for legal, 
fiscal and accountancy assistance. 
This consisted in total of an amount of approximately 
90,000,000 guilders (around EUR 40.8 million or USD 46.4 
million) which was paid by the Ministry of Economic Affairs to a 
foundation called Financial Aid Fireworks Catastrophe 
(Financiële Hulpverlening Vuurwerkramp).250 The government 
estimated that more than 90% of the companies in the disaster 
area could continue their enterprise in an acceptable manner with 
aid provided by the foundation.251 
5. “Volendam” 
Shortly after the events in Enschede, the Netherlands was 
confronted with another major catastrophe. On New Year’s Eve 
of 2000, a large fire took place in café De Hemel in Volendam. 
This fire resulted in many deaths and serious injuries.  Again, the 
question of adequate financial compensation and the role of the 
government arose. In contrast to the fireworks explosion in 
Enschede, Volendam concerned primarily personal injury 
damage. The possibilities of using tort law were examined, in 
addition to social security payments to the victims. Although the 
owner of the café may be the primary individual responsible, 
victims looked at other potential defendants due to insolvency 
concerns. The owner of the café only had insurance coverage for 
a limited amount of the damage and, thus, victims sought 
recovery from other sources. Barendrecht showed that the 
Volendam case is typically one where multiple tortfeasors have 
acted together and have all contributed to the risk. Therefore, 
Barendrecht suggested that a division of liability should occur 
based on the contribution of each tortfeasor and victim to the 
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entire risk.252 
Formal law suits against public authorities did not take 
place, and, ultimately, a group of victims reached an agreement 
with the owner of the café. With the help of the community of 
Volendam a settlement was reached whereby the owner of the 
café decided to sell his café which was purchased by the 
community. The sum Volendam received for the real estate was 
then made available for victim relief via a Fund. 
Other forms of support were discussed following the 
Volendam disaster. Again, the WTS 1998 was  declared not 
applicable because the disaster concerned insurable damage.253 
However, the government donated an amount of 3.5 million 
guilders (around EUR 1.6 million or USD 1.8 million) shortly 
after the disaster to two foundations that took care of victims 
with serious burns.254 The Dutch government explicitly stated 
that this payment was made as a gesture of national solidarity 
with the victims and not as a recognition of some kind of 
government liability. In addition, substantial amounts were paid 
by the central government. These amounts were used to 
reimburse the compensation costs made by the community 
Edam-Volendam, the compensation of costs for a specific 
research committee that examined the sources of the disaster, and 
for the compensation of various other costs. 
A Committee instituted by the government formulated 
several advice papers concerning the financial compensation that 
the central government should provide for the Volendam victims. 
Those guidelines were also followed in practice. In those papers, 
many comparisons were made with the arrangement for the 
                                                          
 252  See Maurits Barendrecht, Verdeling van verantwoordelijkheid als het 
fout gaat: Volendam en Aandelenlease als voorbeelden, 79 NEDERLANDS 
JURISTENBLAD [NJB] 2180 (2004). 
 253  See Café-brand Volendam; Lijst van vragen en antwoorden over o.a. 
het kabinetsstandput Nieuwjaarsbrand Volendam, 01-10-2001, Kamerstukken 
II 2001-2002, 27 575, no. 6, 50, available 
at:https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27575-6. 
 254  These two foundations are the Nederlandse Brandwondenstichting 
(Netherlands Burns Foundation) and the Stichting Slachtoffers 
Nieuwjaarsbrand (Foundation Victims New Year’s Eve Fire). See Café-brand 
Volendam; Brief minister en staatssecretaris met een overzicht van de 
gebeurtenissen in de twee weken na de ramp, 17-01-2001, Kamerstukken II 
2000-2001, 27 575, no. 2, 8, available at: 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27575-2. and Café-brand 
Volendam; Kabinetsstandpunt Nieuwjaarsbrand Volendam, 18-07-2001, 
Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27 575, no. 5, 42, available at: 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27575-5. 
340 Loyola Consumer Law Review Vol. 31:2 
victims of the fireworks factory explosion in Enschede. A 
suggestion was made to provide an amount of EUR 150,000 
(USD 170,000) to the Volendam victims, whereas the amount 
provided to the Enschede victims was only EUR 120,000 (USD 
136,000). The specific Committee argued that, specifically in the 
case of Volendam, many young victims were involved and 
therefore the incident damaged their future perspectives. The 
Committee also took into account that serious burns would lead 
to a very long and slow recovery process.255 On the basis of these 
proposals, the central government made a total amount of EUR 
30.1 million (USD 34.2 million) available for the victims.256 This 
is remarkable since the initial intent of the central government 
was to merely provide compensation for direct costs. Ultimately, 
large amounts of ad hoc compensation were provided as well. 
6. Lessons from Enschede and Volendam 
A common feature of the Enschede and Volendam 
catastrophes was that no mandatory solvency guarantees were 
available. The operator of the fireworks factory in Enschede had 
only a voluntary liability insurance with a cover of several 
millions of guilders and the same applied for the owner of the 
café in Volendam. Consequently, the Dutch government has 
provided generous financial compensation both after the 
Enschede and the Volendam catastrophes. As mentioned, in the 
case of Enschede, 90 million guilders (around EUR 40.8 million 
or USD 46.4 million) was paid by the State; in the case of 
Volendam the Dutch State (the taxpayers) paid approximately 50 
million guilders (around EUR 22.7 million or USD 25.8 
million).257 
7. Criticism to the WTS 
It is remarkable that the statutory arrangement set forth in 
the WTS, which was specifically created by the legislator to 
compensate victims of catastrophes, has been applied merely in 
the case of damage due to heavy rainfall. The WTS was not of 
use in the case of serious man-made disasters resulting in major 
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personal injuries, such as the aforementioned fireworks accident 
in Enschede in 2000 or the Volendam fire in 2000-2001.258 Thus, 
the legislator has not succeeded in its attempt to create with the 
WTS an exclusive arrangement for government contributions in 
the event of both natural and man-made catastrophes. Hence, it 
is not surprising that the WTS has been the subject of criticism in 
various literature. 
The first criticism relates to the fact that the government 
intervenes with specific funding for victims of catastrophes on an 
ad hoc basis. This preference for victims of catastrophes has been 
criticized from the angle of the equality principle.259 Second, legal 
doctrine also holds that, if specific financial compensation needs 
to be provided to victims of catastrophes, it is more desirable to 
have a structural solution instead of the current ad hoc 
arrangements. In this respect, the WTS 1998, which apparently 
does not serve this goal, should be revised. Third, it has been 
stressed that  there might be reasons to increase duties of 
potential tortfeasors to guarantee their solvency. Fourth, it seems 
logical to increase the possibilities of first party insurance. 
To some extent those four general criticisms of the WTS  
are strongly related. The first criticism of the ad hoc 
compensation is of course related to the second criticism that a 
structural solution which specifies clearly ex ante the rules of the 
game would be better. The third criticism relates specifically to 
technological (man-made) disasters, to the extent that a tortfeasor 
can be identified (like the operator of a specific plant), imposing 
solvency guarantees would have a double benefit. The imposition 
of solvency guarantee leads to more adequate compensation to 
victims and at the same time guarantees better prevention, given 
that  moral hazard is controlled. Whereas the third criticism 
relates to technological disasters, the fourth criticism on the lack 
of first party coverage relates to natural disasters. In cases where 
tort law can be applied (like with technological disasters), it is 
logical first to apply liability rules and compulsory financial 
security in order to correctly allocate the social costs of disasters. 
To the extent that (for a variety of reasons) such a cost allocation 
to tortfeasors is not possible (like with natural disasters) it would 
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be logic to work out a comprehensive mandatory first party 
insurance scheme (similar to France and Belgium). Such a 
structural first party insurance scheme for natural disasters is 
then precisely the structural solution (required in the second point 
of criticism) and avoids the need for ad hoc compensation 
(addressed in the first point of criticism). The same applies to the 
third point of criticism : to the extent that adequate strict liability 
rules are put in place, combined with mandatory solvency 
guarantees, financial compensation for victims of technological 
disasters will equally be available. That can equally avoid ad hoc 
compensation, the first point of criticism, and provides the 
desired structural solution, the second point of criticism. 
Now that the prohibited cartel agreements that do not to 
cover the consequences of large-scale flooding and earthquakes 
have been withdrawn, insurance policies covering those risks 
could be brought to the market. These should only come to the 
market, however, provided that some kind of solution for large 
losses is available through reinsurance and/or the government, 
which is so far only the case for damage due to heavy rainfall and 
frost. One should note, however, that, for other relevant natural 
hazard risks in the Netherlands (storms, lightning and hail), 
commercial insurance coverage is available. 
8. Reforms 
The government of the Netherlands has installed a body 
with the specific task of providing an assessment of the WTS 
1998: the Commissie Tegemoetkoming bij Rampen en 
Calamiteiten, Commission for Compensation in Cases of 
Catastrophes and Incidents (“CTRC”). In 2001, the CTRC was 
asked to provide the government with advice on optimal 
compensation in the event of catastrophes.260 The CTRC 
examined the existing possibilities of compensation and, 
subsequently, formulated proposals for desirable additional 
compensation. Its final report, Solidariteit met Beleid, Solidarity 
with Policy, was presented to the Minister of the Interior on 7 
March 2005 and consisted of three parts: a general section, two 
research reports on the financial settlement of disasters in the 
Netherlands, and the financial compensation schemes for damage 
caused by catastrophes in some other countries. The CTRC 
                                                          
 260  Vuurwerkramp Enschede; Brief minister met de halfjaarlijkse 
voortgangsrapportage Vuurwerkramp, 18-10-2001, Kamerstukken II 27 157, 
no. 44, 4, available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-27157-44. 
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brought to the fore multiple interesting suggestions regarding 
financial compensation for victims of catastrophes in the 
Netherlands, including the following: 
- Tort law needs to be the primary mechanism for 
compensating catastrophic damage; 
- Judicial liability procedures should be shortened 
and simplified by means of a new act on the 
collective settlement of mass damage;261 
- Insolvency guarantees for injurers need to be 
introduced or increased; 
- For catastrophes where no liable injurer can be 
identified, the CTRC suggests increased use of first 
party insurance. The proposal is designed not to 
make the purchase of disaster coverage mandatory 
(as in France), but to facilitate the insurability of 
risks by letting the State act as reinsurer (if 
necessary) and pursuing an active information 
policy; 
- Change the WTS into a national solidarity fund 
that would, on the basis of clear rules and 
structures, provide various types of compensation, 
including for uninsurable damage. 
Most of the Commission’s proposals are in line with what 
has been suggested in legal doctrine. As far as the revision of 
financial compensation of victims of catastrophes is concerned, 
the former Minister of the Interior wrote on 5 June 2006 a letter 
to parliament outlining the position of the government on the 
reform proposals of the CTRC.262 In that letter, the former 
Minister of the Interior noted the government’s desire to achieve 
                                                          
 261  See Wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en het Wetboek van 
Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering teneinde de collectieve afwikkeling van 
massaschades te vergemakkelijken [Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade] 
[Act on the Amendments of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Legal 
Procedure in order to facilitate class action], June 23, 2005, Stcrt. 2005, 340, as 
amended by Wet tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, het Wetboek van 
Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering en de Faillissementswet teneinde de collectieve 
afwikkeling van massavorderingen verder te vergemakkelijken [Wet tot 
wijziging van de Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade] [Act amending the 
Act on collective settlement of mass damage], June 26, 2013, Stb. 2013, 255 
(Neth.). 
 262  Beleidsplan Crisisbeheersing 2004-2007; Brief minister bij aanbieding 
kabinetsstandpunt over het eindrapport van de Commissie tegemoetkomingen 
bij rampen en calamiteiten (CTRC), 17-07-2006, Kamerstukken II  2006-2007, 
29 668, no. 11, available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-29668-
11. 
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a few fundamental changes on the following basis263: 
- A provision of guarantees or insurance should be 
made compulsory in cases where a liable injurer 
can be identified; 
- Insurance coverage by potential victims has to be 
stimulated in instances where a liable injurer 
cannot be identified; and 
- The current legislative basis for compensation of 
victims of catastrophes has to be changed to 
address the current ad hoc solutions. 
The government was therefore strongly suggesting the 
development of voluntary first party insurance without 
prescribing a straightforward duty for potential victims to 
purchase insurance coverage, comparable to the model that exists 
in France. In the event that insufficient capacity makes the risk 
hard to insure, the State could act as reinsurer. The general idea 
behind this new policy is that there would be less pressure on the 
public budget, but responsibility would be shifted either to the 
industry for technological disasters or to potential victims for 
natural catastrophes. 
Further, in 2012 WRR published a report in which it 
argues that it is important to provide incentives to all 
stakeholders involved for the prevention of disasters.264 The 
report stresses the need to create structural solutions for when the 
damage would occur, but also to create effective incentives to 
control risks, prevent incidents, and mitigate damages.265 The 
WRR rightly argues that many corporations are currently not 
intrinsically motivated to take responsibility with a view on 
preventing incidents. Similar to the proceeding recommendation 
from the CTRC, the WRR therefore recommends that solvency 
guarantees should be introduced for potential injurers. 
Thus, the messages of the CTRC and the WRR are 
similar. The amounts provided by the insurance market today are 
too low, and insufficient amounts are available without 
                                                          
 263  A summary of these proposals can be found in Faure & Hartlief, supra 
n. 1, 341-342 and Bruggeman, supra n. 1, 390-393. 
 264  WETENSCHAPPELIJKE RAAD VOOR HET REGERINGSBELEID, 
EVENWICHTSKUNST. OVER DE VERDELING VAN VERANTWOORDELIJKHEID 
VOOR FYSIEKE VEILIGHEID (NOV. 28, 2011), 
http://www.wrr.nl/fileadmin/nl/projecten/evenwichtskunst/2011-12-
06__Evenwichtskunst__volledige_publicatie.pdf.  
 265  See Marjolein van Asselt & Karin Ammerlaan, Schadevoorziening als 
perspectief: vernieuwing van het denken over verantwoordelijkheid voor 
fysieke veiligheid, [56] OVERHEID & AANSPRAKELIJKHEID [OA] 100 (2012) for 
details of the advice of the WRR.  
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intervention by the government. For that reason, both reports 
point at the important role of the government and insurers in the 
provision of adequate compensation. 
The cases of Volendam and Enschede painfully illustrated 
that the bill for the technological disasters is still paid by the 
taxpayer, rather than by liable injurers and their liability 
insurers.266 
C. Nuclear Accidents 
The Netherlands ratified the 1960 Paris Convention and 
the 1963 Brussels Convention on 28 September 1979 through the 
Act of 17 March 1979.267 The 1979 Act came into effect on 28 
December 1979, bringing both conventions into force on that date 
in the Netherlands. On that same date, the Nuclear Incidents 
(Third Party Liability) Act of 1979 which set forth the regulations 
governing nuclear third party liability in the Netherlands also 
came into force.268 On 1 August 1991, an Act amending the 1979 
Nuclear Incidents (Third Party Liability) Act came into effect, 
implementing the Paris and Brussels Protocols.269 Simultaneously, 
another Act amending the 1979 Act on Third Party Liability in 
implementation of the Joint Protocol was passed by 
Parliament.270 This Act came into effect on 27 April 1992. 
Further, on 30 October 2008 Parliament approved a bill to ratify 
the 2004 Protocols to the Paris Convention and to the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention. A bill to amend the Nuclear 
Incidents (Third Party Liability) Act was also approved. 
The limitations on the scope of the Paris Convention do 
not apply to the liability of an operator of a nuclear installation 
on Dutch territory, for certain kinds of damage. This is 
particularly the case for damage (a) suffered on the territory of a 
State party to the Convention wherever the incident occurred; (b) 
suffered on the territory of a State not party to the Paris 
Convention, but party to the Joint Protocol, as a result of an 
                                                          
 266  E.g., Hartlief & Faure, supra note 6, at 1026. 
 267  Art. 3 Goedkeuringswet Verdrag inzake wettelijke aansprakelijkheid 
op het gebied van de kernenergie [Approval Act Convention on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy], Mar. 17, 1979, Stb. 1979, 160. 
 268  Wet van 17 maart 1979, houdende regelen inzake aansprakelijkheid 
voor schade door kernongevallen [Wet aansprakelijkheid kernongevallen] [Act 
on liability for nuclear accidents], Mar. 17, 1979, Stb. 1979, 225. 
 269  Modification of the Act on liability for nuclear accidents [Act amending 
the Nuclear Incidents Act], Aug. 1, 1991, Stb. 1991, 369 (Neth.). 
 270  Modification of the Act on liability for nuclear accidents [Act amending 
the Nuclear Incidents Act], Apr. 27, 1992, Stb. 1991, 373 (Neth.). 
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incident in the territory of a State party to the Joint Protocol; or 
(c) wherever suffered, as a result of an accident on Dutch territory 
(Art. 15(1)). The operator is also not exonerated from paying 
financial compensation for damage caused by an incident due 
directly to a grave natural disaster (Art. 3). 
The maximum liability of the operator under the Paris 
Convention has been raised to EUR 1.2 billion (USD 1.4 billion) 
(Art. 5(1)). Under Article 5(3), a lower amount may be set by 
ministerial order for low-risk installations. If, in the opinion of 
the Minister of Finance, an operator of a nuclear installation 
cannot obtain the financial security required by the Paris 
Convention, the minister may enter into contracts on behalf of 
the State as insurer or provide other state guarantees up to the 
operator’s liability limit. This possibility also exists if financial 
security is only available at an unreasonable cost. In so far as the 
funds available from the operator’s financial security are 
insufficient to compensate for the damage, the State shall make 
available funds up to the operator’s maximum liability. In such 
cases, the minister is entitled to exercize the operator’s rights of 
recourse (Art. 10). 
If the amount of damage caused by a nuclear incident on 
Dutch territory exceeds the limit of the Brussels Convention, the 
government will make available supplementary funds up to a 
maximum total of EUR 2.27 billion (USD 2.58 billion) (Art. 
18(1)). Under Article 18(4), these public funds will also be made 
available for damage suffered in the territory of parties to the 
Brussels Convention on condition of reciprocity. 
D. Terrorism 
1. Material Damage 
The Dutch government and the Dutch Association of 
Insurers agreed to set up a dedicated reinsurance company, the 
Dutch Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Company, Nederlandse 
Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor Terrorismeschaden N.V. 
(“NHT”), to provide insurance against terrorist acts in all areas of 
business. This step represented an intervention measure to 
address a market failure to supply terrorism risk coverage. 
Since 1 July 2003,271 more than 185 insurance companies 
(95% of all active Dutch insurers), the government, and some 
                                                          
 271  The NHT became operational on 1 July 2003. It has been periodically 
extended for additional periods and is expected to be further extended as long 
as market conditions require.  
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reinsurance companies participate in the NHT. Every insurance 
company which does business in the Netherlands, and which is 
permitted to do business, can become a member of the NHT 
(with the exception of insurance companies providing nuclear 
cover). The participating insurance companies cede all their 
terrorism exposure to the NHT pool, which acts as a reinsurance 
company. The pool then assumes 100% of the terrorism liability 
for all individual and SME insurance policies. The NHT 
provides coverage for non-life insurance (for property located in 
the Netherlands), life insurance (where the policyholder has a 
regular residence in the Netherlands), healthcare insurance, and 
funeral insurance. 
The NHT will provide reinsurance coverage for terrorism, 
malevolent contamination or precautionary measures or any 
conduct in preparation for terrorism. The NHT decides whether 
a particular event should be considered as a consequence of the 
manifestation of the terrorism risk. Terrorism is defined as: 
any violent act and/or conduct – committed outside the 
scope of one of the six forms of acts of war as referred to 
in Article 3:38 of the Financial Supervision Act (Wet op 
het Financieel toezicht) – in the form of an attack or a 
series of attacks connected together in time and 
intention as a result whereof injury and/or impairment 
of health, whether resulting in death or not, and/or loss 
of or damage to property arizes or any economic interest 
is otherwise impaired, in which case it is likely that said 
attack or series – whether or not in any organisational 
context – has been planned and/or carried out with a 
view to effect certain political and/or religious and/or 
ideological purposes. 
The overall capacity of the terrorism risk reinsurance pool 
is limited to EUR 1 billion (USD 1.1 billion) per calendar year. In 
the event of a severe terrorist attack, the limit of EUR 1 billion a 
year may not be sufficient. If EUR 1 billion per year is not 
sufficient, the compensation to all members will be decreased. 
There are four layers of coverage: 
- EUR 300 million (USD 341 million) in the 
aggregate (pooled cover provided by the primary 
insurers); 
- EUR 100 million (USD 114 million) in the 
aggregate in excess of the EUR 300 million 
provided by international reinsurers; 
- EUR 550 million (USD 623 million) in the 
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aggregate in excess of the EUR 400 million 
provided by international reinsurers; 
- EUR 50 million (USD 57 million) in annual 
aggregate excess of EUR 950 million provided by 
the Dutch government.272 
The first layer applies a threshold deductible, which 
means that insurers bear the risk to EUR 7.5 million (USD 8.5 
million). The deductible does not apply to life insurance or health 
insurance. 
On an annual basis, the members pay their share of the 
reinsurance premium and the operational cost of the NHT. The 
individual share is a proportional figure of the market share 
(gross premium income the Netherlands) of a member 
company.273 The Dutch government charges a premium at a level 
intended to price itself out of the market when terrorism risk 
insurability is restored. From the period of 1 July 2003 until 31 
December 2003, the government charged a premium of EUR 10 
million (i.e. EUR 20 million on a yearly basis or USD 23 
million).274 A system of descending premiums is used for 
increasing coverage. For example, the first part of coverage is 
relatively expensive – coverage of EUR 100 million demands the 
same premium as the next increment of EUR 200 million. Thus, 
an incentive is incorporated into the system in order to stimulate 
the recovery of commercial insurance. Pursuant to the incentive,  
individual reinsurers that are capable of covering the risk obtain 
the ability to offer coverage for a lower premium. This point of 
departure seemed to pay off, since a commercial reinsurer 
declared itself willing to cover the first EUR 100 million of 
                                                          
 272  The initial agreement was that the Dutch State would fully share its 
stake in the NHT decrease. For that reason, it was agreed that the premium of 
the State would be slightly higher than that of the reinsurers to make it 
attractive for reinsurers at a lower level premium risk of the State. This has 
worked to the extent that, in 2005, the share of the State decreased to EUR  
100 million and, in 2006, to EUR  50 million. Thereafter, the reinsurers 
indicated that they wished to continue the participation of the State, because, 
after a major terrorist attack, the insurers and State must anyway carefully 
coordinate their activities and communication and because the involvement of 
the State would be highly appreciated. At the end of 2006, the Minister of 
Finance informed the insurers of its consent to this continuation. To date, state 
participation has been continued in this way.  
 273  INT’L FORUM FOR TERRORISM RISK (RE)INS. POOLS, supra note 148. 
 274  Terrorismeverzekering; Brief minister over de Nederlandse 
Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor Terrorismeschaden N.V. (NHT), 01-07-
2003, Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 668, no. 2, 23 June 2003, available at: 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-28668-2. 
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governmental coverage (namely between EUR 700 and 800 
million). Governmental intervention is hence delayed until the 
EUR 200 million threshold.275 
In sum, the NHT is, like in the other European countries, 
a private enterprise in which a large number of insurance 
companies participate and a multi-layered approach is 
provided.276 The main advantage of this model is that a total 
capacity of the pool up to EUR 1 billion can be provided. A 
strong point is equally that a risk premium is charged by the 
government which subsequently has stimulated insurers to 
develop alternatives themselves.277 Some have criticized the 
NHT, arguing that the State should not intervene to provide 
reinsurance. They argue that it would have been better to provide 
this structural solution by applying the WTS 1998 to the 
terrorism risk as well.278 
Given the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, there are 
currently discussions about the aggregate limit of the NHT, 
specifically whether the current limit is sufficient.279 
2. Personal Injury 
Apart from the NHT, the Compensation Fund for Victims 
of Violent Crime, Schadefonds Geweldmisdrijven was 
institutionalized as early as 1976, and offers a payment to 
everyone who has suffered injuries or serious material and 
immaterial loses due to an intentional violent crime committed on 
Dutch territory.280 The Compensation Fund is a supplementary 
compensation mechanism. As such, the Compensation Fund only 
awards financial compensation when it is clear that the victim 
                                                          
 275  Wijziging van de Noodwet financieel verkeer in verband met de 
dekking van het terrorismerisico door verzekeraars; Nota n.a.v. het verslag, 
14-08-2003, Kamerstukken II 2002-2003, 28 915, no. 5, 3, available at: 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-28915-5.  
 276  Faure & Hartlief, supra note 258, at 206. 
 277  See BRUGGEMAN, supra note 1, at 375-81. 
 278  See, e.g., Karin Ammerlaan & Willem H. van Boom, De Nederlandse 
Herverzekeringsmaatschappij voor Terrorismeschaden en de rol van de 
overheid bij het vergoeden van terreurschade, [45/46] NEDERLANDS 
JURISTENBLAD [NJB] 2330 (2003). 
 279  INT’L FORUM FOR TERRORISM RISK (RE)INS. POOLS, supra note 148, 
at 30. 
 280  Wet van 26 juni 1975, houdende voorlopige regeling schadefonds 
geweldsmisdrijven [Wet schadefonds geweldmisdrijven] [Act on provisional 
regulation of the damage fund for violent crimes], June 26, 1975, Stb. 1975, 382 
(Neth.).  
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cannot be reimbursed in any other way. Therefore, the Fund, 
which is financed through the general public budget, acts as a 
safety net. 
E. Summary 
According to the general Dutch perspective, financial 
compensation to victims of natural catastrophes and man-made 
disasters needs to be provided by the general means. This point of 
view is evidenced by Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution, which 
enforces a duty towards the government to provide the 
habitability of the country. The acceptance of the consequences of 
this duty leads to the principle of mutual solidarity between the 
Dutch population. 
This has to a large extent also been reflected in the 
developments in the Netherlands with respect to the financial 
compensation for victims of disasters. Of all the countries studied 
in this Article, the Netherlands has probably devoted most 
resources to discussing victim compensation, to no avail. The 
Netherlands does not really know a structural solution to 
guarantee financial compensation to victims of natural disasters. 
The Act, WTS 1998, that was supposed to serve this goal has not 
been able to provide adequate compensation to victims and has 
for that reason been subject to criticism and reform proposals 
which have not yet led to a legislative change. The inadequacy of 
WTS 1998 was especially shown at the occasion of an explosion 
in a fireworks factory in Enschede and a fire in a café in 
Volendam. In both cases WTS 1998 could not be applied, but 
generous compensation was paid by the Dutch State. A major 
problem, however, was that in both cases compulsory financial 
guarantees did not apply and the (voluntarily concluded) liability 
insurance of the operators provided too low amounts of 
compensation. It is for that reason not surprising that the reform 
proposals have gone in the direction of providing mandatory 
financial security by operators. As far as the cover for terrorism is 
concerned, the Netherlands has been one of the first countries to 
develop (like the other countries discussed so far) a terrorism risk 
insurance pool (“NHT”) which provides a total cover of EUR 1 
billion via a multi-layered approach with a reduced intervention 
by the Dutch State. 
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VI. A CRITICAL COMPARISON 
A. Starting Points and Methodology 
The introduction explicitly stated that this comparative 
exercise was undertaken to see where the legislation in Belgium, 
France, and Germany with respect to financial compensation for 
victims of disasters deviates from the situation in the 
Netherlands. In this section we will provide a critical comparison 
of the situation in the four countries. In order to undertake this 
comparison, we will take the economic starting points that we 
formulated in the introduction as a baseline. Six starting points 
had, from an economic perspective, to be followed in order 1) to 
guarantee an adequate financial compensation to victims ex post 
and 2) to provide effective incentives for disaster risk reduction 
ex ante. These principles will constitute the background for the 
comparison that we will undertake in this section. We will 
thereby follow the same order and therefore address the same 
types of catastrophes as we did throughout the study. We will 
therefore look at the regulation of natural disasters (B), 
technological disasters (C), nuclear disasters (D) and terrorism 
(E). An important limitation of our study is that we did not 
attempt to provide full details on the situation in every country 
for all aspects of those disasters. We could for example obtain 
information on the activities to which compulsory financial 
guarantees apply for some countries, but not for all. That 
limitation on the scope of the research inevitably also limits the 
scope of the comparison. Still, we believe that it provides a fairly 
good opportunity to sketch to what extent the financial 
compensation in the particular countries studied is adequate with 
respect to the four specific types of disasters taking into account 
the need for adequate ex post compensation and providing ex 
ante incentives for disaster risk reduction. 
Our benchmark for the comparison is the adequacy of the 
financial compensation for the victims and the effectiveness of 
the incentives for disaster risk reduction. Obviously other 
benchmarks could be used as well and to some extent we alluded 
to those in this article. For example, some countries, like Belgium, 
worked out specific compensation mechanisms not only aimed at 
adequate compensation of the victims, but also at speedy 
compensation. Speed may be an important criterion to judge the 
adequacy of the financial compensation mechanism for the simple 
reason that the length of the procedure could increase the 
suffering of the victims, and therefore the non-pecuniary losses. 
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In addition, a (too) long procedure could lead to secondary losses 
and for example to bankruptcies simply because a livelihood and 
therefore the source of income of a victim has been destroyed 
(think of an example where a café or restaurant has been put out 
of business as a result of an oil spill on a nearby beach). The lack 
of speedy compensation could in those cases make the losses even 
larger. It is for that reason that in some cases (especially when 
referring to technological disasters) we addressed mechanisms in 
legal systems that strive for the speedy compensation of victims. 
We do not, however, have full information on the way in which 
this is arranged in the four legal systems examined, and it is for 
that reason that we do not use that as a specific proxy in our 
comparison. The reader should, however, be aware that the speed 
of providing the financial compensation can be an important 
element both in judging the adequacy of the compensation to 
victims, but also in assessing the effectiveness of the incentives 
for disaster risk reduction. It may also be clear that the longer the 
procedure takes, the more the ex ante incentives for disaster risk 
reduction might be diluted. Speed in the financial compensation 
is therefore of importance both in the adequacy of the financial 
compensation and the effectiveness of the incentives for disaster 
risk reduction. 
In the introduction, we equally made clear that we do not 
distinguish between the several heads of damages as it would 
make our study needlessly complex. We noticed, however, 
especially with terrorism, but also with some other catastrophes 
that there is a difference in the compensation mechanisms. Some 
pertain, for example, with property damage and material losses 
while other involve personal injury. There is some kind of a 
paradox there: from a policy perspective, personal injury plays 
stronger to the imagination and, therefore, compensation 
mechanisms will often provide generous compensation for 
personal injury at a relatively low threshold. The focus may not 
be directly on property damage, although arrangements to cover 
property damage have, as the overview showed, in many 
countries also been worked out (especially in the case of 
terrorism). The paradox is that, although the public attention and 
compensation mechanisms may often strongly focus on personal 
injury, the largest magnitude of losses is often related to property 
damage rather than personal injury. But the specific 
consequences of those differences also remain further undiscussed 
in this comparison. 
In order to go beyond a country comparison for the 
specific disasters, we will also try to provide a more general view 
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on how the specific countries are doing as far as providing 
financial compensation to victims of disasters is concerned in a 
more holistic manner. Jordan, Würzel, and Zito developed a 
methodology to judge the adequacy of the use of new instruments 
for environmental governance in a variety of countries. The 
authors qualify particular countries as “leaders, followers and 
laggards”.281 Although our field of research is obviously different 
from the field of Jordan, Würzel, and Zito, who focuse on new 
policy instruments in environmental governance, we believe that 
their methodology is interesting to provide an integrated 
perspective in order to assess the adequacy of the financial 
compensation of victims of disasters in specific countries (F). We 
equally examine whether it is possible to find explanations for 
some of the differences we observed (G), and we analyze to what 
extent the existing frameworks were able to deal with some of the 
recent disasters (H). Finally, we speculate on the extent to which 
important reforms may be expected in the domains that we 
examined (I). 
B. Natural Disasters 
In the introduction, it was mentioned that ex post ad hoc 
government compensation will not provide effective ex ante 
incentives for prevention. It was equally mentioned that 
insurance is better able to provide those ex ante incentives. 
Further, it was also commented that the supply of catastrophe 
cover could be stimulated through the government by acting as 
reinsurer of last resort. How are these three particular 
requirements followed in the four countries under discussion as 
far as the financial compensation for victims of natural disasters 
is concerned? 
Addressing the first aspect, whether the particular country 
provides ex post ad hoc compensation which would negatively 
affect incentives, the situation in Belgium is complex: there was a 
Disaster Fund, but this was structural rather than ad hoc. 
Moreover, this Disaster Fund does not provide full compensation 
as a result of which the negative effects on ex ante disaster risk 
                                                          
 281  NEW INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (Andrew 
Jordan, Rüdiger K.W. Würzel & Anthony R. Zito eds., 2003); Andrew Jordan, 
Rüdiger K.W. Würzel & Anthony R. Zito, The rise of “new” policy instruments 
in comparative perspective: has governance eclipsed government?, 53 POL. 
STUD. 477 (2005); RÜDIGER K.W. WÜRZEL, ANTHONY R. ZITO & ANDREW 
JORDAN, ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE, A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF NEW ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS (2013). 
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reduction were probably not that problematic. Since the statutes 
of 2003 and 2005, the role of the Disaster Fund has even been 
further reduced. Belgium has now moved to a system of 
mandatory insurance; the Disaster Fund only intervenes where 
the mandatory insurance does not apply and only in cases where 
the disaster has been recognized as such by the government. 
France does not,  in principle, have  ad hoc ex post compensation 
since coverage is provided via mandatory insurance. Germany 
provides generous ex post compensation from the public purse.282 
The WTS 1998 in the Netherlands is meant to provide structural 
ex post compensation for victims of disasters, largely in the same 
way as the Belgian Disaster Fund. But the WTS does not apply 
to natural disasters that can be considered “insurable”. It has 
been applied to cases of heavy rain. From this brief overview, the 
French system appears to have the best approach because  
mandatory insurance in France avoids the public purse. 
The second aspect of the comparison concerns whether 
there is comprehensive mandatory insurance cover for natural 
disasters.  Belgium followed the French model by introducing 
mandatory additional cover in addition to the voluntary 
concluded housing insurance.  Legislative interventions in 
Belgium led to mandatory insurance coverage for those natural 
disasters that fall within the scope of the statute. Germany tried 
to introduce a similar model in 2004, but the model was rejected 
for political reasons. There was a similar outcome in the 
Netherlands: notwithstanding many attempts and advices by a 
variety of commissions, there is as yet no mandatory coverage for 
natural disasters. The mere availability of voluntary insurance 
for natural disasters, more particularly flooding to which the 
Netherlands is heavily exposed, is still problematic. Again, 
France comes out best, quickly followed by Belgium which 
mirrored the French example. 
The third aspect of comparison relates to the government 
playing a role as reinsurer of last resort in order to stimulate the 
supply of catastrophe insurance. The comparison turns out 
largely in the same way as mandatory insurance: the Belgian 
(now: Regional) Disaster Fund(s) still intervenes for amounts of 
damage which are higher than the upper limit of the mandatory 
insurance cover. It looks similar to the French model, where the 
Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (“CCR”) provides unlimited 
reinsurance, de facto financed by the French State. There is a 
difference though between the two models: in Belgium for 
                                                          
 282  See supra Section IV. A. 
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amounts higher than the insurance limit the (structural) Disaster 
Fund intervenes. This intervention does not seem to be incentive-
based. In the French CCR-model the intervention of the State for 
amounts higher than the compensation provided by insurers is 
not directed to victims. Instead, such amounts are directed to the 
CCR and indirectly to the insurers. In that sense, it could be 
argued that the French model still stimulates the insurability of 
natural disasters by facilitating the supply of catastrophe cover. 
The intervention of the CCR, however, has also been criticized 
for basically providing reinsurance for free and therefore not 
being market-based either. Thus, it is doubtful whether there are 
major differences between the Belgian and French model of state 
intervention for amounts beyond the amounts provided by 
insurance cover. As there is no mandatory insurance mechanism 
for natural disasters in Germany or the Netherlands, those 
countries do not have a particular role for the government as 
reinsurer of last resort in this particular domain. Again, France 
seems to come out best, followed by Belgium. 
C. Technological Disasters 
The requirements for an adequate financial compensation 
of victims of technological disasters are rather different because 
there is a potential injurer who can be held to compensate the 
damage; thus, national legislation should try to provide effective 
incentives for disaster risk reduction to that particular operator. 
There are, however, particular aspects in the design of liability 
rules which are of importance in order to allow liability rules to 
fulfil their incentive effect. Given the fact that operators usually 
have better information than the judge on the optimal 
technologies to prevent technological disasters, and given the 
difficulties in proving a fault for potential victims, a strict liability 
rule would provide better incentives than a fault-based or 
negligence regime. Liability rules, however, can only function 
effectively if guarantees are provided that the injurer will also 
have money at stake to compensate the victims. Since 
technological disasters can easily cause damages of which the 
magnitude can be substantially higher than the injurer’s wealth, 
it is important to introduce guarantees against this insolvency 
risk. Finally, access to justice for potential victims may be 
problematic especially in cases involving a large number of 
victims. Procedural difficulties and long delays in deciding the 
tort case can be expected. That is not only problematic from the 
perspective of victim compensation (in cases where victims have 
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to wait many years for damage compensation), but also from the 
perspective of incentives (when tortfeasors only are forced to 
compensate many years after the incident they may have gone out 
of business, thus potentially diluting the incentive effect of 
liability rules). Therefore, it may be of importance to have 
systems in place allowing a rapid compensation of victims in the 
event technological disasters occur. 
Regarding strict liability, no substantial differences 
between the countries examined are detected. All systems have, to 
a lesser or larger extent, introduced strict liabilities for 
technological disasters. In some cases, this is based on an 
extensive interpretation of old tort law provisions in civil codes; 
in other cases special statutes have introduced strict liabilities. 
Some of those strict liabilities were the result of the 
implementation of international treaties, such as for marine oil 
pollution or nuclear accidents or even European Directives such 
as in the case of product liability and environmental liability. In 
the latter case, there is unsurprisingly a large convergence and 
not much difference between the systems.283 Many legal systems 
have, moreover, accompanied the introduction of strict liabilities 
with mandatory solvency guarantees. Although the limited scope 
of this study did not allow us to examine the full extent of 
solvency guarantees, there seem to be a few striking differences. 
Belgium and France seem to have a relatively large amount of 
activities for which solvency guarantees apply. In the 
Netherlands, there seems to be a larger reluctance against the 
introduction of mandatory solvency guarantees. The dramatic 
cases of Enschede and Volendam284 are typical in that respect: 
there was a serious insolvency problem precisely because the 
limited amount of voluntary insurance purchased by the 
operators was insufficient to cover the damage. It is therefore not 
surprising that the many reform committees that studied the 
financial compensation for victims of technological disasters all 
recommended to introduce or increase mandatory solvency 
guarantees. 
Some legal systems equally have specific procedures 
allowing rapid compensation to victims of technological disasters. 
One of the more recent statutory changes is probably the Belgian 
legislation of 2011 which provides possibilities for victims to 
                                                          
 283  See UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: STRICT LIABILITY (Bernhard A. Koch 
& Helmut Koziol eds., 2002) for a comparative account of strict liability in a 
variety of legal systems. 
 284  See supra Section V. B. 6. 
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obtain low threshold speedy compensation based on a pre-
payment by insurance companies.285 France has a rather peculiar 
Act of 2003, which introduced mandatory first party insurance 
for technological disasters to be financed by victims. From the 
perspective of providing effective incentives for prevention to 
operators it is remarkable that the French legislator chose for a 
mandatory first party construction in the case of technological 
disasters, rather than for mandatory solvency guarantees for 
operators. France, therefore, does not provide an example in line 
with the general starting points mentioned in the introduction. 
Germany and the Netherlands have specific procedures allowing 
victims to claim a limited amount of damages, but the procedures 
are rather general provisions in procedural law and not tailored 
towards victims of technological disasters like in the case of 
Belgium and France.286 
D. Nuclear 
When discussing nuclear accidents in Belgium, the general 
framework was discussed in a detailed manner.287 It was made 
clear that most of the international nuclear liability Conventions 
are based on a strict liability. In addition, the Conventions are 
characterized by a limited liability of the operator, mandatory 
financial security and financial compensation in addition to the 
liability of the operator, to be financed by the State and by all 
Contracting Parties. These features of the international nuclear 
liability regime have been critically reviewed in the economic 
literature. The strict liability and the mandatory solvency 
guarantees are obviously viewed as positive since they may lead 
to optimal incentives ex ante for disaster risk reduction. 
However, the limitation on liability is problematic since it may 
insufficiently expose operators to liability and could result in 
victims being undercompensated. Also, the fact that the State 
rather than the operator provides a substantial amount of 
compensation is problematic to the extent that this de facto leads 
to a subsidy for the nuclear industry. 
Although all countries have based their system on the 
same international Conventions there are important differences 
between the countries examined, as is also made clear in 
                                                          
 285  See supra Section II. B. 3. 
 286  As we mentioned in the introduction to this section, as we lack full 
information on specific procedures aiming at rapid compensation for victims, 
we are not able to provide a full assessment on this point. 
 287  See supra II. C. 1. 
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overviews provided by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the 
OECD.288 These differences could relate to: 1) the total amount of 
financial compensation available to victims; 2) the question 
whether the operator is sufficiently exposed to liability; and 3) 
whether it is the State rather than the operators who provide the 
compensation. The differences can be summarized in the 
following table: 
Table 3: Nuclear Operator’s Third Party Liability Amounts and 
Financial Security Limits 
Country Operator’s liability 
amount 
Funds available 
  Financial 
security 
limit to 
cover 
operator’s 
liability 
amount 
Public funds International 
funds 
(established 
under either the 
BSC or the CSC) 
Belgium EUR 1.2 billion EUR 1.2 
billion 
 SDR 125 million 
France EUR 700 million EUR 700 
million289 
After 
depletion of 
the operator’s 
liability 
amount up to 
SDR 175 
million 
SDR 125 million 
Germany Unlimited EUR 2.5 
billion 
EUR 2.5 
billion290 
SDR 125 million 
The 
Netherlands 
EUR 1.2 billion EUR 1.2 
billion 
After 
depletion of 
the operator’s 
liability 
amount up to 
EUR 2.3 
SDR 125 million 
                                                          
 288  See OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR OPERATORS’ 
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY AMOUNTS AND FINANCIAL SECURITY LIMITS (Apr. 
2018), http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/table-liability-coverage-limits.pdf. 
 289  This amount will only be applicable when the Protocol to the Paris 
Convention will enter into force. 
 290  The public funds come into play when the damages are not covered by 
private financial security or when claims cannot be paid out of such security. 
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Looking at Table 3, several of the questions mentioned 
above can be answered. First, addressing the question of the total 
funds available there appear some similarities and some 
differences. German law is the most generous of the countries 
examined because it has financial security available up to EUR 
2.5 billion (USD 2.8 billion). Belgium and the Netherlands are 
similar in that they have a financial security limit for the operator 
of EUR 1.2 billion (USD 1.4 billion) and in addition international 
funds up to SDR 125 million (EUR 153 million or USD 174 
million). Additionally, the Netherlands has public funds available 
up to EUR 2.3 billion (USD 2.6 billion); however, such funds are 
only available following the depletion of the operator’s liability. 
The country which has most nuclear power plants in Europe, 
France, is strikingly the least generous by only having a limit for 
the operator of EUR 700 million (USD 797 million), public funds 
of SDR 175 million (EUR 214 million or USD 244 million) and 
international funds of SDR 125 million. 
Ultimately, it is clear that even the “best” country does not 
have sufficient funds available to cover the costs of an average 
nuclear accident. Looking not only at estimates of the costs of 
nuclear accidents, but also at the real costs, more particularly of 
the Fukushima incident, it is clear that they amount more in the 
direction of USD 80 billion and higher. This clearly shows serious 
undercompensation of victims. 
A related consideration is obviously whether the operator 
is fully exposed to liability. Again, the situation is probably the 
worst in France where the operator, Electricité de France 
(“EDF”), is exposed to the lowest amount of EUR 700 million. 
Belgium and the Netherlands already do a lot better with an 
operator liability of EUR 1.2 billion and a financial security to be 
provided for the same amount. But the “best” is undoubtedly 
Germany, which has both the principal position of having 
unlimited operator liability and  financial security of up to EUR 
2.5 billion. 
The results are therefore the same when concerning the 
question of whether it is the operator or rather the State who 
takes financial responsibility. Germany comes out best as at least 
EUR 2.5 billion is financed by operators. France comes out worst 
as only EUR 700 million is financed by the operator. Belgium 
and the Netherlands are in between since EUR 1.2 billion is 
financed by the operator. The Netherlands is, however, 
problematic as after the depletion of the operator’s liability, 
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public funds are made available up to EUR 2.3 billion. Note that 
in comparison, Germany makes an amount available of EUR 2.5 
billion, but paid by the operators. 
E. Terrorism 
As far as terrorism is concerned, there are probably less 
differences between the countries as they all have installed multi-
layered systems, including an intervention by the State as 
reinsurer. Although all the countries in this study have pool 
constructions, however, there are substantial differences between 
the countries as far as the total amounts available are concerned 
and related to the financing. Belgium and the Netherlands both 
have pool constructions for a total of EUR 1 billion. The French 
system of GAREAT provides a total of EUR 2.52 billion. 
However, France does not have a limit. The highest layer consists 
of an “unlimited protection” provided by the CCR and backed up 
by a guarantee provided by the French State. Germany provides 
an amount of a total of EUR 10 billion. There are also substantial 
differences as to where the division between insurers/reinsurers 
and the State is concerned. Here, the Netherlands does 
remarkably well as only EUR 50 million out of the total EUR 1 
billion limit is paid by the State. Germany is at the other extreme 
where from the total of EUR 10 billion, EUR 7.5 billion is 
compensated by the State. In Belgium of the total of EUR 1 
billion, EUR 300 million is paid by the State, and in France the 
CCR again provides unlimited reinsurance in excess of the 
amount of EUR 2.52 billion. 
F. Leaders, Followers, and Laggards 
If one would do an attempt to summarize the previous 
comparison using the framework of Würzel, Zito and Jordan, this 
would provide the following picture: 
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Table 4: Leaders, Followers, and Laggards291 
Disaster compensation 
mechanism 
Leader Follower Laggard 
Natural 
disasters 
Ad hoc  France Belgium Netherlands, 
Germany  
First party 
insurance 
France Belgium Netherlands, 
Germany 
Government or 
market 
France Belgium Netherlands, 
Germany 
Nuclear  Amount Germany Belgium, 
Netherlands 
France 
Operator 
exposed 
Germany Belgium, 
Netherlands 
France 
Government 
subsidy 
Germany Belgium France, Netherlands 
Terrorism Amount France Germany Netherlands, Belgium 
Market or state Netherlands, 
Germany 
Belgium France 
Source: Adapted from Würzel, Zito and Jordan (2013) with updates. 
 
To be clear: when referring here to the leader, we usually 
took the country that is doing best as far as the financial 
mechanism is concerned in view of the economic principles. 
When referring to the laggard, we took the country that does 
worst. The followers were always in the middle, but not 
necessarily countries that followed examples from others. 
As far as the natural disasters are concerned, France 
comes out best on all accounts due to its mandatory first party 
insurance. There is in principle no ad hoc ex post government 
compensation and, therefore, also no government intervention. 
Because Belgium has followed the French model, it is also 
considered a follower on all accounts. The Netherlands and 
Germany are the same in the sense that they do not have 
mandatory first party insurance cover, but still largely rely on ex 
post ad hoc compensation and, thus, on government intervention. 
As far as the nuclear disasters are concerned, Germany 
comes out best on all accounts. In Germany, the total amounts of 
compensation are very high, and there is an exposure of the 
nuclear operators to unlimited liability and a mandatory 
                                                          
 291  We have not included technological disasters in this table as we had 
insufficient information to make a clear distinction between the countries in 
this respect. 
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provision of EUR 2.5 billion. The danger of state subsidy in 
Germany is therefore relatively reduced. Belgium and the 
Netherlands can be considered followers as far as the total 
amounts are concerned, which are comparable. However, the 
subsidy aspect in the Netherlands is more problematic than in 
Belgium as in the Netherlands still up to an amount of EUR 2.3 
billion public funds are made available after depletion of the 
operator’s liability of EUR 1.2 billion, which is not the case in 
Belgium. With respect to the nuclear risk, France does worst on 
all accounts. In France, there is only an exposure to liability of 
the operator of EUR 700 million (the lowest in all countries 
reviewed). Therefore, there is an insufficient exposure of the 
operator to liability. In addition, there is also compensation via 
public funds, which produces a subsidy effect. The total amount 
of financial compensation for the nuclear risk in France is also 
low. 
With respect to terrorism, France comes out best when 
examining total amounts because there is, in principle, an 
unlimited provision of funds via the CCR. Germany is next with 
a EUR 10 billion amount. The amounts are substantially less in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, both with EUR 1 billion. As a 
result, both  Belgium and the Netherlands qualified as laggards. 
However, when addressing whether it is the market or rather the 
State that provides the amount, the Netherlands comes out best. 
Of the total amount of EUR 1 billion, only EUR 50 million is 
provided by the State in the Netherlands; moreover, the Dutch 
State is charging a premium for this intervention. The state 
intervention in Belgium is relatively limited at an amount of 
EUR 300 million out of a total of EUR 1 billion. The state 
intervention in France is of course huge as it provides unlimited 
cover via the CCR. In Germany, a last layer of compensation in 
the amount of EUR 7.5 billion is provided by the State. 12.5% of 
the premiums collected by Extremus must be paid to the State for 
this guarantee. Therefore, it is positive that this layer provided by 
the State does not merely consist of a subsidy. 
The interesting aspect of this table is that there is in fact 
no country that comes out best on all accounts. France may come 
out high as far as the financial compensation for victims of 
natural disasters is concerned, and Germany may come out high 
for nuclear incidents. But France came out quite bad as far as the 
nuclear accidents are concerned, and Belgium usually ends up in 
the middle of the countries examined. It is striking, however, that 
in many cases the Netherlands ends up as a laggard, except for 
the fact that it provides a limited government subsidy for a 
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compensation of the terrorism risk for which it equally charges a 
premium. 
G. Explaining the Differences? 
The methodology we just applied allows for some 
indication of the leaders, followers, and laggards. Indeed, also the 
overview we provided, analysing the financial compensation of 
victims of disasters in the four countries showed remarkable 
differences. Of course, it would be interesting to go beyond the 
mere comparison and to ask the question of whether explanations 
can be provided for the different attitudes in the various 
countries. It is striking, not only that some countries (like France) 
are very rapid to introduce mandatory comprehensive insurance 
for natural disasters, whereas others (Germany and the 
Netherlands) are more reluctant to follow that path. But it is also 
striking that following particular disasters (such as Fukushima) 
some countries are very quick in reacting and, for example, 
adapting amounts of compensation for victims of nuclear 
accidents (like Germany) whereas others are much lower or do 
not react at all (France). One can only speculate about the sources 
for those differences. To some extent it may be related to the 
differences in compensation culture in the various countries we 
have examined. We already provided for that reason in the 
summary of each country some more general observations on 
how victimisation is viewed in the particular country and 
whether the country is for example rather relying on individual 
autonomy or on solidarity. We do not have the possibility to 
examine potential sources for those differences based on those 
varying legal cultures. However, some interesting indications in 
that respect have been provided in the literature. In an interesting 
study, Van Dam has used Hofstede’s framework for analysing 
cultural differences292 to explain the cultural differences between 
the tort law systems in Europe.293 Using Hofstede’s criteria to 
explain cultural differences, such as: power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, and masculinity 
versus femininity, Van Dam explains that the cultural differences 
between the countries. For example, in the United Kingdom 
individualism ranks higher than in France or Germany, where 
collectivism is more important. That explains, according to him, 
                                                          
 292  GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES (2nd ed., 2001). 
 293  Cees van Dam, European Tort Law and the Many Cultures of Europe, 
in PRIVATE LAW AND THE MANY CULTURES OF EUROPE 57 (Thomas 
Wilhelmsson, Elina Paunio & Annika Pohjolainen eds., 2007). 
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particular differences between the features of tort law in the three 
countries.294 It would undoubtedly be interesting to apply such an 
analysis based on cultural differences in order to analyze whether 
that could explain some of the differences in attitudes we have 
observed in this study. 
However, in particular cases, the differences observed 
might not be directly related to differing preferences or cultural 
differences. It is well-known that industrial pressure groups play 
an important role in shaping legislation in general,295 and in 
shaping tort law in particular.296 In other words, powerful interest 
groups, mostly those related to industry, may play an important 
role in the shaping of the legislation with respect to the financial 
compensation of victims of catastrophes. That may explain why 
in particular countries (for example, the Netherlands) there is 
opposition against a more wide-spread use of obligations for 
operators to show financial security. And politicians clearly have 
their own preferences as well. Recall that politicians can often 
gain from providing ex post compensation to victims of 
disasters.297 This is seen, for example in Germany, where 
politicians oppose the introduction of structural solutions like 
mandatory compulsory insurance. Structural solutions would 
remove their possibility to obtain political gains from awarding 
financial compensation ad hoc to specific victims. As the German 
case study showed,298 political resistance explained why a 
proposal to introduce mandatory insurance for natural disasters 
was not accepted in Germany. Some of the differences observed 
between the legal systems are therefore not only related to 
different compensation cultures, but also to the various lobbying 
efforts by interest groups and to the corresponding reactions by 
politicians. 
H. Recent Evolutions 
We started this article by referring to an earlier study from 
2006 that had reviewed compensation systems in the four 
                                                          
 294  Id. at 64-75. 
 295  See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT (1962). 
 296  See Michael G. Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, Liability for Nuclear 
Accidents in Belgium from an Interest Group Perspective, 10 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 241 (1990), for an example how nuclear liability legislation in Belgium 
has been shaped by private interests. 
 297  Depoorter, supra note 166. 
 298  See supra Section IV. A. 
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countries299 which we took as a basis for our case studies. 
However, we equally indicated that since that period a lot has 
happened: not only have further proposals for legislative changes 
taken place; the countries examined have also experienced many 
disasters. In fact, with the exception of nuclear accidents, all of 
the other disasters examined (natural, technological, and 
terrorism) have hit one or more of the countries examined. It is 
for that reason that we also examined to what extent the 
compensation mechanisms put in place were used to compensate 
the victims. In that respect, it is striking that the discussion of 
those recent disasters showed that in various ways (and in some 
countries more criticized than in others) financial compensation 
to the victims has been provided. In some cases that took place on 
the basis of existing legislation; in others, new legislation was 
created or ad hoc interventions took place in order to provide 
compensation. 
Belgium could apply its Terrorism Act of 1 April 2007 and 
the pool solution TRIP to the terrorist attack on the Brussels 
airport. France could apply the mandatory insurance for natural 
disasters, with reinsurance via the CCR, to cover the losses 
related to the 2016 flooding. France could also use the 
compensation mechanism for personal injury to compensate the 
victims of the terrorist attacks in both Paris and Nice. The same 
was true in Germany where government compensation was 
provided to deal with the personal injury from the victims of the 
2016 Berlin terrorist attack. As Germany has no structural 
solution, both the 2013 and the 2017 floodings were compensated 
on an ad hoc basis. That could therefore lead to the conclusion 
that all countries dealt in some way or another with the financial 
losses of the victims, also in those recent disasters. However, that 
should obviously not lead to the conclusion that the compensation 
in the countries examined would therefore be adequate. In many 
cases (especially in Germany) there was criticism on the speed 
and adequacy of the compensation. Moreover, as we made clear, 
providing adequate compensation to victims is only one criterion 
to judge a financial compensation system; the other question is to 
what extent the compensation mechanism also provides effective 
incentives for disaster risk reduction ex ante, to the extent that 
that is possible at all. In that respect, there are still remarkable 
differences between the countries, and politicians generally still 
seem to show a strong tendency to provide ad hoc compensation 
when there is a large public pressure, like in the case of terrorism. 
                                                          
 299  Faure & Hartlief, supra note 1. 
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I. Looking into the Future 
An interesting question is of course also to what extent this 
critical comparison of the countries provides any indication of 
how countries would deal with (perhaps also other) disasters in 
the future. Of course, observations in this domain are largely 
speculative, but based on what has happened in the past, a few 
speculations could be made: as far as natural disasters are 
concerned, it is unlikely that major changes will take place in 
France and Belgium for the simple reason that structural 
solutions have been put in place and are generally considered as 
satisfactory. Germany attempted to introduce compulsory 
disaster insurance, but the attempt failed. It is not very likely that 
a similar attempt will be undertaken again in the near future. In 
the Netherlands, the financial compensation for victims of 
natural disasters has led to many debates between the 
stakeholders, policy documents and reports, but not yet to any 
concrete legislative proposal for reform. However, it is likely that, 
inter alia as a result of climate change, the Netherlands will be 
more vulnerable to particular natural disasters, especially those 
related to water such as seawater levels rising, heavy rainfall, and 
flooding. It is not unlikely that when another of those would 
(again) hit the Netherlands in the future, the question of 
insurance to cover those risks would rise again. The question of 
introducing a similar structural solution as Belgium and France 
would also see the light again. 
As far as technological disasters are concerned, it is not 
likely that large changes will occur in the short run in Belgium 
and France. In the Netherlands, it is likely that the debate will be 
reopened on the currently large lack of compulsory financial 
securities for operators of hazardous activities. There may be 
strong political opposition against increased duties in that respect, 
but the current externalisation of harm to society by operators 
will most likely no longer be felt as acceptable, more particularly 
when another large technological disaster would occur. 
The area where the influence of the major interest groups, 
more particularly licensees of nuclear power plants and generally 
electricity producers, has been large is undoubtedly related to the 
liability for nuclear accidents. Not only has the nuclear lobby 
been able to create very favourable conventions with low limits 
on liability; even after Chernobyl it took more than 10 years to 
adapt the international Conventions and more than 30 years after 
Chernobyl, most of those adapted Conventions and Protocols 
have not even entered into force yet. The international arena, 
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more particularly the Nuclear Energy Agency from the OECD, 
does not even have serious proposals on the table to reform the 
international Conventions towards a real internalisation of the 
externalities caused by the nuclear risk, even post Fukushima. 
Given the apparent complete capturing of the NEA by the 
nuclear lobby it is not to be expected that at the international 
arena much will change in the near future. That may, however, 
be different at the national level. Even before Fukushima, 
Germany showed to be quite progressive with higher amounts of 
compensation (compared to the nuclear Conventions) and with 
the reduction of the state subsidies. Interestingly this led to the 
creation of a risk-sharing agreement between the nuclear power 
plant operators in Germany. Not surprisingly the country in 
Europe that is lagging behind in this respect is exactly the one 
where 50% of all Europe’s nuclear plants are located, France. It 
shows the lowest liability for the nuclear operator and a large 
amount of state intervention.300 In general one can, however, 
expect that Member States at the national level would follow the 
German example. Following the German example implies that, as 
a result of public pressure and green lobbyism, some countries 
may decide to deviate from the international regime which is 
largely favourable to the nuclear industry. Deviating countries 
may for example decide to increase limits on liability or even, 
following the German example, transition to unlimited liability. 
Terrorism is one domain that likely will not experience 
much change in the near future. The simple reason is that post 
9/11 all four legal systems already put in place terrorism pools to 
deal with terrorism-related property damage. As far as personal 
injury is concerned, most of the countries examined already had 
compensation funds in place for victims of violent acts which 
could also benefit victims of terrorism. The recent attacks in 
France, Germany, and Belgium have moreover shown that the 
systems that were put in place were able to provide adequate 
compensation to victims. For that reason, it is not very likely that 
large changes could be expected in the near future in that 
domain. 
VII. FINAL THOUGHTS 
We started this article by examining whether, from a 
Dutch perspective, there are possibilities to improve the current 
                                                          
 300  Although there is de facto not that much difference, as the nuclear 
operator (Electricité de France) is state-owned as well. 
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system for a financial compensation for victims of disasters. Our 
examination inquired as to whether higher amounts of 
compensation can be provided and whether the system can be 
structured in such a manner that also effective incentives for 
disaster risk reduction are provided. 
An interesting lesson from the critical comparison 
provided in the previous section is that countries can benefit from 
mutual learning. There are indeed substantial differences. 
Differences relate not only to varying approaches between the 
countries, but also between the different domains (technological, 
natural, nuclear and terrorism). It was also striking to see that 
there is no country that is, in the view of the economic starting 
points, doing perfect on all accounts. As just mentioned, France 
may be doing well as far as the financial compensation for 
victims of natural disasters is concerned, but certainly not in the 
area of the nuclear risk. However, it was also striking that for 
many domains the Netherlands seems to be running behind the 
neighbouring countries. That therefore provides an important 
scope for improvement and learning for the Netherlands. In fact, 
as we have also clearly indicated when discussing the Dutch 
case,301 there have already been many studies that came to a large 
extent to the same conclusions as this report with respect to the 
necessary reforms of the system in the Netherlands. They can 
easily be summarized as follows: as far as the natural disasters 
are concerned, there is a strong case to be made in the 
Netherlands to follow the French/Belgian example and therefore 
to introduce comprehensive mandatory insurance for particular 
natural disasters, specifically for flooding. As far as technological 
disasters are concerned, the dramatic cases of Volendam and 
Enschede clearly showed that the Netherlands should make 
much more use of mandatory solvency guarantees. That was 
already the recommendation in previous reports, including 
reports from the WRR, and is equally the conclusion from this 
study. 
The reason why efficient solutions are not introduced is 
often related to politics and more particularly effective lobbying 
by interest groups or lacking political rewards. Depoorter (2006) 
showed convincingly that politicians receive too little reward for 
investments in ex ante prevention and can largely benefit from ex 
post compensation. That is why there will often be systematic 
underinvestment in ex ante disaster risk reduction and 
overcompensation ex post. That this is not only a theoretical issue 
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was well demonstrated when reviewing the attempt to introduce 
comprehensive mandatory insurance for natural disasters in 
Germany: politicians did not want to lose the power to receive 
political rewards by providing ex post compensation and did not 
want to expose households to the payment of premiums in a time 
of financial crisis.302 Notwithstanding these political difficulties, 
which have undoubtedly played an important role in the 
Netherlands as well, it still remains important to point at the 
dangers and weaknesses of the current system: not only will 
insufficient compensation be available when yet another flooding 
or Enschede/Volendam-type of technological disaster occurs; it 
equally leads to systematic underinvestments in ex ante disaster 
risk reduction. 
One problem when facing catastrophes is that some may 
argue that when a disaster happens, the damage will be so huge 
that it is not possible to provide any type of ex ante compensation 
mechanism that would reasonably be able to deal with such 
catastrophe. Ultimately it will be the government (and therefore 
the tax payer) that has to pay. That (wrong) argument is then 
often used to justify any lack of action with respect to a structural 
solution for the financial compensation of victims of disasters. 
The argument is wrong for the obvious reason that disasters 
come in varying degrees. Not all disasters are of such a 
magnitude that it would be impossible to provide compensation 
via market solutions like insurance. Moreover, even when the 
real amount of a catastrophe is higher than insurable amounts, a 
partially structural solution to compensate for example EUR 10-
20 billion would still have the benefit of reducing the amount for 
which additional financing would have to be sought. The most 
important point is that ignoring catastrophes because of this 
fatalistic perspective (there is nothing we can do anyway) also 
reduces disaster preparedness and effective investments in 
disaster risk reduction. It remains therefore important to work 
out a structural solution even when one has to realize that that 
solution may adequately deal with some but not necessarily with 
the most dramatic disasters. The experience with the 
French/Belgian model for dealing with natural disasters shows 
that it is possible to work out a structural solution (using market 
insurance and an intervention by the State as reinsurer of last 
resort) that is able to deal with most if not all natural disasters. 
Of course, an important limit of our study consists of the 
fact that we addressed only four types of disasters (natural, 
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technological, nuclear and terrorism). We did not pay attention to 
specific types of technological disasters that could potentially lead 
to catastrophic losses. One could think of a major failure of 
energy systems, related to or independent from cyber attacks or, 
more generally, the huge economic losses and societal disruptions 
that could follow from cyber attacks. As we already made clear in 
the introduction, cyber attacks show particular idiosyncrasies 
which make them different from any of the catastrophes we have 
discussed so far. Moreover, as we also made clear, not every cyber 
attack is necessarily a disaster although it may be regarded as 
such in a financial sense. Some of the mechanisms that were put 
in place to deal with the disasters that we have discussed in this 
report (like insurance) are also available to deal with cyber 
attacks.303 Moreover, some alternatives (like the risk-sharing 
agreements used in the nuclear sector in Germany) have recently 
also been proposed as a potential remedy for cyber security 
related risks.304 A major difference, however, between the 
disasters that were studied in this report and cyber attacks is that 
(so far) the losses resulting from cyber attacks have not yet been 
catastrophic (which does not mean that it could potentially not be 
the case). Differently than with the disasters studied in this 
report, the question also arises whether a cyber attack necessarily 
leads to a demand for financial compensation. An element which 
makes the cyber risk different is that there is especially a demand 
for information sharing, for risk reduction and for damage 
mitigation. Those often require also a collaboration, but not 
necessarily the type of financial compensation for the types of 
disasters we have studied in this report. Cyber security risks 
should therefore undoubtedly be subject to further research in 
another study. 
Even though we limited this article to study the four 
specific types of disasters, the principles and solutions worked out 
in this article could be of relevance to other catastrophic lessons 
as well. The major lesson from this and many other studies 
devoted to this topic is always clear: working out ex ante a 
structural solution to deal with the financial compensation after a 
disaster has occurred is always better (in view of both prevention 
and compensation) than an ad hoc ex post solution. The old 
saying remains true: prevention is always better than cure. 
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